The main types of military strategic decisions. Russia's military strategy: an introduction

The national security of the modern Russian state is now based on a more complex than before complex of multifaceted political, diplomatic, economic, technological, ideological, military and other measures. In different periods of Russian history, military means either came to the fore, or were relegated to second place, or acted as the last, decisive means of protecting the statehood of Russia.

The national security of the modern Russian state is now based on a more complex than before complex of multifaceted political, diplomatic, economic, technological, ideological, military and other measures. Of decisive importance among them were and are means of a predominantly political nature, aimed at creating a favorable external and internal situation for the country, eliminating existing and potential military threats, their localization, strengthening international position state, ensuring stable geopolitical positions, reliable protection of its interests from outside encroachments and resolving emerging contradictions by peaceful means. However, these measures can be effective only if they are organically combined with military defensive actions, active deterrence of a potential aggressor, blocking his attempts to exert political and economic pressure, and even more so by force of arms to achieve political goals.

In different periods of Russian history, military means either came to the fore, or were relegated to second place, or acted as the last, decisive means of protecting the statehood of Russia. Sometimes they actively served the implementation of imperial Russian policy, but most often they ensured the protection of the state from aggression, its defense, freedom and independence from outside encroachments. In any case, the more irreconcilable and active Russia's foreign expansionist policy became, the greater the role played by military force. On the contrary than more Russia was interested in maintaining international stability, the less important in its foreign policy was the direct use of the armed forces.

One way or another, the whole history of Russia, as, indeed, of most other states, is organically linked with its repeated participation in defensive or offensive wars, armed clashes and conflicts. Periods of peaceful development both in the distant past and in our time have been interrupted more than once by years of war hard times. Since ancient times, Russia had to repel numerous enemy invasions, when its fate hung in the balance. At the same time, she repeatedly acted as a defender of other friendly peoples and countries, helping them to defend their freedom and independence. At the same time, she Russian empire in many cases, she undertook major conquest campaigns, strengthening her position in the world and expanding state borders. The growth of the Russian state was carried out not only as a result of the voluntary accession to it of neighboring countries, seeking protection from enemies in it, but also by conquering other nationalities and states by force of arms.

In any case, the military aspects of ensuring Russia's national security were based on the solution, in one combination or another, of a complex set of military-political, strategic, economic, diplomatic, scientific and technical tasks. Of particular importance here was the development of a rational military policy that strictly corresponded to the specific situation and the political goals arising from it that faced the army and the country, and its real economic and military capabilities. In accordance with this policy, the military organization of the state was created, a military doctrine was formed, and a national military strategy was determined and carried out.

Of course, in past eras and in our time, all these structural elements military security mechanisms had different meanings, as a rule, they differed in their content and nature. However, some general principles did not cease to operate, due to historical traditions, national traits of the people, as well as the peculiarities of the geographical and geopolitical position of the Russian state, which, having a certain stability, one way or another manifested themselves at all stages of its development. To a large extent, they retain their power even now.

If we talk specifically about Russia's military strategy, then such special enduring features could include: national identity, reliance mainly on its own national forces; continentality; peripheral orientation; sequential neutralization of threats from the west, east and south; proportional development of forces with a priority rate on ground forces; resoluteness of actions, flexible combination of offensive and defense, positional and maneuver forms of struggle.

This work is dedicated to the disclosure of these common features and the characteristic specifics of the Russian military strategy, the complex chain of its evolutionary development and sharp revolutionary leaps, especially in recent decades. Its main goal is to reveal the historical roots and origins of the national military strategy, the stages of its formation and improvement; explore the features of Russia's military strategy in the pre-revolutionary era and in the Soviet period; to establish the pattern of its formation at the present stage, in the conditions of the reorganization of the "Russian state. At the same time, the main attention was supposed to be paid primarily to the theory and practice of military strategy in recent years, to an analysis of the changed conditions and new approaches to the development of Russia's military strategy for the near future.

Naturally, Russia's military strategy cannot be considered in isolation from the general process of the development of military art in the world. Its basic principles, categories, provisions, attitudes and requirements are closely related to the achievements of the military strategy of other states. The Russian military strategy, taking into account everything useful, used them to achieve its goals, or developed a line of counteraction to the strategic efforts of enemies, opposing their strategic efforts and actions with its own strategic plans and methods of action. In this dialectical interweaving, Russia's military strategy, constantly enriching itself, at the same time had an inverse effect on the strategies of other countries. Therefore, it is impossible to understand its essence and content without parallel consideration common ground military strategy. As is well known, military strategy, being integral part military art, its highest field, covers the theory and practice of preparing the wounded and armed forces for war, the planning and conduct of war and large-scale strategic operations.

The theory of military strategy as a system of scientific knowledge studies the patterns, nature of war and methods of its conduct, develops theoretical basis the use of the military forces of the state to achieve political goals, planning, preparing, waging war and strategic actions of all kinds. How area practical activities military strategy is engaged in resolving issues related to the definition in specific conditions of the strategic tasks of the armed forces and the forces and means necessary for their implementation, the development and implementation of measures to prepare the armed forces, theaters of military operations, the economy and the population of the country for war; planning of war and strategic operations; the organization of the deployment of the armed forces and their leadership in the conduct of operations on a strategic scale, as well as the study of the corresponding capabilities of a potential adversary.

Strategy as a field of practical art, military leadership activity of military leaders (highest level) has been known since ancient times. Strategy theory as an integral part military science formed much later as a result of generalization of the accumulated military-historical experience, systematization and development of knowledge about the war. Her role is growing rapidly. Now it is acquiring decisive importance not only in terms of a correct understanding of the increasingly complex military phenomena, but also in the implementation of the ever-expanding possibilities of military art in the light of the extremely high demands placed on it.

There are two levels of military strategy: the strategy of waging war as a whole and the strategy of waging large-scale operations. They are united general principles, but differ in scope, the nature of the issues under consideration, the content of the tasks and approaches to their consideration.

The strategy of warfare is connected with the development of its general problems, the immediate, subsequent and further political and strategic goals, the sequence and order of their achievement, the forms and methods of preparing and conducting armed struggle, the definition and implementation of political, diplomatic, economic and proper strategic plans for war, individual military campaigns, the creation of the necessary material base for this and its use, the organization of the deployment of forces, the conduct of economic and military mobilization. At this level, the general character of actions in war, political and military maneuvering of forces, and ways of successfully ending the war are worked out. This area is of decisive importance for evaluating long-term forecasts and determining the prospects for war.

The strategy of conducting operations deals with the components of war, determines the systems of operations of the state's armed forces in the conduct of various wars, the goals, forms and methods of strategic actions. At this level, the development of plans for operations and strategic actions, the procedure for coordinating efforts various kinds armed forces, the procedure for the preparation of theaters of military operations and the organization of command and control of the armed forces are established.

Of course, one cannot ignore the conventions of such a division, but the more complex the war becomes, the more acute the need for such a conditional division becomes.

Both in the past and even more so at the present time, military strategy occupies a leading, dominant place in the art of war. It dictates the starting requirements for operational art and tactics, sets tasks for them, defines common goals, the achievement of which they must be subordinated to. Battles and operations that do not correspond to the conditions of the strategy, in the final analysis, may not only be useless, but also cause defeat. At the same time, as before, tactics and operational art provide the source material for strategy, and it is through them that strategy basically realizes its potentialities. Of course, the traditional history of Russian military strategy, the interdependence between strategy, operational art and tactics, in which tactical successes are summed up into operational success, and the sum of operational successes gives the final strategic result, becomes not so simple. Military strategy now has powerful means at its disposal, enabling it to directly achieve its goals. In turn, the results of operational actions can sometimes be very significant, and reach a strategic level.

An analysis of world and local wars, as well as military conflicts, shows that one of the effective forms of armed struggle was partisan actions. They were distinguished by high efficiency, especially when the goals, tasks and interests of the state progressive forces that used partisan forms of struggle and the regular army completely coincided with the interests and tasks of the majority of the country's population, as was the case, for example, in the Patriotic Wars of 1812 and 1941 - 1945 gg.

The relationship between military strategy and politics, diplomacy, economics, and ideology is becoming much more complicated. Military strategy, as at all times, is entirely subordinate to politics, determined by it and serving it. In any case, politics today, to an even greater extent than ever before, has a decisive influence on military strategy, determines its goals, tasks, nature and general direction. It prepares the war, forms the material base and creates a favorable environment for its conduct, mobilizes all the forces and resources of the state for the conduct of the war. Based on the requirements of the policy, the methods of strategic actions of the armed forces, the main and secondary theaters of war, the main objects of the application of military efforts, allies and opponents are chosen. As evidenced by the new and recent history, a short-sighted policy pushes the strategy to adventure. Its mistakes and miscalculations have a decisive effect on the course of hostilities. On the other hand, military strategy has a powerful feedback effect on politics. In any case, during a war, and sometimes even before a war, politics is often forced to reckon with considerations of military strategy, to limit or revise its goals and methods for achieving them. Moreover, there are cases when the military factor becomes decisive for some time.

Unfortunately, the prevailing opinion that politicians should deal with politics and the military should deal with defense issues is extremely erroneous. Politics in its pure form does not exist. It is viable and effective only when it takes into account economic, socio-political, ideological and defense aspects in the aggregate. If one of these components is underestimated, the policy becomes flawed. Therefore, politicians and the military need to work hand in hand. Figuratively speaking, the prelude of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people and its dynamics should become a textbook not only for politicians, but also for those government officials on whom the country's military security depends. On June 22, 1941, the army, as a result of the inconsistency of their actions, was placed in an unnatural position: in the conditions of the aggression that had begun, it was forbidden to cross the border when launching counterattacks. Many commanders cautiously gave the order to open fire on the enemy. As a rule, the efforts of military strategy and diplomacy are coordinated with politics. At the same time, on the eve and during the war, diplomacy is usually subordinated to the interests of military strategy, is actively used in order to push the process of political isolation of hostile states, to win over possible more allies, to achieve a favorable orientation of neutral countries, to strengthen the political positions of their own state and friendly alliances, to upset the enemy coalition. On the whole, it is called upon to help create a situation that would make it possible to avoid military clashes at an undesirable moment and the formation of an unfavorable international situation. In some cases, it can also act as one of the means of strategic disinformation in the interests of solving certain military tasks.

But the main thing is that over time, the direct and indirect dependence of military strategy on the economy is constantly increasing. Economic conditions have a multifaceted and versatile influence on the strategy. They are usually the root cause of the outbreak of wars, determine its nature and strength, means and methods of waging. Ultimately, the course and outcome of a war, the shape of the armed forces, and their potential depend on the economic factor and the material resources of the state. This determines the direction of military strategy and its planning.

At the same time, the military strategy has a reverse effect on the economy, the country's leadership, when making all economic decisions, one way or another has to reckon with the requirements of a possible war. Based on strategic considerations, the location of industry is determined, production and science are developing in a targeted manner, new technologies are being developed and introduced, and stocks of material resources are being created. With the outbreak of war, the economy is completely reorganized on a war footing: industry is mobilized, Agriculture, transport and communications, the structure of production is changing, labor and material resources are being redistributed, financial system countries. All this becomes a priority successful implementation principles of strategy not only in large-scale, but also in local wars.

A close organic relationship exists between military strategy and ideology. It manifests itself in various aspects: in the order of the influence of ideology on the nature of the strategy, the use by the strategy of the means and methods of ideological struggle to strengthen its armed forces and the forces of the people, the psychological weakening of the enemy, the consideration of the moral factor in strategic decisions and actions. And here, too, there are both direct and feedback relationships, since effective strategy actively contributes to the growth of the moral and spiritual forces of the army and the people, the strengthening of certain ideological principles. Finally, the interrelation of military strategy with the military doctrine of the state must also be taken into account. A rational strategy usually proceeds from the requirements of military doctrine and is guided by them in solving practical problems. At the same time, to one degree or another, it is based on the data of military science, as well as on the conclusions and solutions of military problems of other social, natural and technical sciences.

Military strategy began to take shape with the advent of the army and the emergence of wars. Its formation is associated with the formation of slave-owning states. In the wars of this period, especially Ancient Egypt, the Greco-Persian wars (V-IV centuries BC), the Punic wars (III-II centuries BC), the Gallic campaigns of Julius Caesar and many others, originated and began to exert a significant influence on the course and outcome of hostilities such principles, methods and forms of the strategic use of armed forces as surprise, concentration of efforts on decisive directions against the main enemy, maneuvering, siege of fortresses, naval blockades, etc.

The development of military strategy as an art was greatly influenced by the practical military activities of the great generals of antiquity: Epaminondas, who first applied the principle of uneven distribution of troops along the front in order to concentrate forces for the main attack on a decisive sector, Alexander the Great, who organized and conducted military operations on the basis of a far-sighted, a deeply thought-out war plan, careful coordination of the efforts of the army and navy, sought to completely crush the enemy, consolidate the occupied territories in political and military relations, turned the cavalry into the main striking and maneuvering force of the troops. The strategic creativity of the Carthaginian commander Hannibal, who attached decisive importance to the correct assessment of the military-political situation, the organization of reconnaissance and the clear interaction of infantry with cavalry, was distinguished by special features. Significant Contribution in the strategy of that time was introduced by Julius Caesar, who, like Alexander the Great, showed special concern for the development of war plans, the coordinated application various means and forms of struggle, dismemberment of the enemy and defeating him piece by piece.

The first attempts to bring the accumulated knowledge in the field of strategy into a system were made by the generals and historians of Ancient China - Confucius, Sun Tzu, Wu Tzu. They summarized and formulated some general rules waging war, which have not lost their significance even now. Later, the so-called "Behistun inscription" appears, containing generalized information about the campaigns of the Persian king Darius in Central Asia. The "History" of Herodotus was devoted to a versatile study of the Greco-Persian wars, and the "History" of Thucydides was devoted to the wars of Ancient Greece. Important positions on military strategy were revealed in the works of the prominent ancient Greek thinker Xenophon (“Anabasis”, “On the art of equestrianism”), in the works of Julius Caesar (“Notes on the Gallic War”, “Notes on the Civil War”). At first new era the first generalized military-theoretical works appeared. Significant of them: "Instruction to military leaders" Onisander (at the end of the 4th - beginning of the 5th centuries AD), "On military affairs" by Vegetius (390-410), etc. Specified works dealt mainly with issues of tactics and training of troops, but also contained some fundamental guidelines for the conduct of the war as a whole.

With all its diversity, the military strategy of the states of the slave-owning era was subordinate to their political goals, was based on the slave-owning economy with the ensuing low level of development. military equipment. The most important turning point at that time was the improvement of edged weapons, the creation of heavy protective weapons and siege funds.

Already at an early stage, the basic elements of strategic planning and leadership of the armed struggle took shape. Specific approaches to the choice of the moment of the beginning of the war, the objects of the main attack, the place and time of battles were determined. Subsequently, as the scale of the armed struggle increased, the duration of military campaigns increased (from several weeks to several years and even decades), and the groupings of the fighting sides became more powerful. Accordingly, the military strategy became more complicated. The principles of waging war against several opponents at the same time, in different theaters of military operations, were developed, and the procedure for creating strong bases for the deployment of military operations was determined.

The transition to a new socio-economic formation - feudalism - also meant a transition to a new stage in the development of strategy. In the period of early feudalism (5th-11th centuries), due to the state fragmentation of Western Europe, the strategy of conducting numerous wars between small feudal states with limited goals, the use of knightly, mercenary and militia armies, acquired the greatest importance. At the same time, the strategy of wars was being improved in the East, with the use of significant military masses for broad conquests. Great importance At this time, the achievement of the goals set by inflicting sudden swift strikes, a combination of defense and offensive, and the assault on fortresses were acquired. Significant changes in military strategy took place in the 16th-17th centuries. in connection with the formation of centralized states. A particularly steep revolutionary leap in strategy occurred in connection with the creation and widespread use of firearms, which not only decisively influenced the conduct of the war, but also the entire system of military-political relations between states. In the military strategy of most Western European countries, the highest achievement of the strategy at that time was considered the capture of enemy territory without decisive battles, the ability to force his army to retreat. In order to counter the maneuver of enemy troops and defend their territory, powerful fortresses were erected. The troops were evenly distributed (along the fortresses and strongholds), covering as far as possible all directions. This strategy is called the cordon strategy. The English military theorist G. Lloyd (1720-1780), who was called the "father of the science of strategy", believed that its main content should be access to the enemy's communications, and the immediate task was to threaten his material base (shops). A follower of Lloyd, the Prussian military theorist A. Bulow (1757-1807) reduced the whole strategy to the science of troop movements and maneuver, and considered achieving victory by "starving out" the enemy as the main method of strategic actions. However, in many other states, especially in the east and south of the Euro-Asian continent, including Russia, these principles have not found recognition and practical application. As before, their strategic aims were based on resolute and bold actions, activity, skillful concentration of the main efforts on decisive directions, and a stubborn struggle for the strategic initiative.

In the XVIII - early XIX centuries. With the establishment of capitalist relations, the creation of mass armies, the growth of productive forces, the development of science and technology, the improvement of firearms, the strategy of "crushing" the enemy replaced the cordon strategy. It was characterized by a consistent weakening of the enemy with his decisive defeat in a pitched battle.

Generalization of the experience of wars in the late 18th - early 19th centuries. contributed to the further formalization of military strategy into a system of knowledge. Numerous military-theoretical works appeared, including the works of prominent military theorists of the West - A. Jomini, K. Clausewitz, in Russia - N. V. Medem and P. A. Yakovlev. Clausewitz in his work "On War" brought out the position on the connection between war and politics. Using the dialectical method of F. Hegel, he developed a position on the relationship between defense and offensive and formulated some strategic principles waging war. Having based his research on the experience of the Napoleonic wars, Clausewitz saw the tasks of strategy in organizing a general battle, for which he recommended concentrating all forces and means.

The theory of military strategy received significant development in the second half of the 19th century. Construction railways, the invention of fundamentally new means - telephone and telegraph, the replacement of the sailing fleet with steam, the introduction of rapid-fire rifled weapons expanded the possibilities of strategy, increased the scope of operations. All this was reflected in military practice and received appropriate coverage in a number of scientific works. X. Moltke the Elder, in particular, continuing to adhere to the strategy of a general battle, attached paramount importance to the widespread use of railways to concentrate large masses of troops. The Russian theorist G. A. Leer in his writings continued the study of the special nature of the relationship between military strategy and politics. He has the prerogative in defining a strategic operation as part of a campaign or war.

With the entry of capitalism into the stage of imperialism, new significant changes took place in the nature and content of war and military strategy. The decisive influence on this was the policy of the largest world powers, aimed at redistributing the already divided world, and participation in wars of the broad masses of the people.

Creation large factories And industrial complexes, new industries (engine building, automotive, chemical, etc.), the growth of mechanical transport, the mechanization of the main production processes made it possible to equip the armed forces in large quantities with a diverse military equipment, including automatic weapons, increased the role of the economic factor in the war. All this led to an increase in the scope and intensity of strategic actions, their further division in space and time, and complicated the command and control of troops and the provision of their actions.

New features of the military strategy of the era of imperialism appeared for the first time in the Spanish-American (1898) and Anglo-Boer (1899-1902) wars. Elements of the army, and in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) and front-line operations, began to emerge in them. Comprehension and generalization of new phenomena in the development of military affairs of this period are reflected in the works of A. Schlieffen (Germany), F. Foch (France), F. Colomb (England), A. Makhzna (USA), Russian military theorist N.P. Mikhnevich.

most brightly character traits the military strategies of the leading states manifested themselves in the first and second world wars. Strategic concepts based on the possibility of achieving victory in a short maneuver war turned out to be untenable. By the end of the first year of the First World War, the coalitions of both sides were forced to switch to conducting strategic defense on continuous positional fronts of great length. This was primarily due to the incomplete consideration by the belligerent states of the new economic opportunities of the coalition and the sharply increased combat power of the armed forces in connection with equipping them with new means of combat, including tanks and aircraft.

All the belligerents were characterized by a centralized unification of the military and political leadership, the presence of higher political and strategic bodies for commanding the armed struggle. Problems of coalition strategy have taken on an important role: the development of unified plans of action, the creation of a unified command, and the organization of strategic interaction.

During this period there was new form waging war - a long struggle on continuous positional fronts with the need to conduct a number of large-scale operations carried out simultaneously or sequentially on various fronts and theaters of military operations. The strategic defense of the rear received considerable development. Basically, the problem of a tactical breakthrough was solved. But critical issues the preparation and conduct of offensive operations at great depth failed to be implemented.

The military strategy of pre-revolutionary Russia developed along the same main lines, and yet in a new, special way. At least two fundamental circumstances distinguish its historical path. First, Russia avoided the slave-owning phase of the development of society, and, consequently, the corresponding system of military-strategic views. Second, Russia has gone through a series of periods of centralization and disintegration, decline and revival, national isolation and active external pressure, local and imperial politics. This predetermined the repeated change of its military strategy, its especially complex and multifaceted nature.

In World War II, the decisive influence on military strategy was the further development of productive forces, the deployment on this basis by the leading states of the world of multimillion-strong armies, the emergence of new types of troops using large masses of tanks, aviation, artillery, airborne assault forces, air defense systems, aircraft carriers in military operations. and other forces. Of decisive importance, however, was the sharply changed alignment of military and political forces: the participation in the war of the Soviet Union with an authoritarian regime of a socialist orientation and Germany with a totalitarian fascist regime of an openly racist, aggressive nature. The clash of these forces gave the war, and at the same time the strategy of all the warring countries and coalitions, an unprecedented decisive and uncompromising character. At the same time, each of the warring countries adhered to its own strategy. The strategy of fascist Germany and Japan was based on the adventurist theory of blitzkrieg, which provided for a surprise attack without declaring war and defeating the enemy in one short-term campaign. This strategy, however, very soon suffered a complete collapse, in connection with which both Germany and Japan during the war were forced to abandon their initial strategic orientations, switch to a strategy of phased actions, and then drag out the war, which, however, with the same eventually failed miserably.

During the war, the strategy of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain also changed dramatically, but it evolved in a diametrically opposite direction. The strategy of all countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, especially the strategy of the USSR, acquired an ever more decisive, active, offensive character, which was one of the most important reasons for their world-historic victory in World War II.

With the end of this war, the military strategy of all the victorious states developed for some time taking into account the experience gained, the alignment of military-political forces in the world and further development traditional means of armed struggle with full mechanization and motorization of armies. In the following years, however, the strategy experienced at least five major revolutionary shifts. In the late 40s and early 50s, they were associated with the creation of nuclear weapons, in the 60s - with the mass equipping of the armed forces with missiles of various types and purposes, in the 70s - with the establishment of the so-called strategic balance between the USSR, USA, ATS and NATO, in the 80s - with the advent of high-precision conventional weapons, and finally, in the early 90s - in connection with a sharp turn in the military-political situation, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of the USSR, the dismemberment of the unified Soviet armed forces, reorientation of the policy of the Eastern European countries and the formation of a number of new independent states, including Russian Federation as successors to the USSR. At the same time, all military-strategic views, fundamental doctrinal principles, views on the means, forms and methods of warfare were subjected to a complete breakdown each time.

The last period continues to this day. It is associated with a radical revision of the policy of most states, their military doctrines, all strategic concepts, but not for military-technical, but for geopolitical reasons.

At the latest stage of its history, Russia has seventy years of experience of Soviet power within the USSR, in military matters it relies on the Soviet military doctrine and its corresponding military strategy, on the basis of which the USSR waged the civil and Great Patriotic Wars, participated in many local wars and conflicts.

The period of Soviet power is often seen as a break in the history of Russian military strategy. Actually it is not. In fact, it was a special stage of its development. In fact, the Soviet military strategy was a continuation of the Russian military strategy, only it was based on a fundamentally different ideological and political basis, a different economic and state system without losing their most important national features.

The Soviet period in the development of Russian military strategy left a deep imprint on it, its essence, content and forms have changed significantly. This was reflected in all areas of defense construction, the development of military thought, and the training of personnel. At least three generations of military leaders have grown up, brought up on her ideas. There was a whole scientific system, which determined the direction of strategic thinking and the nature of the practical activities of all command and control bodies of the armed forces. As a result, a number of new stable traditions were formed, which in many respects retain their strength even now.

Of great importance was the fact that the Soviet military strategy was born in the course of breaking up the old military machine in the fire of revolution and civil war. Throughout its further history, it was completely subordinated to military policy Soviet state and communist party. Its main provisions are: a strictly class approach to all questions of military affairs; unity of political and military leadership, the Marxist-Leninist approach to the analysis of the factors that determine the course and outcome of the war, and their consideration in strategic planning and leadership of military operations; the use of contradictions in the camp of the enemy, the utmost decisiveness and uncompromising action; optimal definition directing the main strike and concentrating the main efforts to solve the most important tasks; flexible maneuvering of reserves; rational use of forces and means; consistent buildup of efforts in selected areas up to the complete defeat of the enemy, skillful creation and effective use large reserves have stood the test of time.

A distinctive feature of the Soviet military strategy has always been a rational combination of diverse types, forms and methods of military operations. At the same time, the decisive role was always assigned to the offensive, although it was not absolutized. In all wars, along with the strategic offensive, strategic defense, counter-offensive and withdrawal were also widely used. Partisan actions acquired a large scope.

The pinnacle of the development of Soviet military strategy was the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. In the course of it, fundamentally new forms of strategic actions were found and successfully applied - operations of groups of fronts. They were carried out on the most important strategic directions, were characterized by decisiveness of goals, large spatial scope, dynamism and effectiveness in solving strategic problems. During these years, it was possible to successfully solve such problems as a rapid breakthrough of the tactical, operational and strategic defense of the enemy, the encirclement and destruction of its large groupings, the conduct of joint operations by formations and formations of the Ground Forces, long-range aviation, the Navy and the Air Defense Forces of the country. Military strategy has been enriched by the experience of strategic leadership of massive armed forces, including coalition forces, on fronts of great length.

In the postwar years, Soviet military strategy continued to develop rapidly. At the same time, all the strategic concepts being developed were aimed at confronting the United States and NATO, and in the 70s, China. In a short time, a theory of the strategy of a nuclear missile war was created. In the future, it was constantly refined and improved, taking into account the profound changes that took place in the military-political situation, the state of the armed forces, the technical means of warfare, and the views of potential adversaries. Over time, the multi-variant strategic concepts of unlimited, including preemptive, use of nuclear weapons were replaced by the strategy of its phased introduction into operation. This was followed by a strategy of repelling aggression, first by conventional means, followed by a transition at a dangerous stage in the development of the conflict to nuclear war. Finally, the concept of equal readiness for both nuclear and conventional war was developed, which was replaced by a strategy of predominant readiness for conventional war in its new forms.

The historiography of the development of Soviet (Russian) military strategy during this period is very extensive: the first theoretical works on Soviet military strategy began to be created immediately after the end of the civil war. Among the pre-war works, the works of M. N. Tukhachevsky “National and Class Strategy”, “Issues of Modern Strategy”, “War as a Problem of Armed Struggle”, the theoretical works of M. V. Frunze “Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army”, “Front and Rear in the War of the Future”, “Main Military Tasks of the Moment”, major research by A. A. Svechin “Strategy”, monograph by B. M. Shaposhnikov “The Brain of the Army”. Of great importance were the works of A. V. Golubev, S. N. Krasilnikov, V. K. Triandafillov, E. A. Shilovsky, G. S. Isserson, A. N. Lapchinsky, who revealed the possible nature of a future war and substantiated new theory"deep operations".

During the Great Patriotic War, the greatest contribution to the theory and practice of military strategy was made by outstanding Soviet generals: G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky, I. S. Konev, K. K. Rokossovsky, K. A. Meretskov, L. A. Govorov and many others.

The works of V. D. Sokolovsky, R. Ya. Malinovsky, M. V. Zakharov, S. P. Ivanov, A. A. Grechko and other military leaders and prominent military scientists played an important role in the development of a new military strategy - the strategy of the nuclear age. . Of particular importance were those published at that time fundamental research: "Military strategy" (1968), " modern warfare"(1978)," Local Wars: History and Modernity "(1975), etc.

With the collapse of the USSR, qualitatively new stage Russian military strategy. At the same time, within its framework, many of the installations of the Soviet military strategy, in a refined form, retained their influence and strength. The formation of the military strategy of the Russian Federation continues.

NATO expansion, about which politicians have been talking for so long, on March 12, 1999 became a fact. The ambassadors of three Eastern European countries, once part of the same military alliance with Russia, handed over to the US Secretary of State documents on the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic Alliance. With the admission of new members to NATO, the combat strength of the European grouping of forces of the bloc increased by almost 13 divisions, approximately 360 thousand military personnel and more than 8 thousand units of military equipment were replenished almost entirely of Soviet production, including 3600 tanks, more than 4000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, almost 400 combat aircraft. In Europe, the balance of power was once again upset. In the new millennium, this creates many problems for our country.

The bloc's eastward move has been a cold shower for many liberal Russian politicians. With this decision, the United States and its allies dispelled their romantic halo of “fighters against totalitarianism” and appeared as tough pragmatists who do not put their previous verbal promises at all and want to take maximum advantage of the temporary weakness of yesterday’s still formidable adversary. The Alliance has created a unique opportunity to include the strategically important region of Eastern Europe as a zone of its stable geopolitical control. The advancement of the bloc to the borders of Russia is an important step towards the establishment of American world hegemony.

The emerging threat, to a certain extent, consolidated the national elite of Russia, which in all other respects was divided by ideological contradictions. The negative attitude towards NATO's advance to the East has become almost the only example of the consent of the country's leading political forces.

The war in the Balkans, cynically and brazenly unleashed by NATO in March of the same year against Yugoslavia, the total destruction of not only the military, but also the economic infrastructure of this country, the bombing of one of the most beautiful capitals in Europe - Belgrade in front of the entire world community, is nothing but the final chord of establishing a new world order on the planet. Politicians - arbiters of destinies ordinary people, there is something to think about.

After the collapse of the USSR and the Soviet Armed Forces in Russia, military reform and the conversion of the military industry were declared for several years. In fact, under the propaganda noise about both, the military sphere was being destroyed: the military industry was put out of action, the foundations were destroyed and the existing mechanisms for mobilizing the country in the event of a military threat were dismantled, the well-functioning system of manning the armed forces became less and less reliable, the training system was liquidated young people to military service, the levels of combat training and military education in the army and navy decreased, the defensive consciousness of the people was deformed and disoriented. The detrimental consequences of such actions were clearly demonstrated by the events in Chechnya. At the same time, the assertions of Russian fans of Western civilization that the West has a peaceful and friendly attitude towards the reformed Russia turned out to be a myth.

It is important to realize that, taking into account the changed role of Russia in the world, its limited economic opportunities, ensuring the country's military security is achievable only if right choice priorities in military construction, in the formation and development of domestic military strategy. It should also be emphasized that if Russia does not retain powerful strategic nuclear forces capable of largely leveling the gap in more expensive conventional weapons from the leading countries of the world, all talk about the military security of the state will be pointless: our country will simply be doomed to division into spheres of influence between the leading countries. world centers.

The military strategy of the Russian Federation is called upon to determine the real and effective ways and means of ensuring the military security of Russia as an independent state in relation to its current geopolitical and geostrategic position in modern world. It should not adapt to the policies of individual parties and movements in power or fighting for it, but to ensure the protection of Russia's true national interests.

When developing it, it is necessary to take into account profound shifts in the world military-political and strategic situation, the internal situation in the country, radical changes in the political and economic situation in Russia, its domestic and foreign policy, tasks, structure and state of the armed forces. Proceeding from this, it is necessary to develop fundamentally new views and military-strategic guidelines. But, of course, with all this it is important to preserve everything positive and progressive that has been accumulated and tested over the long path of developing the theory and practice of pre-revolutionary Russian and post-revolutionary Soviet military strategy.

Danilevich A.A., Pronko V.A.

Logistics management levels

Strategic (more than 3 years);

Tactical;

Operational (coming soon)

Strategic Decisions- the most important decisions that set the general direction of the enterprise. These solutions require more Money and the most risky.

Tactical decisions related to the implementation of the strategy in the medium term. Require less financial resources, are associated with less risk.

Operational decisions- decisions related to the implementation of short-term plans. Financial resources minimal, least risky.

Types of strategic decisions

1.Mission - the philosophy and purpose of the enterprise, the meaning of its existence in the market; distinguishes this company from other companies.

2.Corporate strategy. Shows how the company will realize its mission.

3.Business strategy. Shows how each business in a diversified corporation will contribute to the overall corporate strategy.

3.Functional strategy. Describes the strategic focus of the various functional areas.

Logistics - scientific direction associated with the development of rational methods for managing material, information and financial resources.

Organization logistics management in the enterprise, first of all, it involves the formation of a logistics strategy, which consists of all strategic decisions, techniques, plans and culture associated with supply chain management.

Implementation of the logistics strategy involves making decisions at a lower level (tactical and operational) and transforming the general goals of the strategy into concrete actions.

At this stage, what is actually done is what is necessary to achieve the goals of the strategy.

The implementation translates the vague formulation of the strategy into specific details related to the movement of material, financial and information flows.

Strategy effectiveness = Strategy implementation

Long-term goals are translated into lower level solutions and actions are taken to achieve them.

With the traditional version of material flow management (MP) in the enterprise, there is no systematic management. So, connections between logistics operations (LO) corresponding to different functional areas are not clearly defined, are often established not purposefully, but randomly. Absent organization, combining LO into a single MT management function common to the enterprise, there is also no carrier of this function that should implement it. As a result, there is no optimization as such through MP within the enterprise and the corresponding economic effect, i.e. at traditional system there are no MP management organizations integrative properties. Since LF are closely intertwined with other activities in the enterprise, this often leads to the distribution of LF for different services (marketing, supply, sales, warehousing, production, etc.). At the same time, the immediate goals of these services may not coincide with the goal of the rational organization of end-to-end MT in the enterprise as a whole. Therefore, in order to effectively solve logistics problems, it is necessary to create a separate unit - logistics service which will implement the following main tasks:

1) Development, formation, reorganization of the logistics service.

2) Development and implementation of the logistics strategy of the enterprise.

3) Internal and external logistics integration:

a) the formation of interactions, harmonious and productive working relationships between employees of various functional units that would ensure the achievement of the goal logistics system organization of their joint work;

b) coordination of activities in the functional areas of logistics at the enterprise and in logistics centers.

4) Management of material and related flows, starting from the formation of contractual relations with the supplier and ending with the delivery of finished products to the buyer.

5) Logistics reengineering.

Recently, a number of new strategic concepts have been actively implemented in the US armed forces. The goal is to prepare the armed forces for the perception of the threats of the new century.

Thus, in July-August of this year, large-scale exercises Millennium Challenge 2002 were held, in which more than 13,500 people were involved personnel all branches of the military. The exercise budget was over $235 million. The purpose of the exercise is to work out the connectivity and interaction of units and subunits of all branches of the US armed forces, as well as the procedure for interacting with other federal departments in the course of conducting "quick decisive actions."

According to US Army military experts, Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) is a form of military action for US Army missions in the next decade. RDOs are primarily focused on the operational level, but RDOs also have strategic and tactical implications. Preparation for RDO is purposeful and continuous, focusing on actions that allow you to influence the behavior of the enemy and keep him from making certain decisions. In the event that deterrence fails, RDOs provide the ability to quickly and decisively coerce or defeat the enemy in order to achieve strategic objectives without a lengthy campaign or massive buildup of forces. RDO can be successful both on its own and, if necessary, prepare the conditions for the transition to action in a large-scale regional conflict with the use of heavy weapons.

The basis of quick decisive actions is network confrontation (network-centric warfare, NCW). NCW is a powerful set of warfare concepts that allow the armed forces to gain a complete advantage over the enemy, using all available information about the surrounding space, about the enemy and about their own forces.

Network confrontation includes simultaneous actions in physical,informational And cognitive areas.

physical area. The physical area is the traditional area of ​​warfare. This area unites the traditional spheres of confrontation - land, sea, air and outer space. This is the area in which physical weapons platforms and communications systems operate. Therefore, the elements of this area are the easiest to identify. Combat power in this area is traditionally measured by the effects of physical defeat.

Information area. Information area - an area in which information is created, processed and accumulated. In addition, this is an area in which command, control, communications, communications and intelligence systems operate. In the battle for information dominance, the information area is the area of ​​greatest sensitivity. Previous Approaches to Performance Evaluation information systems are no longer sufficient to measure the quality of information, new assessments are needed to determine the possible “effect” from the use of information means of influence.

cognitive area. The cognitive area is the area of ​​thinking of a fighter and civilians. This is an area in which commanders' intentions, doctrines, tactics, and methods of confrontation are formed. Intangible assets of leadership, morale, cohesion of units, level of training, experience, understanding of the situation and public opinion- elements of this area. According to US military experts, the effects in this area represent the biggest challenge of the current decade.

The need to revise the fundamentals of military science lies in the fact that, as Pentagon military experts note, the recently changed nature of threats has left virtually no time for decision-making by commanders at all levels. The previously existing concepts of confrontation and the armed forces created on their basis are poorly adapted to counter the threats of the new time. According to experts, today it is no longer possible to spend months or even weeks developing plans for the use of troops and their deployment. Instead, it is necessary to use force already in the first hours of the crisis. In this case, those means that affect the targets, the impact on which is capable of producing the desired effects and influencing the further behavior of the enemy, will be used first. This new American way of warfare is believed to improve US national security in the 21st century.

A decade after the end of the Cold War, experts say, the United States is facing a dramatic change in the nature of its geopolitical environment. The range of new threats, in addition to traditional states as potential adversaries, today also includes non-state, transnational groups, the exact boundaries of which are difficult to determine. According to experts, threats from such network structures have recently posed a significant threat to US national interests. In addition, the demographic situation and the growing disparity in wealth and distribution of resources in a globalizing world create additional pressure to implement threats from hostile networks.

According to the authors of the concept of quick decisive action, today, even among traditional state players, the distinction between hostility and non-hostility is practically erased, since new abilities (such as incursions into computer networks) make it difficult to determine exactly when the line of hostility has been crossed.

Pentagon analysts note that today, despite significant technological, economic and military superiority, a number of regional powers and interethnic coalitions have the potential to threaten US national interests.

It is believed that potential adversaries learned a lot from the recent actions of the US Army in Yugoslavia and adapted to the new conditions. Under these conditions, adversaries will look for opportunities to reach the goal before the US can respond to the challenge. In doing so, the adversary will not attempt to defeat American forces in a symmetrical open confrontation, but rather will attempt to defeat the American will by using asymmetric attacks, blocking access and, if necessary, dragging them into a long, slow, and exhausting conflict. It is also believed that the enemy will try to block the access of American forces to the theater of operations, using widely available modern systems weapons. The enemy's goal in this case would be to make the US Army doubt its ability to win within acceptable costs. The enemy will try to counter the high-tech capabilities of the United States by camouflage, stealth, and dispersal of their forces. It will also use sophisticated information actions to influence the national and coalition will to win.

American experts note that the actions of the US army in Serbia and Kosovo showed an example of how the enemy will confront the US armed forces in possible conflicts of the new century: actions by distributed small units, the widespread use of mobile air defense systems and the massive use of camouflage, camouflage and shelters, information the actions of the Serbs were directed against the will to win, as well as the destruction of the existing coalition. They admit that US troops were forced to resort to suboptimal methods of attack due to the need to minimize their own losses.

Against this background, profound changes have taken place in informatics, biology, space research, as well as in a number of other areas of science, make it possible to approach the development of military science from fundamentally new positions. Parrying new threats created the latest technologies, can be a very difficult task for the military during the Cold War. Pentagon experts emphasize that today we are entering an era in which there can be no clear lines between hostile and non-hostile or political and military action. Enemy actions will extend far beyond open hostilities and may include terrorist acts and attacks on computer networks. At the same time, it will be very difficult to find the performers of these actions. Even after they are discovered, they can mix with the civilian population, making it very difficult to retaliate. Under these conditions, it is necessary to operate in a continuum of multidimensional political-military-economic-social-infrastructural-information space, in which both the goals themselves and the intensity of interactions with potential adversaries can change rapidly.

In this regard, Pentagon experts note that the combined forces that exist today, with their overwhelming superiority in conventional conflict with an enemy of equal strength, do not have the means by which it is possible to dominate the new operational environment. The US military notes that since the fall of the Soviet Union, the US has changed the size of the Cold War military and created a smaller version of them. However, most of the doctrines of the Cold War, the principles of action, planning and construction of the armed forces remain unchanged. The United States has been able to increase the effectiveness of individual components of the armed forces with the advent of the benefits of the "revolution in military affairs", but has not been able to increase the effectiveness of the use of military force as a whole.

According to a number of experts, the limitations of the former force include significant reliance on bases; lack of forces to meet the increased requirements; insufficient level of strategic mobility for the rapid deployment of powerful but heavy forces; insufficient ranges of weapons, etc. In addition, it is noted that today the United States has an unsurpassed ability to collect information about the surrounding space, about the enemy and about its own armed forces, but lacks joint planning and management in order to use this information to achieve the superiority of the solution. It is also noted that the US Army, having precision weapons that are capable of hitting a target with great accuracy, lacks the ability to consistently produce the desired operational effect and force the enemy to make decisions beneficial to the US. Today, the army must be ready for a rapid transition from a relatively peaceful process of confrontation to intense hostilities. At the same time, quickly and decisively achieve strategic goals. It is believed that US military power, in conjunction with other instruments of national power, should develop the ability to respond quickly and decisively and resolve conflicts in the shortest possible time. At the same time, the United States plans to do this without losing the ability to win if a large-scale regional conflict is unleashed with the use of heavy weapons.

US Army military experts believe that in order to respond to the changes that have occurred in the geostrategic space in early XXI century, the US must transform the way joint operations are conducted today. Today it is important to know how to conduct military operations in conjunction with other instruments of national power. Analysts note that basic characteristics that describe the fundamental differences between future and today's joint actions is based on knowledge and on effects.

Knowledge base. Possession of superior knowledge will allow the US military to change future joint actions. The power of the complex information systems of the future will enable the unprecedented creation and sharing of knowledge in understanding the enemy, the US Army's own capabilities, the environment, and the battlefield. Improved situational awareness will achieve decision superiority, reduce operational risk, and increase the speed, coherence, and effectiveness of actions several times over. It is believed that the more known about the enemy, environment and about oneself, the more precisely one can direct one's own faculties to produce the desired effects.

A continuously updated perception of the enemy as a complex adaptive system will allow the US military to more precisely coordinate the application of the full range of national capabilities.

Basis for effects. Effect-based Operations (EBO) is a philosophy of warfare that focuses on obtaining the desired strategic result or "effect" on enemy behavior through the application of a full range of military and non-military measures at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. "Effect" - a physical, functional or psychological result, event or consequence that follows a single action or set of actions . Effect-based actions are designed to combine the advanced concepts of precision strike, dominance maneuver, and information operations across the entire battlespace, enabling effects to be created and changes in enemy behavior to take place.

It is believed that the combined forces of the future, based on a comprehensive understanding of the situation provided by advanced surveillance and intelligence systems, will be better able to determine the effects that will create the required changes in enemy behavior, which in turn are in the American national interest. This will be facilitated by knowledge that will help determine the critical points of the enemy's infrastructure (center of gravity), their critical vulnerabilities and causal relationships.

A clearer understanding of the causal relationships between remedies and the effects they produce will allow one to choose precisely those remedies that produce desired effects and avoid those that produce effects that are undesirable.

The greatest importance in the course of creating the joint forces of the future is given to information operations. According to Pentagon experts, an information operation is the informational equivalent of maneuver and fire. An information operation is especially effective when it is implemented in its target area (in information sphere). It can also be used to support fire and maneuver in other areas of confrontation.

Information operations are implemented in two main areas of information effects: electronic effects and influence effects. Electronic effects are achieved primarily by electronic warfare and attacks on computer networks. Influence effects are achieved through psychological operations, disinformation, public relations, operational security and special information operations.

The information operation has unique characteristics that allow it to be used both in peacetime and in wartime. These characteristics include low collateral damage to the physical infrastructure, low deployment requirements, relatively fast response to the task at hand, low risk to personnel, potentially high impact with little effort, and target specificity.

Thus, the approaches to the construction of joint armed forces worked out during the Millennium Challenge 2002 exercises will allow the US administration to approach the conduct of military operations from fundamentally new positions. foreign policy USA in the XXI century. The basis of such a policy will be a set of, primarily, non-military measures aimed at creating "effects" that lead to a change in the behavior of a particular subject. international relations in a direction favorable to the United States.

Sergey Grinyaev

Strategy is a way to achieve victory in war through goal setting, general plan and the systematic implementation of measures to counter the enemy, taking into account constantly changing circumstances and situations.

Strategy includes the art of combining the preparation for war and the successive operations of the armed forces (troops) to achieve the goal of the war. The strategy deals with issues related to the use to defeat the enemy as armed forces and all resources of the country.

In some foreign countries are divided grand strategy(war strategy in general) and small strategy (issues of planning, preparation and conduct of operations of all kinds of various scales). In the Russian tradition, small strategy is called operational art.

Strategic forces

The most powerful and effective means of armed struggle are often reduced to the so-called "strategic forces", which are subordinated to general view- To the Commander-in-Chief of the country's armed forces and the General Staff, and in the operational - independently carry out the goals and tasks assigned to them.

For example:

• In the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation;
• In the US Armed Forces: US Strategic Nuclear Forces.

nuclear triad

Structurally, the Strategic Forces are usually combined into the Nuclear triad (eng. Nuclear triad), - the so-called "Strategic offensive (or defensive) armed forces", including three components:

• Strategic aviation with nuclear weapons on board;
• Ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles equipped with multiple reentry vehicles with a nuclear warhead;
• Heavy strategic submarine cruisers- nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.

Strategic control centers

For continuous monitoring of the strategic situation in the country, region and world, "Strategic control centers" are created, usually:

• The main strategic center that serves the top military and political leadership of the country;
• Regional centers or Centers by branches of service or military groupings.

Such Centers of permanent deployment, as a rule, have duplicating structures.

Stationary Strategic Control Centers are usually created in advance in peacetime and often represent large, extremely protected structures that can successfully operate even as a result of the direct use of all types of offensive weapons against such Centers, including nuclear, chemical, biological, climatic, geotectonic and other.

Along with stationary specially protected Centers, “Operational Mobile Centers” or “Crisis Centers” are often created, which are completed and begin to function after receiving a special order or on the basis of their own information of a strategic nature.

In order to mislead the strategic intelligence of the enemy, false "Strategic Control Centers" are created, both stationary and mobile.

Political and strategic goals

The aims of war must be strictly coordinated with the means available to achieve it. War, as a rule, is waged in order to be able to conclude peace later on certain conditions.

Consequently, the political leadership, when determining the political goal of the war, must outline for its armed forces such goals, the achievement of which will create in the future, after the end of hostilities or in the course of them, favorable conditions for conducting peace negotiations by diplomatic means.

Based on the political goals of the war, a strategic goal is outlined - final result military operations on a strategic scale, the achievement of which leads to fundamental changes in the military-political and strategic situation.

The strategic goal can be the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, the destruction of its economy, the seizure of territory, the retention of territory, and others.

The general strategic goal determines for the armed forces and the economy of the country the entire planned course of the war, either for a certain period of it, or for the entire campaign as a whole. Private strategic goals are set for specific theaters of war (theaters of operations, directions, areas) and for the period of various types of strategic operations.

Usually, the general or main strategic goal is to repel aggression (to defeat the enemy), while private strategic goals should lead to the defeat of the enemy’s strategic groupings, the withdrawal of certain states from the war.

Types of strategies

Traditionally allocate crushing strategy, which is based on the achievement of victory through the complete defeat of the enemy, the destruction of his armed forces and the destruction of his military-economic base and exhaustion strategy, which is based on the calculation of achieving victory by consistently weakening the enemy, depleting his armed forces. Close to starvation strategy indirect strategy, which consists in the implementation of the blockade, disruption of communications, disruption of supply transportation, undermining the military-technical potential, psychological impact on the enemy population and its armed forces.

It is also often used deterrence strategy- demonstration of military power and its partial preemptive use to achieve concessions from a militarily weaker enemy, forcing him to cease hostilities, accept the put forward conditions for concluding peace or capitulation. close to her limited action strategy- waging a war with limited goals, with the deliberate extension of hostilities only to a certain territory, using only part of its military potential, with strikes only at selected objects and groupings of troops (fleet forces) of the enemy. An example of such a war is the 1999 NATO war against Yugoslavia.

Also stands out continental strategy, assuming the main efforts mainly on the defeat of the enemy ground forces and ocean strategy, in which the main goals of the war are achieved by defeating the enemy's navy and destroying their bases. An example of the latter is the war in the Pacific theater of World War II.

Of particular importance is block strategy- the creation in peacetime and wartime of a wide network of military-political alliances for gaining dominance in certain areas of the world, unleashing aggression or waging a defensive war against a more powerful enemy. Associated with her coalition strategy- the strategy of conducting a coalition war, involving the coordinated use of the armed forces of several allied states.

During the war years, the Soviet military strategy was guided by the tasks that the top military-political leadership of the Soviet state set for it. As a result, the advantages of the Soviet socio-political system, the higher stability of its economy and advanced military theory ensured its superiority over the military strategy of the enemy. Attacking Soviet Union, Nazi Germany pursued the goal of destroying it as a state, exterminating millions of people and thereby clearing “living space” for itself, and turning the rest into slaves - a source of cheap labor serving the caste of new “masters”. Under these conditions, the political goals of the war on the part of the Soviet state were to protect the freedom and independence of the peoples of the USSR, drive the German invaders out of the Soviet land, help the enslaved peoples of Europe, destroy fascism and create conditions for the free development of peoples along the path of peace.

These goals were of a liberating nature and were the most just. They had a decisive influence on military strategy. Concrete strategic tasks followed from the political goals of the war. The main ones were the development of plans for the mobilization of forces and means, the development of the Armed Forces, their strategic deployment and use on land, air and sea, the determination of the most effective methods and forms of warfare, campaigns and strategic operations; directing the course of armed struggle, organizing strategic interaction between fronts, groups of fronts and branches of the Armed Forces; logistical support for the needs of the war

The goals of the war, in conditions when it was not possible to defeat the enemy with a single strategic effort, were achieved by the Soviet Armed Forces consistently, by fulfilling a number of military-political tasks that were the content of military campaigns. During the war years, each of the campaigns carried out by the Soviet Armed Forces included a number of strategic operations and other military actions, united by the general plan of the Supreme Command Headquarters and aimed at achieving important military and political goals of the war. Offensive campaigns were usually planned well in advance.

Particular attention was paid to the planning of those strategic operations that were carried out in the main directions. The creativity of the Soviet military strategy was manifested in the search for such forms and methods of military operations that would best suit the conditions of the war and ensure the successful solution of major strategic tasks in a short time. The main types of strategic actions used by the Soviet Armed Forces during the war years were the strategic offensive (with its variant - the strategic counteroffensive) and the strategic defense. The strategic offensive was the main method of action of the Soviet troops, thanks to which a complete victory over the enemy was achieved. The most important direction in the development of the strategic offensive was to increase the composition and strike force of groupings of troops, as well as to expand the front and depth of the offensive. If the strategic offensive of the Soviet troops until the middle of 1944 was carried out on one or several sectors of the Soviet-German front, then starting from the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, it was actually carried out on the entire Soviet-German front. At the same time, the depth of advance of the Soviet troops increased from 200-400 km in the winter campaign of 1941/42 to 600-1100 km in the final campaigns of the war. In the second and third periods of the war, the number of personnel involved in the beginning of the offensive campaign increased by about 1.5 times, guns and mortars - by 3 - 3.5 times, tanks - by 3 - 6 and aircraft - by 4 - 5 times . The increase in the scope of the strategic offensive of the Soviet troops during the war was due to the growth of the capabilities of the military economy, the power of the Armed Forces, and the improvement of military art.

In the first and second periods of the war, when there were not enough forces and means to simultaneously create several strike groups, a strategic offensive usually began with a counteroffensive on the axes of the main attacks of campaigns, which was typical for conditions when the struggle was to seize and hold the initiative (counteroffensive near Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk). This allowed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to create strong groupings of troops in decisive directions, seize the initiative, and, after attracting new forces and bringing in strategic reserves, to expand the offensive front and consolidate the initiative. In the campaigns of the third period of the war, when the initiative was in the hands of the Red Army and it already possessed the necessary superiority in forces and means, the offensive began with several strategic operations, which were carried out successively in various directions. Characteristically, these operations in the summer of 1944 resulted in a general offensive of the Red Army along the entire Soviet-German front. A well-thought-out system of successive strategic offensive operations was a new step in the development of Soviet military strategy.

It forced the enemy to constantly regroup forces and means, thereby creating favorable conditions for the Soviet troops to launch an offensive in new directions. Thus, the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk, Belorussian, Lvov-Sandomierz, Yassko-Kishinev and other operations of the summer of 1944 were successively carried out. German front and led to the complete defeat of Nazi Germany. An important role in achieving the success of offensive campaigns was played by the correct determination of the direction of the main attack. The Soviet command sought to deliver the main strikes in those areas where it was possible to achieve significant military-political results, leading to the defeat of the enemy and a change in the strategic situation on the entire front of the armed struggle.

Thus, in the winter campaign of 1941/42, the main blow was dealt to the enemy, who was rushing towards Moscow. The strongest enemy grouping (up to 50 divisions) was defeated in this direction, which dramatically changed the strategic situation on the entire Soviet-German front, creating the prerequisites for launching an offensive not only in the central direction, but also in other sectors of the Soviet-German front. From an economic point of view, the defeat of the enemy near Moscow should have had a favorable effect on the work of the industrial region of the capital.

Finally, the major defeat of the enemy near Moscow was of great political significance, since it had the most direct impact on raising the morale of the Soviet people, contributed to the strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition and the strengthening of the national liberation movement in the countries enslaved by Nazi Germany. The combination of political, economic and military factors dictated the main strikes in other campaigns of the Great Patriotic War. On the axes of the main strikes in the campaigns, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command resolutely concentrated the necessary forces and means. As a rule, several front-line formations operated as part of shock groups, including from a quarter to a half (and sometimes more) of the forces and means of the army in the field. For example, in the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, 40% of the personnel, 48% of guns and mortars, 77% of tanks and self-propelled guns, 53% of the total number of aircraft in the army.