Modern problems of science and education. Problems in the implementation of investment projects Absence of problems in the implementation of the project

"Economic analysis: theory and practice", 2007, N 2

The greatest difficulty is the forecasting of large and international investment projects, as a rule, construction ones. The main reasons for the difficulties that arise in their forecasting are.

Objective factors:

• rising prices for building components (materials);
• clarification of technical solutions at various stages of project implementation;
• significant technical changes to the project;
• additional regulatory requirements, including in the field of safety and ecology;
• delays in construction and downtime caused by both financial and non-financial reasons;
• social obligations;
• deterioration of the money market in the country where the project is being implemented: rising inflation, changes in tax conditions, devaluation, etc.;
• researchers consider the complexity and complexity of the project to be a special factor in increasing the cost of construction, which increases the level of uncertainty due to a combination of risks of different nature.

Subjective factors:

• the desire of project managers for easier approval and launch of projects;
• nomination by contractors during tenders of underestimated financial offers to strengthen their competitive positions;
• "political decisions" about the start of projects.

Let's consider these factors in more detail.

objective factors. Forecasting large and international projects is becoming less effective every year, despite seemingly proven forecasting models and experience in implementing various projects. Let's take a look at some statistics. Conducted by Aalborg University (Denmark) study of 260 projects implemented in 1910 - 1998. in 20 countries, showed that 90% of them were completed in excess of the initial estimate. In most cases, the rise in price ranged from 50 to 100% of the initial cost, for some projects it increased by 10 - 20 times.

The most significant cost overruns were observed in the construction of the Suez Canal, the construction of the supersonic passenger liner Concorde (USA), the construction of the Trans-Alaska oil pipeline system and the Big Dig highway (Boston). In them, the actual costs exceeded the initial estimate by 19, 11, 8 and 5 times, respectively. The situation was no better in Russia. One of the most ambitious projects in Russia and in the world was the construction of the Siberian Railway (SZhM), the decision on which was made in 1897. individual sections of the route. The total cost overrun for the construction of the SZhM (including the Chinese Eastern Railway) amounted to 186%. Another well-known project (albeit already in the USSR) is the construction of the Baikal-Amur Railway (BAM). During the construction, which lasted several decades, the budget was exceeded by 5 times and amounted to 10 billion rubles. Cost overruns have always been a characteristic phenomenon in the electricity sector of the USSR, for example, during the construction of the Volga hydroelectric power station (1950 - 1958) and the Irkutsk thermal power plant (1952 - 1961)<1>.

<1>The history of major projects in the former USSR shows that cost overruns were common, and an in-depth analysis of their causes was the exception rather than the rule. Finding specific culprits for cost overruns has often replaced a systematic approach to project management.

The reasons for the rise in the cost of projects in a planned and market economy outwardly differ, but systemic factors do not depend on the state regime. When applied to large-scale projects, various external causes can be considered as expressions of similar systemic problems:

• inability to mobilize the resources needed for major construction in a limited time frame and in limited sectors. Often projects require fundamentally different resources and new technologies that have not been used before;
• a large project in most cases is a self-developing system, the elements of which require constant adjustment;
• large projects tend to be highly sensitive to political and legal changes;
• they are characterized high costs on adaptation to the environment and protective measures.

The greatest impact on changing project parameters is exerted by:

• price changes (even with a short forecast horizon) affect the cost of the project by an average of 40 - 50%;
• problems associated with the complication of technical solutions. It is almost impossible to fully foresee all potential technical risks, especially when it comes to work in regions with difficult climatic conditions or the implementation of innovative projects;
• environmental factor. The construction of large facilities is almost always associated with a negative social effect. The initial coordination of environmental parameters with relevant state structures does not insure the initiators against additional difficulties. The activity of environmental non-governmental organizations and foundations is constantly increasing<2>;
• legal aspect. The construction of large projects is subject to a variety of regulatory documents - from federal laws to orders (orders) of local authorities. Changing the legal field in any part of it may lead to the suspension of the project, however, they complex forecast almost impossible at all levels;
• control. Organization of international projects is complex managerial task, which is associated with various kinds of errors.

<2> For example, in February 2006, it turned out that the route of the Angarsk-Nakhodka gas pipeline planned for construction would pass through the Ukok high plateau - a natural park in Altai. In the same time environmental organizations announced the need to reroute the gas pipeline, which would require an additional several hundred million US dollars. Given the strategic importance of the pipeline and the cost of possible changes, Rosprirodnadzor will not put any special obstacles on the project. It is unlikely that Transneft will change anything in the route of the project, in connection with which it is provided with additional costs to neutralize the negative external background around the project.

Let's consider the problems of project cost rise on the examples of individual industries.

Transport construction projects are characterized by a number of properties inherent in most large projects:

• high cost of implementation;
• the impact of complex natural conditions, geological parameters and geographical extent;
• high level regulation transport construction;
• participation of joint capital - private and state;
• a complex system of relations with suppliers and contractors, forming a chain of inter-industry interactions;
• great impact of the project on the livelihoods of the population living in the construction area;
• high level of environmental impact.

Research shows that out of 10 transport infrastructure projects, nine experience cost overruns, with:

• the total cost railways on average 45% higher than the initially determined cost;
• the total cost of stationary communications (tunnels and bridges) is on average 34% higher than the initially established cost;
• the final cost of roads is on average 20% higher than the initially set cost.

The total cost of all types of transport projects is on average 30% higher than the initial cost (examples for some projects are given in Table 1).

Table 1

Examples of cost overruns for various projects

Source: "Expert RA".

The main reason for the increase in the cost of the construction project of the Great Belt railway tunnel in Denmark by 80% was ecological problems already identified during the project. The initial cost overrun for the construction of the Channel Tunnel is due to a combination of reasons, including changing safety requirements, delays in the construction phase and rising prices, which in itself increased the cost of the project by 40%.

According to experts (in particular, the manager of one of the world's largest Swedish construction company Skanska J. Ots), in the construction of large facilities it is quite acceptable to exceed the estimate by 20 - 30%, and in the construction of, for example, an underground or underwater tunnel, a twofold cost overrun is considered normal. The Estonian newspaper Delovye Vedomosti cites the facts of the implementation of road projects in Tallinn, which confirm the opinion of Ots. According to the financial report of the Tallinn city government for 2001, only in road construction the planned budget was exceeded by 107% - from 84 to 175 million kroons, while not a single company (!) met the declared estimate.

According to the data in Table. 2, for the considered projects, the most common reason for the rise in price was the refinement of technical solutions at the design stage. Secondly, the rise in prices is associated with downtime and delays in construction, which entail fines, penalties and even obsolescence of already built structures. An important factor in the rise in the cost of Russian and foreign projects are also changes in the regulatory framework governing the execution of construction work. The longer the project implementation period, the higher the likelihood of legislative changes and additions that affect the cost of the project.

table 2

Reasons and comments about the rise in the cost of large projects

Project	Initial price	rise in price	Main causes rise in price	Comments
1. Communication tunnel through Irtysh river, Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan	3.5 million USD	71,4%	Change design solutions for raise ecological security (replacement semi-anadromous channel on tunnel)	Data provided June 2002 When construction there was no tunnel completed. Fact flooding tunnel and suspense construction according to reason insufficient funding from the side Kazakh government, throughout visibility, led to further rise in price project
2. Liquidation area "Erosion" (restorative work at construction Petersburg subway), Russia	1 billion rub.	46,4%	downtime due to untimely funding from the side urban authorities	rise in price assessed within volume funding for 2004
3. Ring automotive road (KAD), Saint Petersburg	24 billion rub.	166%	Clarification technical decisions in connection with complex geological conditions, long chain suppliers, downtime due to interruptions in financing	Construction CAD should have end at 2005 full input in exploitation was planned for 2007
4. Bus station "Moscow", Minsk	11 million rub.	54,5%	price rise, application of new construction materials, introduction of new construction standards	Construction was implemented in period since 1987 to 1999
5. Freeway "Big Dig", Boston	2.6 billion USD	461,5%	price rise, additional requirements for ecology, costs for maintaining order and security	Grade produced according to April data 2003 - moment of entry into bridge Action, tunnel and almost complete graduation construction. Administration state Massachusetts in present time holds detailed investigation reasons rise in price

Source: "Expert RA".

Objects of the oil and gas complex. The process of commissioning fields at the beginning of the new century is more difficult than in the 1970s, and the cost of one ton of explored hydrocarbon reserves is becoming higher every year. As a rule, the development of oil fields is carried out in extremely difficult natural conditions. Distances from fisheries to large settlements can be up to several thousand kilometers, which significantly complicates the delivery of goods, fuel, equipment, food and workers to the place of work. The inaccessibility of power lines forces the creation and use of autonomous energy sources, which, in the conditions of energy-intensive projects, significantly increases the cost. The inaccessibility of most fisheries requires the development of expensive road infrastructure at the initial stage of the project, which is associated with large financial costs. The least predictable risks are associated with geological exploration technologies, which in turn depend on natural factors.

As already mentioned, oil and gas projects usually include not only the development of fields, but also the construction of transport infrastructure - pipelines. The reasons for the rise in the cost of their construction are similar to those of ordinary large transport projects. The large territorial length of pipelines and difficult climatic conditions largely determine the high probability of error in calculating their cost. In recent decades, adjustments to the regulatory framework in terms of compliance with environmental requirements at all construction sites have become a serious factor in the rise in prices, and the costs associated with the protection environment, including the emergence of new modern technologies(Table 3).

Table 3

Main resource projects and circumstances of their rise in price

Name project	Initial price (billion dollars) USA)	rise in price	Main reasons rise in price	Comments
1. Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan	3,2	12,5%	Delays in implementation project, acceptance additional measures to security in Georgia, depreciation dollar against other leading global currencies, rising prices for equipment and services in oil sector	Data given as of November 2004 When construction oil pipeline was done 99%
2. Development gas condenser satny Place of Birth Shah Deniz (Azerbaijan)	3,2	25%	Cost increase materials used for construction, devaluation of the American dollar, which was calculated cost project	According to bp company, project partner, appreciation in mostly touched construction platforms TPG-500
3. Project Snovit - construction complex for production LNG<3>, Norway	5,8	30%	Significant change design solutions, changing conditions taxation	According to mid 2004 construction in project does not continue
4. Modernization Kremenchug refinery	unknown	30%	Rising prices, no competition in choosing contractors	-
5. SWG (development shallow water parts of Guneshali - rehabilitation old site and development new), Azerbaijan	0,5 - preliminary GNK calculations, 0.7 - feasibility study	114,3%	gradual decline productivity developed reservoirs and need for investment funds in new ways extraction and intensification oil recovery, growth equipment wear	Data about rise in price given according to as of 2001 Score rise in price produced according to towards feasibility study (1997)
6. Trans-Alaska oil pipeline system	0,9	788,9%	Additional costs for installation of supports for ground part pipeline, measures to protection of the pipeline from earthquake explosion, rising prices	-
7. Construction major pipeline systems (first turn), Russia	0,4	20,7%	Rising prices, change designs hydrotechnical structures, clarification technical solutions for improve reliability and ecological system security, providing the necessary port infrastructure	Along with overspending on individual articles happened significant cost savings
8. Caspian pipeline consortium	2,1	76%	Not known	Based on 1998 data
9. Experienced industrial development maritime Place of Birth Kashagan, Kazakhstan	7	114%	Rising prices, necessity additional geological surveys, delay in receiving/ lack of necessary approvals and permits and etc.	largest oil project Kazakhstan being developed on terms section products. Initial calculation cost was produced in the beginning of the past decades

<3>Includes subsea facilities, offshore pipeline, onshore terminal, liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant and 3 dedicated offshore vessels.

Source: "Expert RA".

The above data on the rise in the cost of oil and gas projects allow us to draw the following conclusions. Rising prices are the most common reason for rising prices. The second reason was the refinement of technical solutions or the transition to new solutions, which is typical for projects implemented in difficult climatic conditions. Less pronounced, but no less significant, are the regulatory requirements and orders of regulatory expert bodies. In some cases, the overestimation is due to contributions to social programs, but they do not significantly affect the project.

A typical example of the rising cost of an oil and gas project is the construction of the first stage of a large pipeline system in Russia. The reasons for the increase in project costs are complex character(the share of each item in the total increase in price is indicated):

• rising prices for equipment, materials, electricity, pipe products, construction works, oil products and services - 50.4%;
• clarification of technical solutions - 16%;
• performance additional work for the construction of objects of the second stage - 14.7%;
• change in the design of hydraulic structures - 8.9%;
• additional costs for land acquisition - 5.1%;
• an agreement with the regional administration on targeted financing of housing construction - 3.5%;
• providing the necessary administrative infrastructure of the terminal (organization of customs and border services, providing them with the necessary housing) - 0.9%;
• cleaning of construction areas from explosive objects - 0.5%.

Along with overspending on a number of items, savings occurred (in particular, instead of purchasing funds, they were rented, part of the costs was postponed to a later period).

An analysis of the causes of excess spending also points to the leading role price factor, including inflation. Active construction of the first stage of the system was carried out in 2000 - 2001, when the average inflation rate was more than 32%. If the project were carried out in modern conditions, the impact of inflation would be less, but it is unlikely that the rise in prices would lose its decisive significance.

Development of Kashagan oil field in Kazakhstan is the largest project in the Caspian region, it is carried out under production sharing agreements. The project investor is the North Caspian Consortium (NCC), the operator is one of the members of the CCC, the Italian company Agip KCO.

At the first stage, it was necessary to carry out a pilot development of the deposit; the start of oil production was scheduled for 2005. According to the latest data, actual production will not take place until 2009. Simultaneously with the increase in commissioning time, the cost of pilot development has doubled, which increased the total cost of the project by $5 billion to $29 billion. USA. Experts note that as the budget grows, pressure on the initiators from the government of Kazakhstan increases to increase donor support. Apparently, donor contributions become an additional "payment" for initially made mistakes in identifying project costs.<4>.

<4>According to Agip KCO, the main reasons for the increase in the cost of the project are:

• rising world prices for equipment and services for the oil industry;
• increase in the number of appraisal wells;
• delays due to the need to obtain numerous permits from various departments of the republic;
• delays in the fulfillment of financial obligations by some shareholders;
• errors in calculations when estimating costs, etc.

Of particular interest is the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TATS) project, which was built at a huge cost overrun due to changes in the engineering plan. In 1969, the cost of the work was estimated at $900 million, assuming that the entire pipeline would be laid underground. As a result of a partial change in the technical plan, it was decided to install about half of the pipeline on special supports above the ground, which increased its cost to $4.5 billion. After construction was completed in 1977, the total cost of TATS (including pumping stations, valves, marine terminal) amounted to 8 billion US dollars.

A few years ago, an assessment was made of the possible cost of the project, taking into account modern conditions. According to calculations, if the facility had been built in 1999, then in this year's prices, the costs would have amounted to $22 billion - almost three times the final cost. In addition, an additional 25% of the said cost would have been spent on law enforcement measures in accordance with current regulations.

VPK. As a rule, the largest military developments are characterized by a high share of innovations. In most cases, they are classified, but there is still information on individual projects in the public domain (Table 4).

Table 4

Some projects of the military-industrial complex and the circumstances of their rise in price

Name project	Initial price	rise in price	Main reasons rise in price	Comments
1. Laser NIF installation (National Ignition Facility, USA	2.1 billion USD	138%	Necessity new technical protection solutions optics from dust	The project is in implementation stage. Installation will have multifunctional meaning and be used as in military, as well as civilian purposes
2. Development fighter- "stealth" F-35, USA	5 billion USD	660%	Development of new technologies and extension opportunities aircraft. Weight reduction aircraft. Installation on aircraft protective systems that are not allow foreign buyers copy secret knots and aggregates	Data on planned growth aircraft cost
3. Modernization 18 intelligence nimrod aircraft, Great Britain	3 billion USD	33,3%	Requires full redesign machines: from existing park Nimrod machines can leave only fuselages. Planned create an airplane other wing, cabin, engines and combat systems	Contract in progress implementation

Source: "Expert RA".

A significant factor in the rise in the cost of defense projects are new technical solutions, the possibility of developing and applying which was absent at the initial stages of planning. For this reason, accurate cost planning is more difficult in defense projects than in projects in other areas of the economy. Innovation projects, as a rule, change their configuration at each next stage of implementation. As the Pentagon official overseeing the development of the F-35 stealth fighter noted: “The price is going up because at the beginning of the project you don’t know how much it costs. It’s about development and a new understanding of the program.” Another factor in the rise in the cost of defense projects can be recognized as longer periods of work than previously planned.

Nuclear power. The decisive condition for the implementation nuclear projects is to ensure their high reliability and adherence to strict security parameters. Available data on the rise in the cost of these projects are given in Table. 5.

Table 5

Some projects in the field of nuclear energy and the circumstances of their rise in price

Name project	Initial price	rise in price	Main reasons rise in price	Comments
1. Factory recycling nuclear waste, Hanford, USA	4,35 billion Doll. USA	31%	clarifications in technical solutions for each implementation stage project	The project was approved in 2000 Construction factory continues. The increase in value is indicated as of July 2004
2. Project refurbishment factory Y-12 (operations with enriched uranium), Oak Ridge, USA	120 million USD	252%	Backlog from graphic arts construction for 5 years	Overspending Data given according to as of March 2004 The project is not completed
3. NPP "Clinton", USA	430 million USD	900%	unworked technology, problems with providing security	Completed project. Planned construction of a new blocks in the square power plants
4. Completion and launch of the 3rd power unit Kalinin NPP	400 million USD	175%	Definitely not installed. had place deviation from chart construction - more than one year	Block launched at operation. Marked high degree of quality and readiness for block start

Source: "Expert RA".

Most nuclear projects are characterized by temporary delays due to additional elaboration of safety and reliability issues at various stages of implementation. In addition, decision-making on the construction of nuclear power plants in various countries of the world is often difficult due to the presence at the government level of conflicting opinions on the advisability of developing nuclear energy, as well as due to the negative reaction of the public and the local population to them.

Summarizing the above, we will derive a single algorithm for the influence of various factors on the cost of projects, taking into account their industry specifics (Table 6).

Table 6

The influence of objective factors on the rise in the cost of large projects, depending on their sectoral structure

Rise factor	Projects
oil and gas	transport	defense	atomic
1. Rise in prices and change financial parameters	Widely spread
2. Refinement of technical decisions	Widely spread	not typical
3. New technical solutions	common	Not common	Widely spread
4. New regulations requirements / comments	common	Not common	Wide common
5. Delays (downtime)	common	Not typical
6. Errors in management project	Not common	common
7. Unforeseen factors	common
8. Social obligations	common	not typical

Source: "Expert RA".

subjective factors. Among the subjective factors that make it difficult to predict projects, we note the decision-making mechanism based on the political (strategic) importance of projects. Let's single out the five most common types of situations in the field of international projects that have shaped the "political" decisions taken at the state level.

1. In most of these cases, the possibilities of the world market in terms of the prospects for the implementation of the project are not taken into account at all. A striking example of this thesis was the Blue Stream project. In 1997, in accordance with an intergovernmental agreement, OAO Gazprom entered into a commercial contract with a Turkish state company BOTAS to supply gas to Turkey for 25 years. According to the technical implementation, Blue Stream is one of the most complex and capital-intensive gas pipelines in the world (the cost of its construction amounted to $2.7 billion). According to preliminary estimates Turkish company, by 2005 the national demand for gas was to reach 43 billion cubic meters. m, and in 2020 they would amount to 82 billion cubic meters. m of gas. It seemed possible to ensure such demand through well-established channels: since 1987, the republic has been actively purchasing raw materials from Russia, Iran and Nigeria. It was expected that the project would pay off in 5-7 years.

However, in 2000, during additional verifications, the economic efficiency of the deal was called into question: the Turkish prosecutor's office opened a criminal case on fraud involving government officials. The results of the investigation forced the Turkish authorities to refuse further deliveries, which led to the threat economic sanctions for breach of contract. As a result of the negotiations, the parties agreed to reduce the volume and cost of deliveries. As of mid-2004, about 1.2 billion cubic meters were supplied under the contract. m of gas, while the volume previously planned for 2002 - 2004. exports were recorded within 12 billion cubic meters. m! To make up for lost profits (Gazprom's lost profit over 25 years when the project was liquidated was estimated at 25-42 billion US dollars), Gazprom began construction of another branch of the pipeline to the Israeli market, which increased the cost of the project and extended its payback period for an indefinite period . In addition, the project received similar sales risks: in the fuel and energy balance of Israel, the share of oil is 67%, coal - 30%, natural gas - only 1%. The prospects for the project still look uncertain.

1. In some cases, the hasty study of the basic elements of the project entails a subsequent conflict of interests of shareholders, which is most clearly expressed in the project of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). Oil pipeline system of CPC - the first major oil pipeline in the territory former USSR, built with the participation of private capital, came into operation in 2001. It connects the Tengiz field in Kazakhstan with a marine terminal located near Novorossiysk. CPC at the time of its foundation was the only transport corridor for the sale of Kazakh raw materials for export. The founders of the consortium in 1992 were the governments of Russia, Kazakhstan and the Sultanate of Oman (as of June 1, 2006, their combined share was 50% of the share capital). In 1996 leading Russian and foreign companies joined the project. Project documentation(feasibility study) was prepared by the specialized institute Giprovostokneft and American company Fluor Daniel, the total cost of the first stage of construction amounted to 2.6 billion US dollars (total for the project - 3.7 billion US dollars).

In 2004, the volume of deliveries through the pipeline reached 22.5 million tons (capacity in 2005 made it possible to transport 28.2 million tons, of which 13.5 million - directly from the Tengiz field). It is expected that by 2006 production at this field will increase to 23 million tons per year. Despite the need to expand the capacity (up to 67 million tons per year set in the feasibility study), the corresponding memorandum has not yet been signed, which is explained by the intention of the Russian side to resolve a number of technical issues, in particular in the field of marketing, as well as due to disagreements in the tariff policy (the current the value of the tariff for the pumping of raw materials was agreed upon by all shareholders of the consortium and formed the basis for the payback of the project)<5>. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that without an increase in the tariff, the Russian authorities may not approve the start of construction of the second stage of the project, in which both private shareholder companies and the Republic of Kazakhstan are interested. The situation is largely confusing and is based on the desire of shareholders not to lose their own, sometimes to the detriment of previously reached agreements and the competitiveness of the project itself in comparison with alternative ones (for example, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or Baku-Novorossiysk).

<5>At the end of 2004, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the Russian Federation approved the proposals of the Federal Energy Commission (FEC) to include the Russian section of the pipeline in the register of natural monopolies, which makes it possible for the commission to set transportation tariffs after agreeing them with the main shareholders.

1. The "strategic" nature of some projects completely overshadows the need to study their feasibility and economic efficiency. The Russian project for the construction of an oil pipeline to the Pacific Ocean (Angarsk - Nakhodka), which has been actively discussed since 1999 with a view to determining optimal routes. It was only in May 2005 that an order was issued by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the Russian Federation on the construction of the first stage of the facility to the town of Skovorodino, which is located 70 km from the border with China. The total cost of the project (including its component before China) is estimated at $6.5 billion. The route of the oil pipeline, although it provides favorable opportunities for the sale of oil to China, but no final decision has been made on it, which is associated with the risk of supplying raw materials through it in the required volume, including due to insufficient investment in geological exploration of East Siberian subsoil . The strategy of the project does cause serious criticism. Russian officials believe that "the first stage of the pipeline can be guaranteed to be filled with West Siberian oil"<6>, analysts do not have such confidence, because at present only two large deposits: Talakanskoye and Verkhnechonskoye, which together by 2010 should provide no more than 17 million tons of raw materials (out of 80 million tons needed). President of Transneft OJSC S. Vainshtok called these fears justified, arguing the need for construction by the fact that "we will never get the development of the East Siberian province if we do not build a pipe there ... Economic feasibility can be ensured only thanks to such plasticity"<7>.

<6>"Vedomosti" dated 05/27/2005 - S. B-3.
<7>From an interview with S. Vainshtok "Kommersant" from 29.04.2005.

On the whole, the effectiveness of Transneft's financial forecasting cannot be called high: the company prefers to form a marketing strategy during construction or after it. In particular, in 2004, there were cases of downtime of the transport capacities it had previously created, which, in the opinion of its representatives, were associated with low rates of raw material extraction. Russian manufacturers and shortcomings in the formation of export schedules. In this regard, the company, together with the Ministry of Industry and Energy of Russia, had to make a decision to reduce the previously planned turnover of the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS).

Despite the general approval of the project, the rationale for the return on investment is so superficial that it entails a high probability of a significant change in its cost parameters. As you can see, few people care about this - after all, the project is being implemented by a state-owned company in the national interests. It should be recalled that earlier, in 2002, a much more efficient and economically viable scheme for the implementation of the project was proposed by Yukos, which, within the framework of a joint venture on a parity basis, intended to carry out construction for 2.5 billion US dollars, laying a pipeline to Dadqing, where the main processing plants are located. power of China. No organizational and financial alternative to the version proposed earlier by Yukos has yet been presented.

1. Obvious blunders in the territorial construction of international projects related to momentary decisions of the state to comply with the commodity market are not common, so such cases always attract attention. In August 2001, the opening of the Odessa-Brody pipeline took place in Ukraine throughput 14.5 million tons of oil per year for the transit of Caspian oil to Europe. The cost of public investment in construction amounted to $465.4 million. Case in between folk practice unprecedented - for 3 years the pipeline was actually empty, and since July 2004 it has been in use Russian companies in reverse mode (northward). For 2004 - 2005 transported only a few million tons of oil. Strategic miscalculations were cited as reasons for the downtime - the previously planned inflow of raw materials from the Caspian was eventually placed in the pipeline system of Transneft OJSC, and prices for Russian oil in Central Europe turned out to be more profitable for buyers. As can be seen now, the assessment of the effectiveness of the construction of the pipeline was dealt with superficially due to the need for the state to gain access to serious energy channels and facilities as soon as possible in a favorable market environment.

The correctness of this assumption is confirmed by experts. According to TNK-BP President A. Gorodetsky, "the oil pipeline... will operate in reverse mode until the completion of a comprehensive analysis of the most efficient options for its operation... (and)... direct operation of the oil pipeline is possible after its completion..."<8>. The prospects for this project are not clear to this day.

<8>From an interview with A. Gorodetsky to Kommersant dated 03/16/2005.

1. As already mentioned, environmental and social violations in large international projects are observed quite often, which has become a chronic (and almost intractable) shortcoming for the vast majority of such projects. In some cases, they become quite outrageous. As the most obvious example, let's consider the international project Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, despite the complimentary nature of statements addressed to it by authoritative foreign publications. The violations committed are unlikely to cause irreparable damage to countries; they can be partially justified, given the technical complexity of the project and its capital intensity. However, some mistakes have repeatedly jeopardized the project's timeline and, as a result, led to a significant overestimation of the project. Maybe that's why the well-known Italian bank Banca Intesa, which at the end of 2004 announced the sale of its stake in the project, "could not stand the nerves". Previously, in mid-2004, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of Georgia suspended construction for two weeks to conduct a safety assessment. And environmentalists created the Baku-Ceyhan Campaign project in order to draw public attention to the environmental and social damage from the project. The effectiveness of the project management was investigated by the Trade and Industry Committee of the British House of Commons, which published a specialized report on poor quality coating of a quarter of pipe joints laid in Georgia. The large-scale social effect of the project, guaranteed by investors during the period of its budgeting, is also ambiguous: the prospects for subsequent employment of personnel after the execution of ongoing work on the construction of the relevant sections of the pipeline are very vague<9>.

<9>Apparently, intending to improve the negative information climate around the project, the British operator British Petroleum - BP (together with SOCAR they own a controlling stake - 55.1% of the shares) announced the allocation of grants to finance social programs Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey in the amount of up to USD 40 million.

According to the British company BP, the commissioning of the oil pipeline is scheduled for mid-2006. Assimilated investments amounted to $2.7 billion (out of $3.6 billion). However, there is still a risk of failure to meet the deadlines for supplying the pipeline with raw materials due to force majeure circumstances: the corresponding costs could amount to an additional $400 million. Returning to the activities of the British company, we note that scandals have already unfolded around its name caused by a violation of the ecology of the environment. For example, due to the 2003 Prudhoe Bay explosion incident in Alaska, the company was fined $716,000<10>. Another large foreign company - Total (also having a stake in the project) was noted in connection with major corruption investigations against its former leaders.

<10>"Vedomosti" dated 30.03.2005 - S. B-3.

In any case, a more complete assessment of the activities of the initiator can be given after the facility is put into operation. However, the circumstances in which the project is being implemented hardly allow us to note its high elaboration. And the ability of the British company's managers to smooth out fleeting conflicts, including with regional authorities on the allocation of donor deductions and compensation, is "worth its weight in gold."

As can be seen, the adequacy of forecasting international projects is significantly distorted as a result of the influence of factors that are far from economic in nature. In many cases, the economic and social expediency of projects is replaced by the observance of national interests, which as a result are increasingly undermined due to clumsiness and ill-conceived political decisions. Based on the above facts, we are forced to state that an international project is increasingly becoming a toy in the sphere of political interests of various states, and no one is interested in analyzing their economic efficiency.

1. A significant discrepancy between the final cost of a project and its initial budget is a systemic risk that depends on many reasons; and it is almost impossible to accurately predict the complex effect.
2. A steady rise in prices for the main types of materials used in construction, primarily for cement and steel, is typical for both the world and the Russian economy. The rise in prices for building materials and metal is the most significant and common reason for the rise in the cost of construction projects in the world.
3. The main reasons for the rise in prices for building materials in the global economy, according to researchers, are:

• rise in oil prices. Increase in the transport component in the cost of materials;
• construction boom driven by "the world's largest construction site" - China, which consumes more than 20% of the world's cement production, about 30% iron ore, 25% steel;
• political instability in the world.

A.E. Barinov

I propose to ask the question: is the phenomenon of management problems related to project activities? What points of contact with problems arise in the practice of solving design problems? If you think about it thoroughly, it may turn out that the situations diagnosed as problems in projects, in fact, do not have the nature of such obvious difficulties, since the problem and task contexts often conflict with each other.

What problems are causing the projects?

At the very beginning of our reasoning, I propose to pay attention to two articles published on our website. Firstly, this is a material dedicated to. In its first two sections, a brief substantiation of the problem-based approach to management is made. Secondly, in the article on creation, we talked about the fact that problems, goals and objectives are the engines of business development. It examined the phenomenon of the problem-target rhombus as a kind of model in which the project management paradigm is actively involved. And we return to this issue again, but from a somewhat different position.

Let me remind you that a problem is proposed to be understood as such an uncertainty or contradiction that arises at the management level, and its elimination cannot be achieved within the framework of the current management concept. And no matter what decision, based on the existing model, would not be taken, the contradiction or uncertainty is not eliminated. Below is a visual diagram of the main difference between a problem and a correctable difficulty. To get out of the crisis situation, it is necessary to change the very concept of management, fundamental, fundamental approaches to its construction. This means that strategic transformations are required, and the formulation of the project task begins to have a program character.

Model of the main difference of the correctable deviation from the problem

Taking into account the phenomenon described above, we can conclude that the sources of projects are, on the one hand, the goals and objectives of business development in accordance with the stage life cycle companies. On the other hand, the engine of unique tasks is root difficulties or, in other words, management problems. Examples of such tasks include reorganization of the management system, reengineering of business processes, transformation of corporate culture, etc.

In addition to pre-planned systemic changes caused by root problems, sometimes there is an urgent need to complete investments due to events such as an accident, a sharp collapse in demand, an indiscriminate layoff of staff, etc. In such cases, you need to understand that the activities implemented in the "fire" mode also correspond to one of the management problems. Only the management of the company in this case is dealing with overripe symptoms, resulting in an open hotbed of a crisis situation.

Therefore, to formulate the accumulated problem in time, to set on its basis a set of transformative goals, to develop a whole program of project activities is an essential aspect of strategic management. All these actions form a complex of sources external to the project. However, the contradiction or uncertainty refers to projects not only as a factor initiating them, a stoppage of activities can also occur within their implementation. We will consider this issue in the next section of the article.

Project Implementation Errors and Related Problems

Specialists and managers working in the project field inevitably face a situation of project failure, disruption in achieving the intended results: full or partial. A number of studies have been carried out on this topic. World Bank Position Spread, Institute economic development which, based on the results of observations of infrastructure projects, drew certain conclusions. Their essence is that problems arise due to role uncertainty among the participants. The roles of the customer, project manager, contractors are set vaguely, and this leads to negative consequences. In addition, there is no sufficient delimitation of liability.

Please note: neither the lack of dedicated financial resources, nor the level of technological development are identified as sources of key difficulties. The emphasis is on the imperfection of management. In principle, all the problems that can be identified in major projects, albeit on a smaller scale, can be transferred to simple tasks. Also interesting are the studies that were conducted by the PM Network in 1998, repeated in 2005 and at a later time. They show that 46-48% of projects have problems and a little less than 28% are not brought to a result at all for the same reasons.

The reasons for the failure of the project are most similar to the symptoms. As a rule, they are in the functional plane of the business management concept. Causes are more localized than problems and are closely related to subject area development of a particular company with its specifics. So, for example, in the IT field, according to research by IBM, the failures of an automation project are mainly associated with a lack of discipline, responsibility and skills. project management. Below is another example of the analysis of large IT tasks in relation to their failures, presented in the form of a diagram. If we consider the causes of disruptions in a general context, then the following points are most often called:

• insufficient level of resources;
• inadequate deadlines;
• incorrectly formulated goals;
• low level of team cohesion;
• surface planning;
• ineffective communications;
• changing the goals and objectives of the project at the time of its implementation;
• conflicts between the interests of functional units and the purpose of the project.

The composition of the causes of project failures according to Metagroup research (“Why Operation Projects Fail?”), 2002

If the reasons for the failure of the project reflect the symptoms of the problem, then the errors that arise during its planning and implementation, in fact, lead to it. A miss is never made in singular, there are usually several of them. Combined in a complex way, they lead to a problematic situation, when a contradiction or uncertainty becomes a fatal reality. Errors are usually divided into three groups.

1. Omissions related to the control object. The manager takes on a project task without fully understanding what his object is (goals, results, boundaries, plans, etc.).
2. Miscalculations related to the subject of management (mistakes in taking into account the interests of participants, in organizational structure and so on.).
3. Errors related to the project processes (risk assessment, communication gaps, etc.).

The ability to diagnose and avoid problems is important to a project manager. He must distinguish between an insoluble contradiction and a correctable difficulty. If he manages to make a diagnosis in time and correctly, to correct the mistakes made, then within the framework of the performed and corrected tasks, the situation is evened out, and the project, albeit with deviations, is brought to a successful completion. This suggests that the scope of the project manager's competencies grows over time with experience in managerial research and problem setting.

Why are there problems in the implementation of the project within the company that can lead to the failure of the undertaking. Our expert Maxim Yakubovich talks about this. He also gives recommendations for their solution.

2 . Combination of roles. Now imagine that the leader CRM implementations appointed the head of the sales department and he was also identified as the customer. Due to the lack of experience in project management, he will clearly make mistakes in planning, which will put a “bomb” under all the work. And the combination of the two roles will lead to the fact that he will begin to correct the mistakes made during planning through a compromise with himself (in matters of requirements for the CRM system). For example, an IT company does not have time to implement the functionality associated with receiving reports on transactions. The specialist may refuse this option. And at the system launch stage, in case of failure, everything is blamed on the IT company or employees who do not know how to use the program.

My belief is that there should be a healthy “conflict of interest” between the project manager and the customer: the manager needs to deliver the project on time and on budget, and the customer needs to get the expected result and start using it. Therefore, I advocate that in internal projects the roles of the manager and the customer should not be combined.

3. What causes a misunderstanding of the role of the project customer- on the part of the employee who is assigned to this role?

Let's take CRM as an example. First, the head of sales must understand that, as a customer, he makes all decisions regarding the requirements for the results of the project. You need to take responsibility for making such decisions, and not try to shift it to the leader or sponsor. Otherwise, this will lead to delays and disruption of the timing of the entire project.

Second, the head of sales should be responsible for agreeing on all project outcome requirements, not just those needed to improve the performance of his department. This can be difficult, because. the requirements of other departments, most likely, will seem not so important and the customer may neglect them.

4. ABOUTlack of employee motivation for the implementation of the CRM-system will lead to sabotage of the introduction of new software. The timeframe for completing the task will increase with this approach. Perhaps the project will be completely closed without achieving any results.

5. Problem with allocating scheduled time- if an employee combines work in the project with the main job, then he will most likely have the main job as a priority. And this jeopardizes the timely allocation of resources and ruins even a well-planned project. I wrote more about the problem.

6. Lack of reporting practices according to design tasks expressed in the fact that employees do not want to fill out reports. Because of this, it is difficult for the manager to understand whether everything is on schedule or if there are already some delays. This is fraught with loss of control of the project.

7. Lack of acceptance test rules upon delivery of the project will lead to the fact that the customer will not understand how to check how adequately the requirements for the results are implemented. This will lead to a delay in terms in general.

In a situation where the head of the sales department combines the roles of a customer and a manager, he will find a way to agree with himself and accept the project. At the same time, the quality of work is unlikely to be checked properly. There is a possibility that during the operation of the CRM-system, the company's employees will "suffer" with an unfinished product.

I had experience in managing an internal company project, where there was no regulated acceptance and delivery procedure. We have been "butting" with the customer for a long time to come to an agreement on this issue. After that, I decided that for any internal project, even at the start, there should be a procedure for accepting and delivering results. The customer must agree to this procedure.

So, the problems of internal projects have been sorted out, let's move on to recommendations for solving them:

In conclusion, I want to note that my experience does not cover all possible problems. Perhaps I missed some important points. You may also disagree with the suggested solutions. If so, I'm waiting for your suggestions in the comments to the article. Think about it.

Maxim Yakubovich

Project management expert, consultant and business coach of the Here and Now consulting group.

Over 10 years of experience in project management.
20 completed projects as project manager and project program manager.
Teaching experience - 10 years. About 2200 students have been trained at his seminars.

Lecturer in the Project Management module at the Russian School of Management.
Guest lecturer in Project Management at the British Higher School of Design.

A.V. Sheremetiev

Department of Organization and Management of Industrial Complexes, St. Petersburg State

the University of Economics"

PROBLEMS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTEGRATED PROJECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF URBAN TERRITORIES

Annotation. The article is devoted to the actual topic of the development of urban areas. The features of the implementation of projects for the integrated development of territories for the purpose of housing construction are considered. A modern approach to the rational use and management of a large territory, based on the interaction of the public and private sectors, as well as a comprehensive account of the compatibility of the functions of urban planning zones, has been studied.

Key words: territory, large city, developer, planning, real estate market.

A.V. Sheremetyev, Saint-Petersburg State University of Economics

PROBLEMS REALIZATION OF COMPLEX PROJECTS URBAN DEVELOPMENT

abstract. The article is devoted to the topic of development of urban areas. Considers the features of realization projects of complex development territories for housing construction. Studies the modern approach to sustainable use and management of a large territory, based on the interaction of public and private sectors, as well as a comprehensive account of the compatibility functions of the town planning zones.

Keywords: territory, big city, developer, planning, real estate market.

Integrated development and development of territories is the basis for the formation of a modern urban environment. This form of development of the territory provides an opportunity to improve the investment climate during the implementation of projects and avoids the creation of isolated residential areas, which, without their own points of attraction, financial, economic, cultural and educational layers, eventually lose their consumer appeal, turning into depressive ghettos.

Government Russian Federation Decree No. 265 “On pilot investment projects for the integrated development of territories for housing construction” was approved, within the framework of which 22 pilot housing construction projects were selected as part of the integrated development of the territory of Russia to develop organizational, technological, legal and financial mechanisms for the integrated development of territories . This Decree provides for the possibility for the region to receive up to 50% of funds from the federal budget for social and engineering facilities. Financing is carried out on the basis of federal targeted programs containing separate subprograms that stimulate housing construction in selected regions.

The main drawback of the Federal Target Programs is that the region must be selected for this program every year. Accordingly, there is a risk of termination of funding in a given year. Therefore, this problem can be solved by adopting a regional program with a breakdown by years of all activities to create social infrastructure. This regional program, as well as the federal target programs listed above and Decree No. 265, allow the construction of social infrastructure at the expense of the budgets of three levels: federal, regional and municipal.

The integrated development of urban areas should be understood as the formation of an integrated and balanced urban planning solution that allows achieving high economic, social and environmental results, as well as a synergistic effect from their combination in a certain area.

Projects of integrated development of territories can be divided into two large groups. The first group includes projects for the integrated development of urban areas free from development. Another group includes projects for the integrated development of built-up areas. In particular, the renovation of territories built up with houses of the first generation of industrial housing construction and an emergency fund is one of the priorities of the housing policy of large Russian cities. Currently, a mechanism for the implementation of such projects is being formed.

It should be noted the experience of restoration and modernization of large-panel residential buildings in modern Germany. In East Germany, before unification with the FRG, large-panel housing construction was predominant in housing construction. Currently, the new construction of large-panel houses in Germany has been stopped, but there was a huge housing stock that was in dire need of reconstruction and modernization, in addition, many areas built with panel houses looked like unfinished construction sites and this also could not be tolerated. At the same time, according to the calculations of German specialists, it was necessary to spend 500-800 euros for the rehabilitation of large-panel housing, and for new construction, when demolishing the old one, 1800-2000 euros per square meter. m. In Berlin, a program was developed to support the refurbishment of large-panel housing on the basis of a comprehensive program that includes technical, social and economic aspects. This program began to be implemented in 1993, and was of a phased nature. As a result of the implementation of projects for the integrated development of territories built up with panel houses, the sustainable development of the economy of the corresponding district and the city as a whole is ensured.

The implementation of projects for the integrated development of territories should be carried out with the active participation of local governments through clear urban planning and regulation of the construction of social and engineering infrastructure. At the same time, transparent principles and mechanisms for co-financing social, engineering and transport infrastructure through federal, regional and municipal programs are needed. This will reduce the significant risks currently borne by developers of projects for the integrated development of territories.

In conclusion, we note proposals for improving the investment climate in the implementation of projects for the integrated development of urban areas. It is necessary to allocate separate zones and land plots for social, engineering and other infrastructure facilities. This will allow developers not to include the cost of land under social facilities in their costs. It is necessary to improve the law on the possibility of obtaining compensation by the developer land plot, instead of given under the social object. It is also necessary to improve concession mechanisms. Now this mechanism is justified, from the point of view of the investor, if he builds and operates not one, but several objects. However, when transferring several objects to an investor under a concession, questions arise from the antimonopoly service, since the rights of small developers are curtailed.

In addition, it is necessary to provide compensation to the investor not only for the cost of building social facilities, but also for the cost of money. Currently, investors do not have the opportunity to obtain "long" loans at low interest rates. Providing cheap long-term loans for the construction of social facilities will reduce the cost of their creation.

Bibliography:

1. Sheremetiev A.V. Problems of territorial development of Russia and ways to solve them // Problems of Economics and Management. 2015. No. 6 (46). pp. 110-113.

2. Selyutina L.G. Approaches to the implementation of programs for the reconstruction of urban

complexes in Russian practice // Management of the city and urban economy: collection scientific papers. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University of Economics, 2014. S. 46-50.

3. Goldberg A.L. Development of agglomeration processes in Russia // Vestnik razvitiya nauki i obrazovaniya. 2014. No. 5. S. 93-96.

4. Selyutina L.G., Volkov A.S., Kazieva A.K., Rakova V.A., Chalenko A.V., Sheremetiev A.V. Participation of the state in solving the housing problem of citizens in modern conditions // Basic Research. 2015. № 12-4.

5. Selyutina L.G., Evseeva E.I., Martynova A.V., Nektov V.V., Nikolyuk E.S. Social housing construction in Russia: realities and development prospects // Scientific Review. 2015. No. 21.

6. Selyutina L.G. Analysis of the main socio-economic indicators of the need for housing // Economic problems of development of construction in the region in modern conditions: Sat. scientific works. St. Petersburg: Publishing house of St. Petersburg State University of Economics, 2002. S. 57-66.

7. Makeev V.A. Functioning and development big city: the problem of sustainability // Modern scientific research and innovation. 2015. No. 6-4 (50). pp. 18-20.

8. Selyutina L.G. A systematic approach to solving problems in the field of design and construction management // Kant. 2015. No. 2 (15). pp. 71-72.

9. Demyanovich E.E. Features of the territorial development of Russia in modern conditions // Problems of the modern economy. Novosibirsk, 2015. No. 25. P. 42-46.

10. Selyutina L.G., Mityagina N.V. Features of innovation and investment processes in modern construction // Problems of economics and construction management in conditions of environmentally oriented development: materials of the scientific and practical conference. Irkutsk, 2014. S. 319-323.

A problem management procedure is provided to resolve problems that arise during the execution of the project. Any problem usually needs tracking, which makes it possible to monitor the status of the problem and determine whether it is solved or not. This applies to issues related to documentation, software and testing. Problems differ from contentious issues in that they are associated with significant shortcomings in obtaining results from this project. The problem management procedure is a mechanism by which each of the parties involved in the contract can bring up for discussion any issues that arise during the implementation of the project.

The purpose of the problem management procedure is to establish how problems related to the results of the project are handled. This procedure structures and directs the actions of management to address such problems in a timely manner. Issues arising from field visits are first documented in a site visit report and discussed in project status reviews. These can then be categorized by the project team as contentious issues or issues. Project personnel identify problems during the performance of project management quality tasks, such as during quality reviews. The customer can identify problems with the results in technical reviews and acceptance of results. The organization of the procedure is provided by the project manager.

The project administrator maintains a record of problems in the appropriate form and log. Information on these issues is provided to specially designated members of the project team. The Problem Report form is returned to the project administrator for saving as a file in the project library after the problem has been resolved or no action has been taken, and the problem report log indicates the final status of the problem. Information about the problem is presented in the following form:

Current state(adjusted if necessary) – priority (immediate/urgent/normal), surname, name and patronymic of the researcher, status (Table 9.3); research - who is assigned, when it should be completed (specific date), related requests, what is affected, what is found and recommendations, related contentious issues, related documents, business impact, hardware impact, proposed/actual actions, assessment of work required;

Decision - approval (by the contractor) with the date, approval (by the customer) with the date;

Fulfillment - who analyzes the change, date of the analysis, document confirming the implementation (as of a specific date), the associated Change Request form.