In May 2013 in St. Petersburg on the basis of the Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineering and Signal Corps Russian Academy rocket and artillery sciences, the fourth international scientific and practical conference was held "War and weapons. New research and materials".

We bring to your attention the article by V.V. Naumov "Experience in organizing the management of the rear of the Russian contingent in the zones of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts", published in part III of the proceedings of the conference.

Photo (c) A.A. Kovylkov, correspondent of the newspaper "Military Bulletin of the South of Russia" / fotki.yandex.ru/users/kovilkov/album/827 31/

Another, the third since the withdrawal from the composition former USSR, Georgia's attempt to liquidate the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia by force of arms, and after that liquidate Abkhazia, ended in a decisive defeat of the Georgian invasion forces.

The armed action against South Ossetia, in which the Georgian side invested a significant part of the military potential it has accumulated in recent years, has become, perhaps, the fastest regional armed conflict in the post-Soviet space.

In the course of the operation, the analysis of the experience gained in the conduct of combat operations of troops, as well as their logistic support and command and control, deserves attention. Logistics management is an integral part of command and control and consists in the purposeful activities of commanders (commanders), deputy commanders (commanders) for logistics, logistics headquarters to maintain the rear in a high degree of combat readiness, prepare it to perform assigned tasks and lead formations, units, logistics organizations (SCOT) in the course of their implementation.

It should be noted that the management of the rear during the operation was built according to the classical scheme: Center - military district - association - formation - military unit - subdivision.

At the same time, the management of the rear consisted in the development and implementation of measures to create a rear management system, maintain high combat readiness, develop and build up its stable and continuous functioning, as well as rapid recovery during the operation.

The complexity of organizing rear management in the operation consisted in the fact that during its preparation and conduct it was necessary to take into account the influence of such factors as: suddenness and unpredictability of the actions of the Georgian side; insufficient degree of awareness of the rear management bodies about the upcoming tasks; staffing of units and subunits of the rear, as well as rear management bodies at all levels in peacetime states; physical-geographical and climatic conditions; lack of controls and a significant reduction in their capabilities in mountainous areas.

Link: Center
To manage the logistics of groupings of troops (forces), the Logistics Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation deployed a rear management system. It included the operational group (OG) of the rear control of the Center, the rear control authorities of the directions, the North Caucasian Military District, 58 A, 4 A of the Air Force and Air Defense, the Black Sea Fleet, rear control points (points) of 58 A, 4 A of the Air Force and Air Defense, 19 MSD, 42 MSD, formations and units of the Airborne Forces, special forces and other formations and military units that are part of groupings of troops, as well as units and military units of communications and automation.
The work of the military control bodies of the rear, in accordance with the nature of the conduct of hostilities, can be logically conditionally divided into 3 stages:
Stage 1: management of subordinate formations, units and organizations in preparation for the operation;
Stage 2: management of logistic support of the units participating in the operation to force Georgia to peace;
Stage 3: management of logistics support for troops during their withdrawal to their original positions, the formation of motorized rifle brigades and posts.
A threefold task was set before the rear control bodies from the Center to the formation: to build a vertical of control along the trunk of responsibility; timely forecast the development of the situation on logistic support; make a proactive assessment of the development of events.
During the first stage, measures were taken for the advance and direct preparation of the rear.
At the same time, advance preparation of the rear to provide formations and units in the operation included: the implementation of a set of measures with the development of all operation plans and directive documents in relation to several typical situations. Anticipating a significant increase in the volume of logistic support tasks associated with a likely increase in the size of the Russian peacekeeping contingent, limited time parameters, and the complexity of geographical conditions, the Logistics Headquarters of the RF Armed Forces developed a number of preparatory measures to bring material and transport resources closer to potential conflict zones.
The Headquarters of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation prepared and sent to the North Caucasian Military District instructions from the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the creation of increased stocks of materiel (for 30 days, including military stocks - in military units (subdivisions) for 6 days, carryover stocks - in a joint warehouse SSPM and separate departments of storage of KSPM for the entire grouping of troops (forces) for 24 days) and the formation of an integrated logistics base in the settlement. Gudauta and the joint warehouse in the village of Java.
Direct preparation was carried out as soon as possible during the second stage. At the beginning of the operation, the control of the rear of the groupings of troops (forces) was carried out from the rear control point of the North Caucasus Military District, later, in order to fulfill the triune task, it was decided to create an OG in the zones of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts. They included generals and officers of the headquarters and central departments of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
This measure made it possible to maintain the controllability of the logistics support system, especially during the period of a dynamic increase in the composition of groupings of troops and rear in conflict zones. Working directly in formations and military units, operational groups obtained information about the real state of the military rear; provided them with practical assistance; promptly brought to the Center information about changes in the provision of troops with materiel and transport resources.
An analysis of the activities of the rear management bodies from the Center to the division inclusive showed that all plans for the use and support, combat crews, and urgent reports were forgotten. Literally, each calculation of the need for certain material resources had to be developed anew, as if before that there had been no developments, reconciliations and clarifications of planning documents.
With the outbreak of hostilities, combat crews did not provide for the procedure for the provision of reporting and administrative documents by military command and control bodies, SCOT. From the entire list of urgent reports in the prescribed form, the following were submitted: a report on the rear of the Black Sea Fleet (in the Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - from August 14 this year), a summary of the rear of the Air Force Civil Code (in the Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - from August 8 this year) and a summary on the rear of the Airborne Forces (in the Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - from August 15 of this year). By the timing of submission, it is clear that the reports began to arrive at the Staff of the RF Armed Forces with a delay of up to seven days from the start of hostilities.
In terms of their content, the reports were declarative in nature, and, as a rule, were an initiative development officials. Wherein necessary analytics, based on objective calculated data, was absent. In addition, in violation of the requirements of the statutory documents, most of the quantitative indicators were calculated not in the RFE (the exception is the reports of the Airborne Forces), but in natural units of measurement, which did not allow assessing the compliance of the level of security of the groupings of troops with the established standards. In summaries, as can be seen from Table. 1, not all required sections were worked out.

Table 1. The quality and completeness of the logistic reports submitted

Logistics sections	Black Sea Fleet	Airborne	air force
rear deployment areas	+	+	+
financial security	+	+	+
data on the delivery of materiel	+	+	-
condition of transportation routes and vehicles	+	+	+
data on technical support for logistics services (failure of equipment, repair and evacuation of logistics equipment)	-	+	-
health care data	-	+	-
losses from the impact of the enemy	+	+	+
trophy details	-	+	+
conclusions about the state of the rear (degree of combat readiness)	-	+	-
applications for missing (necessary) material and technical means	+	-	-

The exchange of operational information between the military command and control bodies was carried out inefficiently, because. these tasks were performed by individual officials, while the rest of the operational staff was engaged in daily activities. It was difficult to collect information about the state and operation of bases (warehouses).
This negatively affected the coherence of the actions of the entire vertical of rear management, up to the military level. Due to the poorly organized information exchange, information about the real situation of the troops (forces) and their security was collected with difficulty, the information was frankly scarce, and often contradictory.
A number of bodies of the military command and control of the rear, including those that are part of the Civil Defense Command, which are entrusted with the function of ensuring the peacekeeping mission, were excluded from this process.
The rear management system did not ensure the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to it, the required stability and efficiency, was poorly adapted to work within the framework of an interdepartmental joint operation, and generally remained at the level of the 80s of the last century. The communication system, primarily its technical
state, did not ensure the reliability of the control of the rear of the land group, and especially in mountainous conditions.
The peculiarities of rear management in the course of the completed peacekeeping operation was that the command and control bodies acted in peacetime states, personnel he was not called from vacations and business trips, the activities of everyday “peaceful” activities were carried out in full. The officers of the headquarters and rear services worked according to peacetime documents, which did not provide for the development of those documents that they should work out during operations. With the beginning of the conflict, the rear management system, which worked quite quickly and steadily in everyday mode, gave some failures.

1. Violations of the stability of the functioning of the communication system. To ensure the stability and continuity of the communication system in the Rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, it was proposed to create a mobile communication center of constant readiness.
2. Problems with the organization of communications were identified in the work of the central command post for the rear of the Navy. It is proposed to equip the headquarters of the rear of the Navy with radiotelegraph equipment and create a subscriber station for receiving secret electronic correspondence.
3. One of the problems was of a systemic nature and consisted in the fact that units and subunits of the rear, according to the Combat Regulations, are not included in the battle order of a division (brigade, regiment). And the tasks in the combat order are set only for the elements of the combat (marching) order. In the course of coordinating the draft Combat Manual, the headquarters of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation drew the attention of the developers to this. After all, the order of battle is the formation of formations (units) for combat. And the bodies of the military rear are organizationally included in the states of these formations and military units. Therefore, they should also be included in the battle order. Moreover, the rear is part of the operational formation. But these arguments were not taken into account.
As a result, there was a discrepancy between the theoretical views of the developers of the charter and objective reality, as a result of which the battalion rear and the rear of divisions turned out to be the only full-fledged echelon in the combat zone in the military rear. Those tasks that were supposed to be solved by regimental and divisional transport vehicles had to be performed by district automobile battalions. And the tasks of the district transport had to be assigned to the automobile battalion, transferred from the Center.
In order to exclude the prerequisites for a recurrence of negative examples, it is proposed to include units and subunits of the military rear in the battle formation, similar to how formations and units of the rear are included in the operational formation of troops. It is proposed to apply for amendments to the Combat Regulations in terms of including subunits and military units of the rear in the combat order, taking into account the presence of a rear in the operational formation of formations and the experience gained.
4. The procedure for the transition of military control bodies to wartime documents has not been determined.
With the beginning of the use of interspecific groupings of troops in conflicts of any intensity, it was proposed to put into effect the Report Card for urgent wartime reports for all involved units, military units, formations, associations and command and control bodies. At the same time, it was proposed to provide for the appearance in the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of bodies of orders and deliveries, perpetuating the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland, as well as subordination to the head of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Railway Troops.

Operational link
The Logistics Directorate of the North Caucasus Military District actually prepared the operation in the course of combat operations, and the previously developed plans were only partially implemented.
From the beginning of the operation, the logistics management of the active grouping of troops (forces) was built in accordance with the scheme for organizing the management of troops and was carried out through the regular logistics management bodies of the units and subunits, as well as through the operational logistics groups (OGT), formed at the expense of the personnel of the Logistics Directorates of the North Caucasus Military District and 58 A.
Combat crews did not provide for the procedure for the provision by military command and control bodies, SCOT with the start of hostilities of reporting and administrative documents.
The presence of incomplete and untimely information on the provision of troops with basic types of materiel (ammunition, fuel, food), as well as the lack of real information at a certain point in time on the volume of need for their transportation and the state of the rear created significant difficulties in planning the logistics of troops (forces) and development of regulatory documents.
Taking into account the fact that the fixed communication network in South Ossetia was put out of action by air and artillery strikes of the Georgian army, and field communication lines were not built, the basis of the communication system was satellite and radio communications, which were used to organize direct communications.
The rear of the Air Force and Air Defense Army was controlled by the Chief of Logistics - Deputy Commander of Aviation and Air Defense Forces - from the rear control point. Management was organized using the forces and means of the Air Force communications system. It was carried out by setting tasks and separate orders issued personally by superiors to their subordinates using technical means of communication or through their representatives. However, the established algorithm of work and the air force and air defense rear services was not maintained.
Rear management Black Sea Fleet carried out from the day-to-day control point. The work of the Deputy Commander of the Fleet for Logistics in the subordinate SCOT in organizing the fulfillment of the assigned tasks was carried out by exercising personal control over the correct understanding, timely and accurate execution of the given orders and providing the necessary assistance to subordinates. There were no failures in the Black Sea Fleet rear management system.
As a result, on the part of the operational rear, primarily the logistics departments of the North Caucasus Military District and 58 A, organizational activities to ensure the advancement and deployment of district and army military units, as well as troops arriving in the composition of the interspecific grouping being created from other regions, were not carried out.
At the third stage, the logistic support management system in the conflict zone consisted of the following structure of the levels of command and control: North Caucasus Military District Logistics Group - Rear Department 58 A - NT formations - NT units and subunits - posts.
An audit by the Logistics Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation showed that this structure turned out to be incompetent.
All the instructions and orders of the chief of logistics and the chiefs of the rear services of the North Caucasus Military District did not go beyond the army level. The military link generally fell out of the management process. A situation has arisen in which information from the “top” does not reach the “bottom”, and the “bottom”, in turn, cannot reach the “top”.
In the course of an inspection by the Logistics Headquarters of the RF Armed Forces of the troops located in the zones of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts, the logistics management vertical was restored, which consisted in the creation of a single operational logistics group headed by the head of logistics 58 A (in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict ), with the subordination of officers of the operational groups of the rear services of the district, as well as the heads of warehouses.
The bulk of the shortcomings were made not because of a lack of resources, but because of the lack of organization of specific officials.

Problematic issues and solutions:
1. Violations of the stability of the functioning of the communications system for the rear of the North Caucasus Military District. It is proposed to restore the TPU 58 A communication center in order to maintain it in constant combat readiness.
2. Significant problems in the work of the OUT were created by practically complete absence connections. The funds intended for the work of the deputy commanders of the SCOT were absent or did not work. The means of communication that ensured the combat work of the deputy commanders of the rear units were not provided by the states, both between the logistics control bodies themselves at all levels, and with subordinate forces and means, especially during the advancement of troops in mountainous wooded areas. In this regard, the daily collection, generalization and analysis of the tactical and rear situation were actually paralyzed.
Documents from the rear department at the command post of the operational group of the North Caucasus Military District were not kept in a timely manner. Reports in the links "connection - military unit" were worked out untimely and biased, and the link "unit" was practically excluded from this work.
Taking into account the prospect of the transition of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to a brigade structure, it was proposed to develop the structure and composition of the brigade rear, taking into account the reorganization of the battalion level, as well as the district rear, capable of simultaneously providing formations and military units of the district set, on a modular basis to form the most approximate to the provided interspecific groupings of troops, the necessary rear groupings.

Military link
The performance of combat missions was carried out by battalion tactical groups (BTGr). At the same time, the chiefs of the rear of the battalions, on which the main burden lay at the military level, did not have regular means of control and communication, which greatly hampered the rapid exchange of information with the higher headquarters and the contenting body. The experience of the previous "Chechen companies", as well as the conduct of the operation on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan, indicates that this form of warfare is typical for the conditions under consideration, and, therefore, taking into account this factor, it is proposed in the future to provide rear units with appropriate controls.
At the same time, the military control bodies of the rear of regiments and divisions were put forward in the conflict zone, which, having no forces and means under their control, only hampered the control process, turning into redundant intermediate links in the control system.
The presence of incomplete and untimely data on the provision of troops with basic types of materiel (ammunition, fuel, food), as well as the lack of real information at any given time on the volume of their delivery and the state of the rear created significant difficulties in planning logistic support and transferring administrative documents to the troops. .
During the creation of groupings of troops in the directions, the march was carried out by almost all military units and subunits.
The greatest load fell on the units of the 42nd Motor Rifle Division, which made a march of more than 200 km in 15 hours and 136 Motorized Rifle Brigade - 680 km in 48 hours, respectively, which were immediately put into battle after the march.
The military units of the Airborne Forces showed good training when making a march to the conflict area.
A number of military units of constant readiness with the outbreak of hostilities were sent to areas of combat mission without full-time rear units. At the same time, the military control bodies of the rear of regiments and divisions were put forward in the conflict zone. But, not having forces and means under their control, they could not affect the timeliness and quality of the supporting process. Thus, the aforementioned rear controls also turned into redundant intermediate links in the control system.
Excessive breaks were allowed between combat and rear units, which did not follow a single marching order. For example, when 71 infantry regiments of 42 infantry divisions, 693 infantry infantry divisions of 19 infantry divisions were put into battle, the removal of battalion rears reached 15 km, and in some cases even more (with a standard of no more than 3 km). Ultimately, omissions, primarily of a managerial nature, resulted in delays in refueling military equipment, preparing hot meals, delivering bottled water on time, and so on.
In conditions of unstable communications (and often lack of communications), a significant amount of time was spent transmitting combat orders and orders from senior commanders to the BTGr. As a result, the decision-making and setting of combat missions were carried out by the BTG commanders under a strict time limit. The organization of interaction with units and subunits (including other types and types of troops) was not carried out. All issues were resolved by the unit commanders in the course of performing combat missions (with neighbors operating in the same direction, interaction was organized only through personal communication).
Decision-making and management of subunits was hampered by the absence at the initial stage (subsequently insufficient number) of maps of combat areas. At the same time, outdated maps of the 1987 edition did not always correspond to modern reality. The commanders were in dire need of large-scale maps, city plans, aerial photographs of the main military installations and important industrial centers.
In the link battalion - regiment - division there were no control vehicles with automation equipment. There was no automation of the communication system, as a result, its high inertia, low mobility and the inability to constantly comply with the rapidly changing command structure (the actual need to ensure communication between the military district (army) and the armored personnel carriers, companies in separate directions, i.e. through two, three instances) .
The means of communication were not protected from electronic suppression by the enemy. In the absence of communication, units were often managed using mobile phones captured from the Georgian military.
They were armed with bulky, outdated and unreliable means of communication (and those in insufficient quantities), which were not able to provide communication in the mountainous terrain. The traditional way of deploying a subscriber network (cable lines) did not meet the modern requirements of the control system.

Problematic issues and solutions:
1. Lack of means of control and communication in the rear units.
Taking into account the expansion of the practice of application in modern conditions battalion tactical groups, it was proposed to include in the battalion rear forces and means that would ensure its autonomy to the maximum extent possible. At the same time, to provide for the presence in the staff of the rear units of the developed and put into service command and staff vehicle of the new generation KShM-142T, which should become for the head of the rear and the heads of services both a point and a means of control.
2. Low level of training of home front officials. The main reason was the simplistic approach in carrying out combat training activities. Support units enter the exercise areas in advance, operate in a daily rhythm, no one keeps them on their toes. When the situation develops dynamically and unpredictably, they are not ready to perform tasks in difficult conditions.
In the course of planning measures for the combat training of units and subunits of the rear, it was proposed to take into account the analysis and generalization of the experience gained. Eliminate a simplistic approach when conducting tactical-special (special) classes and exercises.
3. The absence (insufficient number) of maps of combat areas from the deputy commanders for logistics, commanders of the SCOT. It is proposed to resolve the issue of providing units and subunits of the rear of central and district subordination with maps of the respective regions through the headquarters of the rear of the North Caucasus Military District.
Despite the complex and contradictory situation in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts, operating system logistics management and the logistics system as a whole have fulfilled the tasks of meeting the needs of groupings of troops.

#rear #history #war #headquarters #WATT

Along with general organizational issues, realizing that one is not a warrior in the field, he decided to strengthen his main support - the headquarters of the rear.

Chief of Staff of the Logistics Major General Utkin was an experienced campaigner, Khrulev knew him for many years. But Andrei Vasilyevich put the interests of the cause above personal sympathies or antipathies. General Utkin in the difficult conditions of the war could not cope with his duties, he lacked efficiency and resourcefulness.

Khrulev consulted with General Bayukov, who was, in fact, the political officer under the chief of logistics. Vladimir Antonovich agreed with the opinion of Khrulev, and both of them agreed on the candidacy of the general Milovsky Mikhail Pavlovich, who was Utkin's deputy, was fully aware of the situation and could take up a new position without delay.

The replacement took place. Since Khrulev worked with Milovsky for many years, as they say, soul to soul, I will introduce him to his biography.

Mikhail Pavlovich Milovsky. He was born on May 27, 1899 in the village of Nikulkino, Filippovsky District, Vladimir region. Father is a forest watchman, mother is a seasonal worker, brother and sister are weavers.

Mikhail Pavlovich began his career at the age of ten: he worked as a painter and roofer. In the Red Army since 1919, he fought on the Southern Front, from where he was sent to study. He successfully completed the Moscow Infantry Command Courses and again fought on various fronts. From the end of 1920 he served in the 11th Leningrad Rifle Division. In 1924, he was already a regiment commander, and from this position he left to study at the Academy. Frunze. After graduation, he served in the army, and in 1932 he returned to the academy, but in a different capacity as a teacher.

№ 139

ORDER OF THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE

WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE GKO DECISION ON MANAGEMENTTHE REAR OF THE RED ARMY

I declare for guidance and execution Decree State Committee Defense No. 3543s of June 9, 1943 on changing the Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 300s of July 31, 1941 “On the Management of the Rear of the Red Army”.

Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Soviet Union VASILEVSKY

RESOLUTION

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE No. 3543s

ON CHANGING THE DECISION OF THE STATE

“ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE RED ARMY’S REAR LINES”

In a change to the Decree of the GOKO No. 300s of July 31, 1941 “On the Management of the Rear of the Red Army”, the State Defense Committee decides:

I. According to the Logistics Directorate of the Red Army

1. Abolish the Main Logistics Directorate of the Red Army. 2 Establish the post of Chief of Logistics of the Red Army with direct subordination to his People's Commissar of Defense. 3. Under the head of the rear of the Red Army to have:

1) Headquarters of the Chief of Logistics of the Red Army;

2) personnel department.

4. Subordinate to the head of the rear of the Red Army:

1) Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Red Army;

2) Main Automobile Directorate of the Red Army;

3) Main Road Directorate of the Red Army;

4) Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army;

5) Main Directorate of Food Supply of the Red Army;

6) Main Military Sanitary Directorate of the Red Army;

7) Department of fuel supply of the Red Army;

8) Veterinary Department of the Red Army;

9) Financial management Red Army;

10) Department for personal accounting of losses of junior commanders and rank and file of the army and pensions for their families;

11) Administrative and economic department of NCOs;

12) Editorial Board of the Logistics and Supply of the Red Army magazine.

5. In the direct jurisdiction of the chief of logistics of the Red Army to have:

A) Molotov Military Academy of Logistics and Supply of the Red Army;

b) the Military Transport Academy of the Red Army named after Kaganovich. 6. On the head of the rear of the Red Army to assign:

a) organizing the rear of the Red Army;

b) the development of questions on the organization of the rear of the army in the field, the development of plans and considerations for the formation, disbandment and distribution

between the fronts of rear services, units and institutions and the implementation of these measures through the General Staff of the Red Army;

c) carrying out operational transportation of military formations, marching reinforcements, as well as transportation of wounded and sick military personnel;

d) delivery to the fronts, at the request of the main and central departments of NCOs, of weapons, ammunition, food, fuel and lubricants, technical, quartermaster and other property;

e) management of military bodies on rail, water and air transport serving the Red Army;

f) management of the quartermaster and food services of the Red Army, management of the supply of fuel and lubricants, monetary and housing allowances for the troops;

g) leadership of the motor transport service and the supply of motor vehicles to units and formations of the Red Army;

h) management of the road service of the Red Army;

i) leadership of the sanitary and veterinary services of the Red Army;

j) organizing and conducting the evacuation of wounded and sick military personnel from the theater of operations;

k) transportation of prisoners of war, trophy and unnecessary military property from the fronts to the rear of the country;

l) management of the case of personal accounting of the losses of the junior commanding officers and rank and file of the active army and the provision of pensions for their families;

m) management of the combat and special training of the rear services, units and institutions of the Red Army.

7. Establish that the chief of logistics of the Red Army fulfills his duties of providing for the Red Army through the chiefs of the main and central departments of the NGOs and the chiefs of the rear of the fronts and individual armies.

8. To the head of the rear of the Red Army, in the circle of duties assigned to him, to grant the right:

a) enter with a petition to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on all issues related to the implementation of measures to organize the rear of the Red Army, the creation of stocks and the supply of food forage, fuel and lubricants, clothing, wagons, household, medical and veterinary property and other issues belonging to the scope of duties of the chief of logistics of the Red Army. Note. The chiefs of the main and central departments of NCOs subordinate to the chief of logistics of the Red Army may enter with a petition to the Government of the USSR only through the chief of logistics of the Red Army.

b) issue orders and instructions for the rear, binding on all bodies and institutions subordinate to the head of the rear of the Red Army;

c) issue orders on the personnel of the rear services, units and institutions subordinate to the head of the rear of the Red Army:

1) on the assignment of military ranks up to and including the colonel;

2) appointment and transfer to all positions, with the exception of the chiefs of the rear of the fronts and armies, the heads of the main and central departments and their deputies and the heads of the departments that are part of the main departments, whose appointment is made by orders of the People's Commissar of Defense;

d) approve and put into effect manuals, guidelines, learning programs, instructions relating to a range of issues related to the organization of the rear of the Red Army and the supply of quartermaster property, food and fodder, fuel and lubricants, medical and sanitary and veterinary equipment and combat training of rear units, institutions and educational institutions;

e) to control the correct distribution and use, within the limits determined by the State Defense Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, of resources for the Red Army of food and fodder, quartermaster, sanitary and

veterinary property, fuels and lubricants, motor vehicles, tractors and spare parts for them, as well as to control the operation and repair of vehicles.

II. Front Logistics Administration (Army)

Under the head of the rear of the front (army) to have:

a) Headquarters of the Front (Army) Logistics Directorate;

b) personnel department;

c) inspection.

Subordinate to the head of the rear of the front (army):

a) Directorate (department) of military communications of the front (army);

b) Automobile management (department) of the front (army);

c) Road administration (department) of the front (army);

d) Quartermaster department (department) of the front (army);

e) Directorate (department) of the food supply of the front (army); f) fuel supply department of the front (army); g) Sanitary department (department) of the front (army); h) veterinary department of the front (army); And) financial department front (army);

j) department for personal accounting of losses of junior commanding officers and rank and file of the front (army).

To assign to the head of the rear of the front (army):

1. The organization of the rear of the front (army) and the management of the location of the rear organs, units and institutions of the front (army), the organization of their defense.

2. The development of questions on the distribution between the armies of rear organs, units and institutions and the implementation of these measures through the headquarters of the front (army).

3. Management of the creation in front-line and army warehouses and in formations of established stocks of food and fodder, fuels and lubricants, clothing, baggage, household, medical and veterinary property and full and uninterrupted provision of troops with these types of supplies.

4. Planning and organizing the procurement of local funds in the front, army and military rear areas.

5. Management of the operational transportation of military formations, units and marching reinforcements, carried out by order of the military council within the borders of the front (army), and transportation along railways front (army) of the wounded and sick to the rear of the country.

6. Organization of the supply of armies (formations) at the request of supply departments (departments) of the front (army) of ammunition, food and fodder, fuels and lubricants, military equipment and other military property to army bases and unloading stations of armies.

The head of the rear of the army is in charge of the transportation of all types of supplies from army bases, unloading stations (divisions of army bases on the ground) to the DOPs along the unpaved supply routes.

7. Leadership of military communication agencies on the railway and waterways of the front (army).

8. Organization of the restoration and repair of automobile dirt rear roads of the front (army), construction and restoration of bridges on them and organization of the defense of roads and bridges.

9. Management of the commissariat, food, monetary, apartment allowances for the troops of the front (army) and the supply of fuel and lubricants.

10. Management of the motor transport, road, sanitary and veterinary services of the front (army).

11. Organization and conduct of the evacuation of the wounded and sick military personnel to the rear of the country.

12. Transportation from the front (army) to the rear of the country of prisoners of war, trophy and unnecessary military property.

13. Management of the case of personal accounting of the losses of the junior commanding officers and rank and file of the front (army).

14. Leadership of the combat and special training of rear services, units and institutions of the front (army).

15. Organization of repair of military equipment and property.

16. Selection and appointment of leading personnel for services directly subordinate to the chief of logistics of the front (army), within the limits of the rights granted to him.

Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. STALIN

F. 4, op. 11, d. 76, l. 87-92. Script.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 5(9-10)/2001

Logistics control system of the Armed Forces: stages and prospects of development

Lieutenant GeneralD. V. BULGAKOV

MILITARY Doctrine Russian Federation as one of the main development priorities military organization the state determined the creation of a unified management system and ensuring its effective functioning. An important element of this system has been and remains the subsystem for managing the Logistics of the Armed Forces.

Rear management is an integral part of command and control of troops (forces). It includes the purposeful activities of commanders (commanders), headquarters, chiefs of logistics - deputy commanders (commanders) for logistics and subordinates to them. management structures to maintain the constant combat readiness of the troops and institutions of the rear, to prepare them to provide for associations, formations and military units in the performance of assigned tasks both in peacetime and in wartime.

A retrospective analysis of the activities of the rear management bodies shows that up to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, despite the experience of logistic support of the troops gained in the conduct of hostilities on the river. Khalkhin Gol and in the Soviet-Finnish war, a single centralized system of logistics support for the Red Army, and, accordingly, a single rear management body was not created. The body uniting the functioning of several supply services (food, clothing, convoy-economic, apartment-operational) was the Office of the Chief of Supply of the Red Army. In 1940, it was transformed into the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army (GIUKA), whose apparatus consisted of two departments - mobilization-planning and organizational and military-economic inspection. At the end of the same year, the departments of personnel, warehouses and transport, trade, as well as the inspection for boiler supervision and fire protection were additionally included in its composition.

The supporting services (departments) of the People's Commissariat of Defense (including GIUKA) at that time were subordinate: in the center - to the deputies of the people's commissar of defense, the chief of the General Staff, and in the districts, armies, formations and military units - to the corresponding commanders (commanders) and their headquarters who, in essence, controlled the rear. As part of the General Staff, there was a department for the arrangement of logistics and supplies, at the headquarters of military districts - logistics departments, in formations - departments, in regiments - a deputy chief of staff for logistics. At the same time, the combined arms headquarters, being responsible for organizing the rear, planning material support and supplying materiel to associations, formations and military units, did not bear direct responsibility for supplying the troops. The direct support of the troops was carried out by the rear services, which had at their disposal all types of materiel.

Such an imbalance with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War led to the emergence of a number of serious problems in the logistics of the troops (forces), which is eloquently evidenced by archival documents. Here is just one example. The commander of the Western Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, in his directive of July 9, 1941 No. 043, stated: “The work of the army rear continues to be unsatisfactory. There is no supply plan. Supply stations are not controlled, there is no communication with the armies. The command stations of the army are not connected with the armies and operate without a system. There is no record of the provision of troops in the armies, and no measures are being taken to clarify it. Troops are supplied without taking into account their security. Vehicles are used wastefully, predatory. Hundreds of vehicles dangle aimlessly around the rear of the army. At the same time, the “capture” of cars is being carried out by all sorts of bosses. Delivery routes are not organized. The evacuation of the wounded occurs without a system, on a case-by-case basis. The evacuation of property is carried out without taking into account the needs of the troops. Today they are evacuating, tomorrow they are bringing them back…”

The real state of affairs at the fronts required the immediate creation of a unified system of logistic support for the Red Army and a centralized rear management system in the interests of the prompt and efficient distribution and use of material resources, forces and means of logistic support. In addition, it was necessary to free commanders (commanders) and combined arms headquarters from unusual functions, to give them the opportunity to concentrate their main efforts on command and control of troops (forces) performing combat missions. On August 1, 1941, an order was signed by the People's Commissar of Defense on the organization of the Main Directorate of Logistics of the Red Army and the rear departments of the fronts and armies. This order introduced the positions of chief of rear of the Red Army and chief of rear of the front and the army.

The Chief of Logistics of the Red Army was subordinated to the Main Directorate of Logistics of the Red Army, consisting of the headquarters of the rear, the department of the VOSO, the road service and the rear inspectorate. GIUKA, the fuel supply department, the sanitary and veterinary departments were subordinate to him. Similar structures (only instead of rear headquarters - organizational planning departments) are created in the fronts and armies. Subsequently, in 1941-1944, the headquarters of the rear of the Air Force, Navy, military districts, fronts, armies and corps were formed.

Thus, in August 1941, a fundamentally new system rear control. Its main generating link was the headquarters of the Logistics of the Red Army. This is eloquently evidenced by the fact that in the middle of 1943, when the post of Chief of Logistics of the Red Army - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense was established, the headquarters of the rear was strengthened structural divisions responsible for planning the delivery of materiel, and the chief of staff received the rights of the first deputy chief of logistics. Throughout the war, the headquarters of the Logistics of the Red Army carried out a large amount of tasks to organize logistics support for the actions of the troops (forces). He coordinated in his field the activities of all the main and central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, monitored the operational and rear situation on the fronts, planned the material support of the troops, supervised the work of military transport agencies for the supply of materiel and evacuation transportation, and solved many other tasks.

The centralized system of logistic support created during the war and its management bodies fully justified themselves. The rear coped with its tasks successfully. In the order of the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR dated August 25, 1946 No. 38, issued in connection with the fifth anniversary of the creation of the Logistics of the Armed Forces, it was noted that in the Great Patriotic war personnel of the rear services - quartermasters, medical workers, motorists, road builders, workers of military communications, fuel supply services and veterinarians - successfully coped with the tasks assigned to him to provide fronts, adequately fulfilled his duty to the Motherland.

Big changes in the organizational structure of the rear management bodies began immediately after the war. This was due primarily to the reduction of the Armed Forces, the reorganization of their structure, the restructuring of the top military leadership. However, in a number of cases this was done without sufficient elaboration of all the nuances of the reform.

So, in 1950, the chiefs of rear services were deprived of the rights of deputy commanders and commanders, as a result of which they, the main organizers of the rear support of troops (forces), lost the opportunity to manage the rear structures without the intervention of commanders (commanders), as well as to quickly interact with officials of associations , formations and military units in solving problems. A number of services were withdrawn from the rear, and the headquarters of the rear were abolished. The Logistics Headquarters of the Soviet Army was reorganized into the Logistics Services Directorate. All this had a negative impact on the provision of troops (forces), combat readiness and preparation of the rear.

Subsequently, the mistakes made were eliminated to a certain extent: in 1953 the headquarters of the Logistics of the Ministry of Defense was restored, and in 1958 the position of Deputy Minister of Defense - Head of the Logistics of the Ministry of Defense was introduced (from 1962 to 1991 - Deputy Minister of Defense - Head of Logistics of the Armed Forces of the USSR) . By 1958, the logistics headquarters included the following departments (departments): operational rear services; organizational; mobilization; operational-rear, combat training and universities; military scientific; special; transport and rear mechanization; secret department.

Significant changes in the rear management system, in the organizational structure of the headquarters (departments) of the rear took place in the 60-80s. Computers began to be introduced into the practice of the activities of the governing bodies, the issues of information, software and technical support for the automated rear management system were clarified. In 1973, the Central Control Center (CCP) of the Logistics of the Armed Forces was created, which at that time was one of the few facilities fully equipped with modern means automation and communications.

The organizational structure of the rear management bodies at the central level, branches of the Armed Forces, military districts and fleets was improved. The headquarters of the Logistics of the Armed Forces was developed, which included: management - operational and rear, communications and automation; departments - organizational and mobilization, combat training of universities, planning and economic, complex mechanization of loading and unloading operations, material and technical planning and transportation, military scientific and secret department. Such an organizational structure, the availability of trained personnel, means of communication and automation made it possible to manage the rear steadily and solve problems of providing troops (forces) in any situation.

The emergence of qualitatively new, more powerful types of weapons and their massive introduction into the troops created the prerequisites for the further development of methods and forms of warfare, significantly changed the content and scope of the tasks of all units of the Logistics of the Armed Forces to provide troops and fleet forces in peacetime and wartime. The consequence of the development of military affairs was the growing influence of the quality of control on final results activities of troops (forces). The most important condition for increasing the effectiveness of rear management was the introduction of modern means of automation and communication.

In 1969, vigorous work began to improve the communications system for the Logistics of the Armed Forces. Schemes for the organization of communications for peacetime and wartime were developed with the calculation of the necessary forces and means, the construction of a communications center for the Central Control Center for Logistics of the Armed Forces began. In the 1980s, separate battalions were formed in the armies and army corps, and in the military districts, separate communications regiments of rear command posts. These measures have greatly increased the efficiency of rear management in all its links.

As for the automation of control, the headquarters of the rear of the Armed Forces has always been at its forefront. Already in 1962, a computing center of the headquarters of the Logistics of the Armed Forces appeared. In 1968, a computer center for the Logistics of the Armed Forces was created, equipped with the most modern computers at the end of the 60s "Minsk-22". This made it possible to solve problems in the interests of both the headquarters of the Logistics of the Armed Forces and the Main Military Medical Directorate. In 1971, two BESM-4s were put into operation. During 1975-1977, the existing computers were replaced with more powerful EC-1030 and EC-1022. In 1982, the Lavender complex of automation equipment for the operational-tactical control level was put into service, and in 1987, the Saigak mobile automated logistics control complex was put into operation. In the period 1990-2000, a mobile automated complex for controlling the rear and technical support front (army, division). In July 2000, the complex was put into service and put into operation.

At present, the Armed Forces Logistics command and control system consists of subsystems for commanding the rear of the center (up to 60 command and control agencies in peacetime), branches of the Armed Forces (4 command agencies), military districts and fleets (13 command agencies). In the future, it should include more than 4,000 controls equipped with automation tools.

In the context of the ongoing military reform, the task of paramount importance is to ensure the required level of efficiency and reliability in command and control of troops (forces), their rear, both in peacetime and in wartime. In the process of solving it, one has to take into account a number of factors: changing geopolitical conditions on the territory of the former USSR and in the world as a whole, the need to develop qualitatively new approaches to the development of command and control systems, to meet the needs of information exchange between headquarters and command posts to the maximum, the constant improvement of weapons, electronic warfare and intelligence, insufficient level of sustainability existing system management, resource constraints, etc.

In this regard, the main tasks of the further development of the Armed Forces Logistics Management System are: required level efficiency and reliability of rear management in peacetime, a threatened period and in the conduct of war; compliance with the main operational and strategic requirements common system management of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; improving the automation of the processes of managing the rear of the center, the services of the Armed Forces and the branches of the troops, based on their structural construction and the tasks they solve; increasing the efficiency of control by modernizing existing and creating new stationary and mobile control points.

The development of the Armed Forces Logistics command and control system is based on the following principles: maximum use of the capabilities of the existing command and control system of the Armed Forces, taking into account its subsequent integration into the national command and control system; consistent convergence of the characteristics of the rear control system for peacetime and wartime conditions; balanced development of all constituent parts systems based on the introduction of highly efficient automated controls; reducing the time and cost of creating modern systems and management tools due to their unification and standardization; increasing the survivability of stationary and the creation of unified mobile rear command posts; improving the quality indicators (timeliness, reliability and secrecy) of the transmitted information; creation of territorial systems for command and control of the rear of military districts in strategic and operational areas, interconnected with the systems of command and control of troops of military districts and the nationwide automated system communications, to solve problems of ensuring joint actions of different departmental groupings of troops.

The control bodies of all units of the rear will be developed by improving the organizational structures and training of officials in the interests of effective management of the rear of the Armed Forces both in peacetime and in wartime. It is planned to improve the working methods of officials, to equip them with modern means of control, primarily PCs, and to make wider use of local computer networks.

Improving the system of rear command posts is aimed at optimizing their structure, ensuring high survivability of launchers and stability of control, reliably guaranteeing the continuity of command of subordinate troops (forces) and institutions in any situation. In the near future, it is planned to develop prototypes of stationary and standard mobile control posts of the military and operational level, built on a modular basis. They will form the basis of a single network of rear control points.

The development of control facilities is carried out with the expectation of integration into the territorial communications system of the Armed Forces being created, and subsequently into a single integrated data exchange network of the Armed Forces; to ensure the interaction of the rear structures of the Armed Forces with other troops, military formations, as well as bodies government controlled Russian Federation; further improvement of the automated control system for the logistics of the armed forces and the communications control system.

The fulfillment of tasks for the development of automation of the logistics management is carried out in accordance with the program of work for the development and improvement of the ACS of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2010, which provides for the continuation of work on the creation of an experimental site for an automated control unit for the Logistics of the Armed Forces, complexes of automation equipment in the center and military districts, modernization of existing complexes, development and improvement information system. Work aimed at improving and building up special software for complexes of automation tools for all levels of management, creation mathematical models processes of logistic support of operations (combat actions).

TsAMO RF, f.208, op. 224922, d.1, l. 53-5

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Office of the Chief of Logistics of the Missile Forces strategic purpose

Until December 2008 - the body of the military control of the rear of the Strategic Missile Forces; since 2009 - logistics body of the Strategic Missile Forces. Formed 12/31/1959.

In the process of development and improvement of the Strategic Missile Forces, the development of the organizational and staffing structure of the rear services of associations, formations, units and subunits, the logistics support system of the Rocket Forces, the standards for maintaining stocks of materiel, methods and methods for solving the tasks facing the rear. Logistic support is organized taking into account the requirements for ensuring and maintaining constant combat readiness of missile formations and units, the specifics of the organization of combat duty, as well as special conditions their placement.

In the course of carrying out combat duty, exercises and training, the rear management bodies accumulated and generalized the experience of providing troops in different conditions. By 1964, the development of the basics of logistics support for missile formations was completed. In 1966, a provisional Regulation on Logistic Support for Formations and Units of Individual Launches was developed and introduced. Adoption in the late 70s. to arm missile systems with separate launches (OS) required a significant change in the organization of logistics support for missile formations and units. In this regard, a decision was made to form a new military unit of the rear: a logistics base, which was responsible for providing units and subunits with food and clothing, organizing accommodation and meals for personnel involved in routine and testing work on combat missile systems, reception, issue, maintenance of stocks of material resources in the established size and nomenclature, their dispersal and shelter in field areas, bath and laundry services for personnel. A logistics unit was created in the regiments of the OS to provide personnel on combat duty at the command post and on guard.

By the mid 70's - early 80's. profound qualitative changes are taking place in armament, organizational and staffing structure, views on combat use Rocket troops and their management. Changed perceptions about possible ways the impact of a potential enemy on objects in positional areas. This significantly influenced the choice of ways to further improve the logistics support of the Missile formations and units. A number of organizational and technical measures are being taken to increase the mobility of rear units and subunits.

In subsequent years, the Rocket Forces were equipped with complexes with mobile launchers, which required the development of new approaches to their rear support. For the units armed with these complexes, mobile (portable) stocks of the main types of materiel were developed and introduced by order of the Minister of Defense.

Since the mid 80s. The rear of the Rocket Forces joined in providing trial operation combat railway missile systems (BZHRK), first at the training ground, and then on combat patrol routes. For this purpose, an appropriate organizational and staffing structure for the rear of the formations and units of this complex was developed and the procedure for logistics was worked out. At the mock-up stage, the rear services actively participated in the development of the components of the complex aimed at creating normal living conditions for combat duty personnel and achieving the given autonomy of the BZHRK in the rear. The complex included: a dining car, dormitory cars for personnel, an autonomous reserve car, and a tank car. On technical positions, drinking water ionization stations for long-term storage were created. For the first time, the entire personnel of the duty forces of the complex began to be provided with food according to the norms of flight rations.

The adoption of the Topol and BZHRK missile systems required the search and introduction of new methods of logistics support into the troops. The rear of the Rocket Forces, based on the experience of carrying out combat duty and exercises, determined the basics for organizing material, domestic, medical and other types of support, which were reflected in the statutory documents (regulation on logistics, Regulations on the base of material and domestic support, on the automobile battalion and others ).

In the 1980s, along with the improvement of logistic support for combat duty and combat readiness, the rear of all links carried out a huge amount of work to ensure the elimination of medium-range missiles, especially in draining and handing over to industrial plants and warehouses of the center of rocket fuel components, transportation of rocket weapons for arsenals, the disbandment of units and subunits of the rear, the liquidation of the military economy and the revision of formations and military units.

In the course of the ongoing reform and development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Strategic Missile Forces, the problem of the constant presence in formations and units of such a rear, which is capable of switching to martial law without significant changes and uninterruptedly providing troops in the most difficult conditions of a combat situation, has become more acute than before. For the correct solution of this problem, it is very important that all issues related to further development the material and technical base of the rear of the Strategic Missile Forces, improving its functional composition and organizational structure, have been researched and implemented comprehensively using the latest scientific methods. It was necessary to clarify the purpose, tasks, role, place of all the main structural elements military and operational rear, to find the most expedient correlation and interconnections between them. A very important circumstance that had a positive impact on the activities of the rear of the Missile Forces was the qualitative reorganization of its main bodies - the base of material support and a separate automobile battalion. As a result of their merger, a new formation of the rear of the division was formed - a logistic support base, which settled down according to the combined arms principle and united under a single command warehouses, stocks of materiel, transport units, forces and means of maintenance and repair, and practically became able to accept, contain part of the stocks on “wheels”, to carry out their complex supply to units, refuel equipment, and also timely solve other tasks for the rear support of troops. In general, such a restructuring of the military rear services made it possible to ensure the mobility, efficiency and controllability of the forces and means of the rear, the solution of larger tasks by smaller forces.

During the re-equipment of missile regiments with a modern mobile ground missile system"Topol-M", the rear of the Strategic Missile Forces, in cooperation with the headquarters of the Logistics of the Armed Forces, redesigned the staff of the rear of the missile regiment, with the inclusion of the most advanced technical means in the report card.

The Office of the Chief of Logistics was headed by: Lieutenant General Ponomarev M.I. (1959-1968), Petrov D.P. (1968-1976), Sulatskov S.F. (1976-1979), Katerukhin E.I. (1979-1985); Colonel General Shilovsky V.P. (1985-1989), Nikitin G.P. (1989-1992); Lieutenant General Kosenko Yu.G. (1992-1995); Colonel General Vasenin V.A. (1995-1997); Lieutenant General Kolesnikov V.M. (1997-2001), Ivanov A.G. (2002-2005), Legavin V.N. (2005-2008); Major General Chikunov A.V. (from 2008 to present).