Principles of command and control. Technical aspects of command and control of Russian and US troops

For reliable and effective management of subunits, units and formations during preparation and in the course of combat, a TROOP CONTROL SYSTEM is created. 4 main elements are functionally connected in it: - controls; - controls; - control points; - communication system;

23. The composition and purpose of command posts of subunits and units.

CONTROL POINTS- These are specially equipped and equipped places from which troops are led in preparation and during the battle. Included in each item controls include: - control group; - communication group; - support group; The name, number and composition of command posts depend on the scale of the military unit. COMMAND - OBSERVATION POST - is created in subdivisions. It provides not only leadership of the unit, but also observation of the battlefield, reconnaissance of the enemy by observation. The composition of this control point includes: the commander, his deputy, staff officers, the commander of the attached (supporting) unit, signalmen and security. All of them are placed in several or one armored vehicle, equipped with communications and other technical controls, and if the situation allows, outside the vehicle, in a shelter that provides observation of the battlefield and continuous control division. In addition, a TECHNICAL SUPERVISION POINT (PTN) is being created in the battalion to organize the technical support department.

In the regiment for the management of units, a command post and a TPU are created. An element of the CP is the NP COMMAND POST (CP) - intended to lead troops in preparation and during the battle. It is considered the main launcher, since it houses most of the control apparatus headed by the commander and the main part technical means, important tasks related to the leadership of troops are being solved. REAR CONTROL POINT (TPU) is designed to control technical support and rear units. Composition of TPU: 1. Control group: a) rear control group; b) technical support management group; 2. Support group. 3. Communication node. 4. Other organs.

24. Degrees of combat readiness of troops and their maintenance.

In order to respond in a timely and flexible manner to changes in the state of combat readiness of a potential enemy, 4 levels of combat readiness have been established in the Armed Forces: PERMANENT, INCREASED, MILITARY DANGER and FULL.

When combat readiness is PERMANENT- the troops, being engaged in daily planned activities, are in readiness to carry out combat missions with formations and units of constant readiness, to complete the staffing of command and control bodies and to carry out mobilization (understaffing) by formations, units and institutions. At prepared command and control posts and at headquarters up to the army corps, round-the-clock duty is carried out in shortened shifts. Formations, units, subunits on combat duty are in readiness to perform combat missions in accordance with the current regulations, plans and combat crews. Duty at stationary communication centers is provided by combat crews from the duty shifts.

Combat readiness INCREASED introduced in order to increase reliability and reduce the time for the transfer of troops to the highest levels of combat readiness. Units, remaining at permanent deployment points, areas of training centers and at training grounds, covertly, without declaring a combat alert, carry out preparatory measures to increase their readiness for combat missions or mobilization. With a significant distance of training centers, training areas and training grounds, groups (teams) remain in the PAP personnel capable of performing the priority amount of work on the mobilization of units and formations.

Combat readiness MILITARY DANGER- this is such a state of units and subunits in which they rise on combat alert and carry out combat readiness measures at the point of permanent deployment, areas of combat duty, at training grounds with subsequent, if necessary, withdrawal to concentration areas.

The content of the measures with the introduction of this degree of combat readiness provides for: the withdrawal of units to the areas of concentration (at the same time, radio communications in places of permanent deployment continue to work in the same mode); withdrawal of command and control posts to the area of ​​concentration and their preparation for work in the field; carrying out understaffing of units to wartime states; personnel are issued with cartridges, grenades, personal protective equipment, steel helmets, NZ gas masks, individual anti-chemical packages (cartridges and grenades are in the units in regular capping).

FULL combat readiness- the state of the highest readiness of units and subunits that have completed the entire range of measures to transfer from a peaceful to a military position, including full understaffing and direct training for combat operations, ensuring an organized entry into battle and the successful completion of the task. This state troops are characterized by the following indicators: units and subunits are in the areas indicated by them in readiness for immediate combat operations (the advancement and occupation of areas (positions) for combat operations); reconnaissance of routes of advance and deployment lines is being carried out, a commandant's service is being organized; a decision is made (specified), tasks are communicated to subordinates, combat operations are planned; interaction and all types of support are organized (specified); air defense units (subunits) are in readiness for the immediate destruction of enemy air attack weapons.

When bringing to combat readiness FULL from a state of constant readiness, the measures provided for by the degrees of combat readiness are carried out in the course of direct preparation for the performance of a combat mission.

25. Types of engineering barriers of the unit and the requirements for them.

Engineering barriers are engineering facilities, structures and destruction, installed or arranged on the ground with the aim of inflicting defeat on the enemy, and thereby contributing to the destruction of manpower and equipment by fire of all types and counterattacks of our troops.

Engineering barriers are divided into:

  • Mine-explosive (MVZ)

They consist of minefields, groups of mines, as well as various land mines and charges used to produce destruction.

A minefield is a piece of terrain or water area on which mines are laid in a given order and for a specific purpose.
Types of minefields: PPMP, PTMP and mixed MP.

Main characteristics of minefields:

  • density
  • depth
  • length along the front (length)

MP density - the number of mines installed per 1 lin. m. minefield.
The depth and length of the MP depend on its purpose, tactical situation, the nature of the terrain, as well as the number of rows of mines, the distance between them and the step of its mining. The total depth of the MP can be 20-120 m or more.
PTMPs are installed in tank-accessible areas in front of the front and on the flanks of subunits, as well as to cover artillery firing positions and command posts. PPMP are installed, as a rule, in front of the TMP (tank minefield) to cover them.
In some cases, in areas where the movement of tanks is impossible or not expected, only PPMP or individual mines are installed.
Groups of mines or individual mines are placed on roads, detours, fords, gats, ravines, hollows and settlements. Booby traps (surprises) are used for mining buildings and household items in settlements, traction equipment, rolling stock, communications equipment and utility structures - on railways ah, military equipment, weapons and equipment - on the battlefield.
PPMP from anti-track mines are installed in three or four rows with a density of 550-1000 mines per 1 sq. km. The distance between the rows of mines is taken from 10 to 40 m. In each row, mines are installed one from the other at a distance of 4 to 5.5 m. The rows of the minefield are located parallel to each other.

Methods for setting minefields:

  • with the use of mechanization
    • minelayers (TMZ, GZM-2)
    • sighting mine spreaders (PMR-3, PMZ-4)
    • specially equipped helicopters

Means of mechanization are used mainly by POS.

  • manually
    • along the mine line
    • combat crew
  • remotely
    • aviation
    • artillery
    • special installations
  • non-explosive

Anti-tank ditches - come off on flat terrain and on slopes with a slope of up to 15 degrees. The excerpt is carried out using earthmoving machines and explosives (explosives). For the construction of anti-tank ditches in an explosive way, concentrated (SZ) and elongated (US) charges are used. SZ weighing up to 25 kg. each is laid in the ground to a depth of 1.5-1.6 m with a distance between them of 2.5-3 m. Undermining is carried out simultaneously with all charges. UZ weighing 12-14 kg. VV per 1 sq.m. laid in the ground to a depth of 1.2-1.3 m.

Escarps - arranged on slopes facing their troops, having a steepness of 15 to 45 degrees.

Blockages are arranged in forests with trees with a diameter of at least 20 cm, with a distance between trees of no more than 6 cm. Blockages are arranged in forests, on the edges of forests, on clearings, glades and roads. During the construction of blockages, trees fall crosswise with their tops towards the enemy and are not completely separated from the stumps. The height of the stumps left must be at least 60-120 cm, the depth of the blockage must be at least 30 cm.

Nadolbs are dug into the ground and firmly fixed logs 28-30 cm, reinforced concrete and metal beams (rails) and large stones. They are installed in three to five rows in a checkerboard pattern. Nadolby are used to reinforce barriers of other types and obstacles. In separate narrow areas where tanks cannot move at high speed, gouges can be used as independent barriers.

metal hedgehogs are used to quickly close roads, streets of settlements and passages in other barriers. Hedgehogs are installed in a checkerboard pattern in two to four rows. The distance between the rows is 2 m. For greater strength, the hedgehogs are fastened together with beams and logs, which, in turn, are attached to the gouges with wire.

Barricades are used in the defense of settlements. They are arranged on the streets and in the gaps between buildings. To make it difficult to bypass the barricades, they are adjacent to solid buildings and fences. To ensure maneuver and allow their troops to pass through the barricades, passages are left, which are closed with prepared portable barriers. Barricades are made of brick, stone, bags of earth and improvised materials.

Snow banks are arranged with a height of 1.5 m and a width of 10-12 m. Ice strips are arranged with a width of 10-15 m on the front slopes with a steepness of at least 15 degrees. Snow from the strip designated for icing is raked towards the enemy, after which it is frozen in layers across the slope. On frozen reservoirs along their shores with an ice thickness of more than 20 cm, ice holes 1.5x8 or 2x10 m in size are arranged. The ice taken from the hole is used to build barriers. On the banks of rivers, ice is taken from the shore, creating a polynya with a width of at least 3 m.

Anti-personnel non-explosive barriers:

  • Wire networks
  • fences
  • Spirals
  • Wire in a draft
  • Zaseki
  • slingshots

The wire mesh and the fence are reinforced with anti-tank, anti-personnel mines. A wire net on high stakes is made up of three to five stakes 1-1.75 m long, staggered and braided with barbed wire. The outer rows of stakes are braided with five threads: two diagonally and three vertically. The gaps between the inner rows of stakes are braided with three threads: two diagonally and one horizontal on top.
Wire fences are made up of one row of stakes braided with five strands of barbed wire or reinforced with braces with two or three additional horizontal strands on them.
A wire network on low stakes is made 4.5-6 m wide. Stakes 70 cm long are hammered in rows at a distance of 1.5 m, one from the other in a checkerboard pattern with an elevation above the ground by 25-30 cm. Each row of stakes and gaps between them are braided with wire in two threads, one thread stretches with a loop.
The notch is arranged from trees with a diameter of at least 15-18 cm, dumped towards the enemy (the trees are not completely separated from the stumps). It can be reinforced with mines and braided trees with barbed wire.
Slingshots, hedgehogs, wire spirals and MPZ are used for installation on roads, in trenches, for closing passages and damage in barriers, as well as in swampy areas and in winter. Natural obstacles included in common system barriers are getting stronger. On rivers in the water, wire fences (slingshots, hedgehogs, MZP) are installed and entrances and exits to the water are mined in places convenient for crossing tanks along the bottom under water and along fords and for arranging piers and mooring self-propelled landing craft.
There are 2 degrees of readiness of non-explosive barriers:

I degree of readiness - the barriers are on full combat readiness: mines are installed, safety devices are removed, there are no signs and fences of minefields, the objects scheduled for destruction are fully prepared for the explosion.
II degree of readiness - barriers are prepared for a quick transfer to full combat readiness (minefields are marked, they have passages in necessary places, explosive charges and explosive nets are laid in place at objects prepared for destruction, but detonators and charges are not inserted, demolition stations are equipped.)

  • Combined

They are explosive and non-explosive obstacles together.

The teacher shows the types of barriers on the posters. The location of obstacles on the ground is closely linked to the system of fire, troop maneuvers and natural obstacles.
The basis of the MVZ is minefields, which were widely used during the Second World War (Great Patriotic War). So in 1943, on the Kursk Bulge in the defense zone of the Voronezh Front (60 km wide), 90 thousand anti-tank mines (anti-tank mines) and 64 thousand anti-personnel mines (anti-personnel mines) were installed, and 32 km in the defense zone. - 50 thousand anti-tank guns and 30 thousand anti-aircraft guns, 1000 land mines, delayed-action mines and 11 km. electrified barriers. In modern warfare, when equipping armies with tanks and motorized units, the use of cost centers has increased even more.

26. The content of engineering works of the first and second stages

In the stronghold of a motorized rifle platoon Firstly single (paired) trenches are opened for shooters, machine gunners, snipers, grenade launchers, ATGM operators, trenches at the main firing positions of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (APCs), the sight line and shelling are cleared, barriers are arranged, and CNP is equipped.

Secondly single (paired) trenches are connected into trenches per squad, trenches are opened at spare firing positions for tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (APCs), as well as passages to the firing positions of infantry fighting vehicles (APCs), if they are located on the flank or behind the positions of the squads, covered slots are arranged (dugouts) for each department.

In the future, a dugout is arranged on the KNP, the communication line to the rear is torn off.

The sequence of fortification equipment in each specific case is specified by the commander, depending on the conditions of the situation, the availability of time, forces and means, and the nature of the enemy's impact.

· In case of direct contact with the enemy, all work is carried out manually by personnel using trench tools.

· In the absence of contact with the enemy, engineering equipment is used.

Trench machines: VTM-3 and TMK-2

27. Characteristics of nuclear weapons, nuclear munitions, their types and purpose.

Types of nuclear explosions:

1) Ground (surface) - used to destroy the enemy's manpower and its objects on the ground (water). Characteristic feature: gives extremely strong radioactive contamination. The damaging factors of this explosion are the shock wave, light radiation, penetrating radiation, radioactive contamination of the area and EMP.

2) Air - at an altitude of up to 10 km. Causes powerful destruction on the ground and destroys objects in the air; The shock wave, light radiation, penetrating radiation and EMP are most fully manifested in an air nuclear explosion.

3) High-altitude - about 20 km above the ground. This is an explosion carried out with the aim of destroying missiles and aircraft in flight at an altitude safe for ground objects (over 10 km). The damaging factors of a high-altitude explosion are: shock wave, light radiation, penetrating radiation and electromagnetic pulse (EMP).

4) Space - more than 100 km. characteristic feature: no air shock wave. serves to destroy satellites and other rubbish.

5) Underground (underwater) - the damaging and destructive effect of an underground nuclear explosion is determined mainly by seismic explosive waves (the main damaging factor), the formation of a funnel in the soil and severe radioactive contamination of the area. Light emission and penetrating radiation are absent. Characteristic of an underwater explosion is the formation of a sultan (column of water), the basic wave formed during the collapse of the sultan (column of water).

Explosion power:

1) super small - up to 1 kiloton

2) small - from 1 to 10 kilotons

3) medium - 10-100 kilotons

4) Large - from 100 kilotons to 1 megaton

5) Extra large - 1 megaton and more

1 kiloton - 1000 tons spent

1 megaton - 1,000,000 tons spent.

28. The damaging factors of a nuclear explosion and their effect on personnel.

Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction whose damaging factors are based on the use of energy released as a result of a nuclear chain reaction.

The damaging factors of a nuclear explosion:

1) Shock wave

2) Light emission

3) Penetrating radiation

4) radioactive contamination of the area

5) electromagnetic impulse.

Nuclear explosion protection.

1) From the shock wave - Capital shelters, trenches, any structures, large armored vehicles, reverse sides hills.

2) From light radiation - everything that gives a shadow

3) Penetrating radiation - engineering structures, reverse sides of buildings and hills.

Ways to protect against nuclear weapons:

1) use of collective protection means (shelters, anti-radiation shelters and simple shelters).

2) the use of the protective properties of the terrain.

3) use of personal protective equipment (respiratory protection equipment (gas masks, respirators, anti-dust cloth mask, cotton-gauze bandages), skin protection equipment).

4) use of medical protective equipment.

29. Characteristics of chemical and biological weapons

poisonous substances- toxic chemical compounds designed to destroy enemy manpower during hostilities. OM can enter the body through the respiratory system, skin, mucous membranes and the digestive tract. These substances have a certain complex of physical and chemical properties, due to which in a combat situation they are in a vaporous, liquid or aerosol state. The production of OM is based on simple methods of obtaining from available and cheap raw materials.

The combat properties of agents are determined primarily by their toxicity. The toxic effect is associated with the ability of most known agents to inhibit various enzymes as a result of interaction with their functional groups. For example, lewisite acylates the sulfhydryl groups of enzymes, disabling the latter; hydrocyanic acid forms complexes with iron, an oxidizing agent of intracellular enzyme systems, stopping the access of oxygen to cells; FOV phosphorylate the enzyme - cholinesterase, responsible for the transmission of nerve impulses. The degree of toxicity of agents depends on the selectivity of enzyme blocking. In some cases, such strong connections are formed that therapeutic intervention becomes useless. Thus, it is practically impossible to regenerate enzyme systems affected by phosgene and mustard gas. On the contrary, the introduction of antidotes (See Antidotes) in the case of damage to FOV, lewisite and hydrocyanic acid makes it possible to remove the effect of several lethal doses of these agents.

Strict classification of OM is difficult. Physiological and tactical classifications acquired the greatest importance. According to the first, agents are subdivided according to the predominant effect on the body, according to the second - according to the behavior on the ground in conditions of combat use. In accordance with the first classification, a group of unstable agents (NSW), persistent agents (SOV) and a group of toxic-smoky agents (NWV) are distinguished. NOV - substances with high vapor pressure; infect the atmosphere, forming a cloud that spreads in the direction of the wind and quickly dissipates. SOV - liquid substances with low vapor pressure; create a cloud contaminated with an aerosol of OM: part of the OM in the form of droplets settles in the immediate vicinity of the place of application. JDV - solids with very low vapor pressure; used in the form of toxic fumes.

The complex of measures for the protection of manpower from OV includes indication of OV, degassing and protection. To ensure protection measures, it is important to detect agents in a timely manner and determine their type and concentration. The most reliable instrumental indication is based on OM reactions leading to the formation of colored compounds or to a change in some process, for example, the catalytic activity of enzymes (biochemical method), etc.

The simplest means of indication- papers impregnated with indicators, or tubes containing indicators on fillers or in ampoules, the color of which changes under the action of vapors (or drops) of RH. The sensitivity of the indicators should be approximately an order of magnitude higher than the minimum effective dose of RH. So, to indicate the most toxic nerve agents, a biochemical method is used, the sensitivity of which is 10 -6 -10 -7 mg OB in 1 l. For continuous monitoring of air contamination, continuously operating automatic gas detectors can be used.

Biological weapons- bacterial pathogens and means of their application. It is intended. to affect people, agriculture, plants and animals, contaminate food and water sources. Its action is based on the use of the pathogenic properties of combat bacterial agents (BS). high combat effectiveness of these drugs is due to a low infectious dose, the possibility of covert use over large areas, the difficulty of indication, the selectivity of action (only on a person or on a certain type of animal), a strong psychological impact, a large volume and complexity of work on antibacterial protection of the population and the elimination of the consequences of their use.

For translate OV and BS formulations in a state of combat use explosive ammunition (warheads of missiles, bombs, shells, mines, land mines), pouring and spraying devices. OV can be used in thermal munitions (checkers, thermal generators), and BS - in munitions with a mechanical opening (entomological bombs, which are containers with infected vectors).

Delivery of chemical and biological (bacteriological) munitions to the target is carried out with the help of missiles, aviation, automatic balloons, artillery. BS recipes can be sprayed with aerosol generators from ships. Subversive methods of contamination with biological (bacterial) formulations of premises, food, fodder, and water supply sources are not excluded. To achieve the greatest effect of defeating people, animals and plants by the enemy, combined formulations containing pathogens of several diseases can be used.

Types of BO:

1. Bateria - single-celled microorganisms that cause diseases of plague, cholera, etc.

3. fungi - microorganisms of plant origin

4. toxins - waste products of some bacteria. Causes a disease of staphylococcus, butulism

Protection:

Ø Individual funds protection

Ø Seek immediate medical attention

Ø Personal hygiene

Ø Carrying out all kinds of medical events - quarantines, observation

Ø Individual anti-chemical first aid kit

30. The damaging properties of incendiary weapons.

Incendiary Weapons (OS)- a weapon, the damaging effect of which is based on the use of military incendiary substances.

Incendiary weapons are used to destroy personnel (located openly and in shelters), destroy equipment, materiel, buildings, crops and forests, as well as to create fires in a combat area.

The main damaging factors of ZO are the thermal energy and combustion products toxic to humans. These factors manifest themselves on the target from several seconds to several minutes during the application of the AP. In the future, there are so-called secondary damaging factors that are the result of emerging fires. The time of their action can be from several minutes and hours to days and weeks.

The damaging effect of incendiary weapons on people is manifested in the following forms:

Skin burns, both when burning substances come into contact with the skin of the body or uniforms, and as a result of the action of thermal radiation in the zone of continuous fire;

Burns of the mucous membrane of the respiratory tract, followed by the development of edema and suffocation when inhaling strongly heated air, smoke;

The impossibility of continuing breathing (oxygen starvation) due to the burning out of oxygen from the air in closed structures (shelters) and death of people;

Exposure to toxic combustion products of incendiary substances and combustible materials (carbon monoxide and dioxide, smoke and others). With 1% carbon content in the air, almost instantaneous death.

In addition, incendiary weapons can also have a strong moral and psychological impact on a person, lowering his ability to actively resist fire.

31. Individual and collective means of protection of personnel.

Collective means of protection (types, methods of application)
Collective protection means- means of protection, structurally and functionally associated with the production process, production equipment, premises, building, structure, production site.
Depending on the purpose, there are:
- means of normalizing the air environment industrial premises and jobs, localization harmful factors, heating, ventilation;
- means of normalizing the lighting of premises and workplaces (light sources, lighting fixtures, etc.);
- means of protection against ionizing radiation (protective, sealing devices, safety signs, etc.);
- means of protection against infrared radiation (protective, sealing, heat-insulating devices, etc.);
- means of protection against ultraviolet and electromagnetic radiation(protective, for air ventilation, remote control, etc.);
- means of protection against laser radiation (fencing, safety signs);
- means of protection against noise and ultrasound (fencing, noise suppressors);
- means of protection against vibration (vibration isolating, vibration damping, vibration absorbing devices, etc.);
- means of protection against electric shock (fences, alarms, isolating devices, grounding, zeroing, etc.);
- means of protection against high and low temperatures (fences, heat-insulating devices, heating and cooling);
- means of protection against the impact of mechanical factors (fencing, safety and braking devices, safety signs);
- means of protection against the effects of chemical factors (devices for sealing, ventilation and air purification, remote control, etc.).
- means of protection against exposure biological factors(fencing, ventilation, safety signs, etc.)
Collective means of protection are divided into: protective, safety, braking devices, devices for automatic control and signaling, remote control, safety signs.
Protective devices designed to prevent accidental entry of a person into the danger zone. They are used to isolate moving parts of machines, processing areas of machine tools, presses, impact elements of machines from working area. Devices are divided into stationary, mobile and portable.
Safety devices use for automatic shutdown machinery and equipment in case of deviation from the normal mode of operation or when a person enters the danger zone. These devices can be blocking and restrictive. Blocking devices according to the principle of operation are: electromechanical, photoelectric, electromagnetic, radiation, mechanical.
Widely used braking devices, which can be divided into shoe, disc, conical and wedge. Most often used shoe and disc brakes. Brake systems can be manual, foot, semi-automatic and automatic.
To ensure the safe and reliable operation of the equipment, information, warning, emergency devices for automatic control and signaling are very important. Control devices- these are instruments for measuring pressures, temperatures, static and dynamic loads that characterize the operation of machines and equipment. Alarm systems are: sound, light, color, sign, combined.
Various technical measures are used to protect against electric shock. This - small voltages; electrical separation of the network; control and prevention of insulation damage; protection against accidental contact with live parts; protective grounding; protective shutdown; personal protective equipment.

Personal protective equipment
Individual protection means- means that are used by employees to protect against harmful and dangerous factors production process and also to protect against contamination. PPE is used in cases where the safety of work cannot be fully ensured by the organization of production, the design of equipment, and collective protective equipment.
Provision of workers with personal protective equipment must comply with the Model Industry Standards for the free issue of special clothing, special footwear and other personal protective equipment to workers and employees, approved. Decree of the Ministry of Labor of Russia dated December 25, 1997 No. 66.
Depending on the destination, allocate:
- insulating suits- pneumosuits; waterproof suits; spacesuits;
- respiratory protective equipment- gas masks; respirators; air helmets; pneumomasks;
- special clothing - overalls, semi-overalls; jackets; trousers; suits; bathrobes; raincoats; short fur coats, sheepskin coats; aprons; vests; sleeves.
- special footwear- boots, over the knee boots, half boots, boots, low shoes, shoes, galoshes, boots, shoe covers;
- hand protection- mittens, gloves;
- head protection- helmets; helmets, balaclavas; caps, berets, hats;
- face protection- protective masks; protective shields;
- hearing protection- anti-noise helmets; headphones; liners;
- eye protection- protective glasses;
- safety devices- safety belts; dielectric mats; hand grips; manipulators; knee pads, elbow pads, shoulder pads;
- protective, dermatological products - detergents; pastes; creams; ointments.
The use of PPE should provide maximum safety and inconvenience associated with their use should be kept to a minimum.

32. Standard first aid equipment and rules for using them

STAGES OF PROVIDING ASSISTANCE:

1. first aid. Primary medical assistance can be provided with elements of qualified care if there are appropriate doctors. Crews work offline. The brigades are equipped with medical equipment, transport, power plants, dressing stations, tents and a field kitchen. In triage, it is very important to single out those who are easily injured and who require long-term qualified and specialized treatment.

2. admission to multidisciplinary field surgical hospitals. Here the sequence and urgency of operations, resuscitation, preparation for operations, treatment of shock and the fight against blood loss are determined.

3. admission to specialized hospitals, which are deployed on the basis of large hospitals, or a garrison military hospital, in which specialized medical reinforcement groups are created with their own equipment. Full medical care is provided. The most severely injured are evacuated with the help of aviation to the central medical institutions of the country.

The existing one in the army is called staged treatment with evacuation by appointment. The essence of the staged treatment is that the wounded and injured before they are taken to an institution where they will receive full treatment, go through several medical institutions or stages of evacuation.

Medical evacuation stage- these are the forces and means of the medical service located on the path of the wounded from the battlefield to the rear to provide assistance. For each stage, a certain range of surgical measures is established, which is commonly called the volume of care. The volume of assistance is the sum of surgical measures to be performed, which are intended and prepared this stage. The volume of assistance cannot be completely determined once and for all, it can change in the direction of expansion and contraction, therefore there are three types of assistance:

1. Full, when everything is done

2. Reduced, when, for example, a lot of wounded arrive and some manipulations have to be abandoned in order to serve everyone

3. The minimum, such a volume that has to be used if a weapon of mass destruction is used. Under these conditions, assistance is provided according to vital indications.

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE:

1. First aid provided on the battlefield

2. Pre-hospital medical care is provided at the medical post of the battalion (MPB)

3. First medical aid is provided at the medical station of the regiment (MPP).

4. Qualified assistance is provided in a separate medical battalion and a separate medical detachment.

5. Specialized assistance is provided in the front zone - in the advanced hospital base of the front, and outside the front zone in the rear hospital base of the front.


4. The main tactical unit of the ground forces is the division. In the US Army, divisions can be of the following types: light infantry, infantry, mechanized, armored, airborne, air assault.

Divisions are fundamentally identical. Each includes two main components: a divisional base, consisting of units and subunits permanently assigned to the state of the formation, and combat battalions, the number of which may vary depending on the type.

The divisional base of the division includes: the command and headquarters of the division with a headquarters company; three brigade headquarters with headquarters companies; army aviation brigade; divisional artillery; anti-aircraft division; separate battalions (reconnaissance and electronic warfare, engineering, communications); separate companies (protection against weapons of mass destruction, military police); rear command.

The ratios and types of battalions determine the type of division. The mechanized division has five motorized infantry and four tank battalions.

In its turn motorized infantry battalion consists of headquarters, companies: headquarters, 4 motorized infantry and anti-tank; the headquarters company has a repair platoon, medical, communications, reconnaissance, support, management

Total: l / s 921 people, BMP 58, BTR 26, ATGM Dragon, BRM 6.

5. MPB Germany

Companies: headquarters and supply, motorized infantry (4), mortar, spare

In the headquarters company: a repair platoon, a reconnaissance platoon, a food service platoon, a medical, management and transport department.

Total: l / s 1022 people, BMP Marder, -53, BTR Fuchs-19, ATGM Milan, BRM.

6. Troop control is a purposeful activity of commanders, headquarters and other command and control bodies to maintain the combat readiness and combat capability of troops, prepare them for battle and guide them in the performance of assigned tasks.

Basic management goal is to ensure maximum efficiency in the use of troops in the preparation and performance of assigned combat missions.



Allocate management tasks daily activities of the troops and the tasks of managing the preparation and conduct of hostilities (tasks combat control) . In addition, there are tasks of information, calculation, information and calculation, etc.

The main content of command and control are: organization and continuous acquisition, collection, study and generalization of situational data; preparation and decision making; bringing tasks to subordinates; battle planning; organization and maintenance of interaction; organization and implementation of measures to maintain the combat readiness and combat capability of the troops, for all types of combat support; organizing and ensuring the stable operation of the command and control system, directing the preparation of subordinate command and control bodies and troops for combat; direct control of the actions of troops (forces) in the course of their combat missions; organizing and exercising control, and providing subordinates with the necessary assistance and other activities

command and control requirements

stability continuity efficiency secrecy

Requirement sustainability management means that it must be carried out in any conditions enemy influence.

Continuity of control- a property of the system that characterizes it

the ability to provide processes for solving management problems and

execution of functions without invalid duration breaks

in management.

Main indicator efficiency is time problem solving

Stealth management - control property characterizing

the ability of the control system to rule out cases leaks

information about the processes taking place in control system,

commanders, headquarters, chiefs of military branches,

special troops and services during the period of preparation and during the battle.

Troop command and control principles:

unity of command;

centralization of management combined with the initiative

subordinates;

constant knowledge and deep analysis of the situation,

foreseeing the course of events;

firmness and perseverance in carrying out adopted

decisions and plans in life;

high organization and creativity in the work of organs

management;

knowledge of personnel, reliance on subordinate commanders.

7. The main principles of conducting modern combined arms combat include:

Constant high combat readiness of formations, units and subunits;

High activity, determination and continuity of combat;

The suddenness of action;

Coordinated joint use of military branches and special troops in combat and maintaining continuous interaction between them;

Decisive concentration of the main efforts of the troops in the main direction and at the right time;

Maneuver by subunits and units, nuclear strikes and fire;

Comprehensive accounting and full use a moral and psychological factor in the interests of fulfilling the task;

Comprehensive combat support;

Maintenance and timely restoration of the combat capability of troops;

Firm and continuous command and control of troops, inflexibility in achieving the goals set, fulfilling decisions taken and assigned tasks.

8. A battalion is assigned a defense area, and a company, platoon is assigned a strong point. The width of the battalion defense area is 3-5 km, the depth is 2-2.5 km. A company occupies a strong point - 1-1.5 km along the front and up to 1 km in depth, and a platoon - up to 400 m along the front and up to 300 m in depth.

The task of the battalion (company) of the first echelon is to repel the enemy offensive, destroy it in front of the front line and when wedged into the defense, as well as stubbornly hold an important area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe terrain and create favorable conditions for defeating the enemy. The task of a battalion (company) of the second echelon is to reinforce (replace) subunits of the first echelon in case they lose their combat capability, to conduct counterattacks, and also to destroy enemy airborne assault and airborne units.

9. TACTICAL STANDARDS OF THE UNIT IN THE OFFENSIVE

name Subsection Front Width order of battle TASKS
MCO up to 50 m in 1 echelon Capture a certain object (the enemy in the trenches, separately located tanks, guns and other enemy fire weapons)
SME up to 300m in 1 echelon Seize the object of attack (the enemy in the trenches, tanks, guns, machine guns located separately in the direction of attack).
MSR up to 1 km (in the breakthrough area up to 500m) in 1 echelon from the combat formations of platoons The nearest - from 1 to 1.5 km (destruction of the enemy in cooperation with neighboring subunits in the stronghold of the company of the first echelon and mastering it); the direction of the further offensive to the further task of the battalion (up to 3-5 km).
SME up to 2 km (in the breakthrough area up to 1 km) in 2nd or 1st tier The nearest one is from 1 to 1.5 km (destruction of the enemy in the defense area of ​​​​the battalion of the first echelon on its offensive front and mastery of the first position). Subsequent - 3-5 km (development of the offensive, defeat in cooperation with neighboring battalions of enemy reserves and mastery of their border).
TB The direction of the further offensive to the line of the subsequent task of the regiment (10-15 km).

In order to correctly determine the depth and content of the combat mission of subunits, it is necessary to take into account the depth of the enemy defense and the degree of his engineering equipment. This is confirmed by the experience of the Great Patriotic War and post-war exercises. For example, at the beginning of the war, units of the fascist German troops built their defenses as shallow and focal, and from 1943 they switched to the creation of a continuous, multi-layered and trench defense system. Proceeding from this, the depth and content of the combat mission of the offensive of our units changed. The depth of the combat mission of a rifle company was 500-600 m (the closest - 250-300 m, the next - 250-300 m).

10. see above.

12. Combat documents are all documents related to the organization, preparation and conduct of hostilities, as well as those related to the movement of troops and their location on the spot.
The significance of combat documents is determined primarily by their widespread use in the development of the most important measures for command and control of troops. They are, in particular. the only tool that ensures rapid development and visual display of combat planning issues. In a number of cases, combat documents may turn out to be the most expedient way of bringing combat missions to the attention of executors or providing (reporting) to a senior commander information about changes in the situation and measures taken in connection with this. In addition, without combat documents, it is impossible to prepare various kinds of auxiliary (reference) materials for officials. Without them, it is also impossible to practically generalize and disseminate the experience of combat operations and, on this basis, to improve the methods of troop command and control.
According to their purpose and content, combat documents are divided into three types: documents on command and control, reporting and information, and reference documents.
Documents on command and control of troops are developed for planning combat operations, communicating tasks to the executors and monitoring their implementation. These documents include: working maps, the commander's decision, drawn up on a separate card, preliminary orders, combat orders (combat orders), a planned table of interaction, a plan for fire and nuclear destruction, a plan and order for reconnaissance and other documents.
Reporting and information documents are intended to report to a higher commander or headquarters on the results of the implementation of the received combat missions and the decision taken, as well as to inform subordinates, cooperating troops and neighbors about the situation and to study and disseminate combat experience. These include: combat reports, reconnaissance reports, operational and reconnaissance reports, reports, logs of combat operations, orders and reports, reconnaissance schemes, reporting cards and diagrams, protocols of interrogation of a prisoner of war.
Reference documents are developed as initial and auxiliary (working) documents when planning combat operations and carrying out other measures for commanding troops. These include various kinds of calculations, statements, tables, references, diagrams.
The number of combat documents in all cases is limited by the strict necessity caused by the situation. The division headquarters, if necessary, develops in writing (graphically) all the above documents. The regimental headquarters does not develop operational and reconnaissance reports, and instead of the reconnaissance plan, reconnaissance measures are developed on the reconnaissance chief's working map. Each staff officer maintains a work map, which (according to the functions of work) displays all the main activities for planning military operations.

Requirements for combat documents

Each combat document justifies its purpose only if a number of requirements are met. The main ones are: the timeliness of the development and communication (if necessary) of the document to the executors; brevity, clarity, reliability of the content, as well as the visibility of its design.
The timeliness of development and use for its intended purpose is the most important requirement for a combat document. Even flawlessly executed in all other respects, but a late document loses its value and can be harmful.
In order to achieve timely production and distribution of documents to addressees, it is necessary to widely and skillfully use mechanization tools, apply the most rational methods for developing documents and, in particular, write them without a draft, immediately dictate from a card to a duplicator, reduce the volume as much as possible and apply in advance prepared forms or standard forms of the document.
The brevity of a combat document is achieved by the use of concise language, simple turns of speech, established abbreviations and clarity. The construction of each phrase and its content should be as justified as possible. The use of general (non-specific) phrases, long sentences, unnecessary words that clutter up the text and, therefore, make it difficult to study a combat document, should be avoided.
When formulating any provision or paragraph of a document, one must strive to express the thought as simply, intelligibly, and briefly as possible. To do this, it is necessary to know and be able to apply the rules and norms of the literary language well. Particularly important is knowledge of the specifics of military vocabulary, which is used when writing regulations and instructions.
Truly economical and concise will be only that presentation in which the minimum of words correctly and exhaustively expresses the idea.
Clarity and brevity of a document are inextricably linked, i.e. brevity should not be at the expense of clarity. The content of the combat document must provide its unambiguous interpretation. Neglect of this requirement leads to an inaccurate understanding and implementation by subordinates of the order contained in each document or to a misunderstanding of the information contained in it.
The content of the combat document should not cause any misunderstandings, requests or clarifications. When presenting the content, one should avoid ambiguity, evasive expressions that allow a different nature of execution, such as: try, depending on the situation, etc., or expressions that inaccurately formulate actions by the time they are performed, for example: immediately, after dark.
The combat document must be reliable. It provides only strictly and carefully verified data showing, for example, the exact position and nature of the actions of friendly and enemy troops in place and time, i.e. events are covered objectively. Any doubtful, requiring verification and clarification of information must be specified or not indicated at all.
Of particular importance is the clarity of the combat document. A carelessly executed combat document makes it difficult for the recipients to study and understand it. For the document to be visual, it is necessary to correctly position the text; highlight individual items and provisions with a paragraph or a red line; print on working duplicators with a clear type or write by hand in a legible handwriting so that it can be read even in low light. The visibility of graphic documents is achieved correct application and the clear use of conventional signs, inscriptions and the selection (rise) of the topographic base data needed to show the tactical content of a combat document.

13. THE COMMANDER, EXCEPT FOR TRADITIONAL QUESTIONS, SHOULD UNDERSTAND:

IN WHAT LEGAL REGIME, IN INTERACTION WITH WHAT TROOPS AND BODIES OF STATE AUTHORITY IS THE TASK TO BE PERFORMED;

PROCEDURE FOR JOINT ACTIONS WITH FORMATIONS OF OTHER TROOPS, MILITARY FORMATIONS AND BODIES;

THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTS AND LINES, THE POSSESSION OF WHICH WILL ENSURE ISOLATION OF THE AREA OF COMBAT ACTIONS;

PERMISSIBLE LIMITS OF THE AREA OF COMBAT ACTIONS, TYPES AND PROCEDURE OF USE OF WEAPONS;

PROBABLE DATES FOR THE START OF ACTIONS, POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ESCALATION OF COMBAT ACTIONS AND OTHER ISSUES.

EVALUATION OF ILLEGAL ARMED FORMATIONS,

IMPORTANT TO STUDY

WHERE THE MAIN GROUP IS FOCUSED, ITS COMPOSITION, WEAPONS, POSSIBLE STRENGTHENING DURING ACTIONS;

THE PRESENCE AND POSSIBILITY OF THE APPEARANCE OF SUBVERSION AND OTHER ARMED FORMATIONS AND THE POSSIBLE NATURE OF THEIR ACTIONS IN THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ITS UNIT;

THE PRESENCE OF SETTLEMENTS SUPPORTING IAGS, PROVIDING THEM THE POSSIBILITY TO CONDUCT LONG AUTONOMOUS COMBAT ACTIONS, INCLUDING UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THE BLOCCADE;

SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE AREA OF CONFLICT;

THE SYSTEM OF FIRE AND OBSTACLES, PROTECTION AND DEFENSE OF IAF ON THE DIRECTION OF ACTION OF THE UNIT, AS WELL AS THE MOST IMPORTANT LINES AND OBJECTS IN BATTLE ORDER, CONTROL POINTS, WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION STORAGE BASES, ON THE CAPTURE OF WHICH DEPENDS STABILITY OF THE ENTIRE GROUP OF IAGs;

AVAILABILITY OF MEANS AND PROBABLE METHODS OF ACTION OF Grenade Throwers and SNIPERS;

POSSIBLE PLACES OF AMBUSH AND INSTALLATION OF MINES AND EXPLOSIVE OBSTRUCTIONS, THE AVAILABILITY OF WAYS TO MANEUVER, THE POSSIBILITY OF EXIT FROM BATTLE OR EVOIDING IT;

POSSIBILITIES OF IAGS FOR THE USE OF SETTLEMENTS, TO DETERMINE THE PROBABLE NATURE, AREAS AND SCALE OF ACTIONS OF IAGS AT NIGHT CONDITIONS.

IN THE DECISION TO COMBAT

further defined:

COMPOSITION AND TASKS OF SUBDIVISIONS OF OTHER MINISTRIES

AND DEPARTMENTS PARTICIPATED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MISSION;

PROCEDURE AND METHODS OF LOCALIZATION (LIQUIDATION) AND

DISARMAMENT of illegal armed formations;

PROCEDURE FOR USE OF WEAPONS;

MEASURES FOR THE SECURITY OF CIVIL

POPULATION DURING COMBAT ACTIONS;

PROCEDURE FOR DETECTION OF STORAGE, WEAPONS

AND AMMUNITION, MILITARY EQUIPMENT, MEDICAL POINTS,

MINED TERRAIN OR OBJECTS;

PLACE OF COLLECTION AND PROCEDURE OF DETENTION;

ORGANIZATION OF JOINT MANAGEMENT OF THE TROOPS OF OTHERS

DEPARTMENTS OPERATING AS PART OF THE GENERAL

FORMATIONS.

THE BATTLE ORDER INDICATES:

1. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION -

2. THE MISSION OF THE TROOPS with an exact statement of what

determined by the higher command.

3. TASKS OF NEIGHBORS, interacting forces and means.

4. PURPOSE OF ACTION.

5. After the word "I order", separate subparagraphs are placed

BATTLE OBJECTIVES for each regular and attached (promptly

subordinate) department. The order must be determined

the use of weapons and military equipment, as well as the procedure

actions in case of detection of weapons and ammunition depots

the enemy, his medical posts, mined areas

terrain or objects, gathering places and containment procedures

detainees.

6. READINESS TIME for action, occupation of lines (beginning

actions).

7. SIGNALS OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION.

8. PLACES AND TIMES OF DEPLOYMENT OF CONTROL POINTS.

Ø assessment of HPE in the conflict area;

Ø making a political decision to conduct the PKO, approval of the Mandate, appointment of the Head of Mission and the Commander of the KPKF;

Ø determination of the composition, number and tasks of the KSPM, the procedure for their comprehensive provision and financing, the organizational structure of the OK;

Ø formation of OK, military contingents, determination of the composition of military observers, police units (militia) and other personnel to participate in the operation.

MANDATE

For an OPM

v Legal document approved by the UN Security Council or other body of collective security.

v Legal basis to deploy the CPFM in the conflict zone.

v original document to organize the preparation of the PMO.

v INDICATES:

Ø political objectives and final results conducting an AAR;

Ø timing of the peacekeeping operation;

Ø the candidacy of the Commander of the CPKF, his powers and functions;

Ø combat and strength of the KSPM;

Ø tasks of the KSPM;

Ø conditions under which peacekeeping
forces will be withdrawn from the conflict zone;

Ø organization of material, technical and financial support of KSPM.

O C E N K A O B S T A N O V K I

INCLUDES

Ø assessment of the conflicting parties (population),

Ø assessment of their troops,

Ø assessment of neighbors

Ø assessment of the conflict area (terrain),

Ø assessment of weather conditions, seasons,

Ø assessment of other elements of the environment

(RCB environment, radio-electronic environment, engineering, etc.).

15.Tactical properties of the terrain and their impact on combat operations.

The relief and local objects, acting in various combinations and in combination with the climate, form Various types areas that, when organizing a battle, are evaluated from the point of view of their influence on the combat operations of subunits.

In one case, these types of terrain can contribute to the success of units, and in the other they can have a negative effect. Combat practice convincingly shows that the same terrain can give more advantages to those who have studied it better and use it more skillfully.

The degree of influence of the terrain on the organization and conduct of combat is not constant; it changes along with changes in the methods of combat, the development of new means of combat, and the emergence of new military equipment and weapons. Modern combat can be fought using only conventional weapons, as well as using other modern means defeat. The new weapon, having great firepower and destructive power, is capable of not only hitting personnel and equipment, but to a large extent destroying and destroying local objects.

At the same time, the nature of the terrain, especially the elements of the relief, as well as local objects will have a certain influence on the effectiveness of the damaging factors of nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. Radiation contamination is more kept in the forest, but at the same time, the forest is well protected from penetrating radiation if the explosion occurred outside of it.

Terrain properties that affect the organization and conduct of combat, the use of weapons and military equipment, are commonly called tactical properties.

The main ones are: the passability of the terrain, the protective properties of the terrain, the camouflage properties of the terrain and the conditions for observation, the conditions for orientation and the conditions for firing. In some areas, the conditions of the engineering equipment of the terrain and water supply have a significant impact on the conduct of combat.

Terrain passability - This is a feature of the terrain that facilitates or restricts the movement of troops. The passability of any terrain determines, first of all, the presence of a road network. The more developed the road network, the more accessible the terrain for the actions of units. The importance of the road network is especially great in wooded-marshy, mountainous and desert areas. Off-road passability depends mainly on the nature of the relief, soil and vegetation cover, the presence and nature of rivers, lakes, seasons and weather conditions. The influence of the terrain on the passability of the terrain is determined by the degree of its dissection, the nature and location standard forms and steep slopes. The most significant natural obstacles to the movement of troops outside the road are ravines, gullies, cliffs, cuts and embankments, as well as hills and depressions with steep slopes. The speed of movement of people and vehicles depends on the steepness of the slopes. A serious obstacle to the movement of all types of combat and transport vehicles are swamps, wetlands and salt marshes. According to the patency, the swamps are divided into passable, difficult to pass, and impassable. The assessment of the passability of the terrain and soils must be linked to the specific climatic conditions of a particular region. In winter, at temperatures below 0 degrees Celsius, soil permeability improves significantly. Swamps, impassable in the summer, can serve as convenient routes for the movement and action of troops when they freeze in winter. The passability of forests depends on the availability of roads and clearings, as well as on the density and thickness of trees and the nature of the relief. When the distance between the trees is less than 6 meters, the movement of military equipment in the forest outside the roads is difficult or impossible. Rivers, canals, lakes and other water barriers have a great influence on off-road patency. According to the degree of indentation of the terrain by obstacles (ravines, rivers, lakes, swamps, etc.) that restrict freedom of movement on it, the terrain is divided into: slightly crossed, medium crossed, strongly crossed. slightly crossed area is considered to be about 10 percent of the area occupied by obstacles. If there are no obstacles or they are less than 10 percent, the terrain is classified as uncrossed. Medium cross the terrain is characterized by the fact that obstacles that impede movement occupy 10-30 percent of its area. If more than 30 percent of the area is occupied by such obstacles, the terrain is classified as strongly crossed. She creates favorable conditions for a covert approach to the front line of the enemy, but makes it difficult for his units to move.

Protective properties of the terrain- this is a property of the terrain that weakens the effect of the damaging factors of nuclear and conventional weapons and facilitates the organization of the protection of troops. They are determined mainly by the nature of the relief and vegetation cover. Caves, grottoes, mines, adits, tunnels and other underground structures can serve as good natural shelters. Small units can use relief details (pits, gullies), as well as artificial depressions and hills (ditches, mounds, embankments, etc.) as shelters. Large tracts of forest weaken the effect of the shock wave of a nuclear explosion by 2-3 times compared to open areas. Dense deciduous coniferous forests protect well from light radiation and reduce the level of penetrating radiation. For example, in a mature forest with undergrowth, the effects of light radiation are reduced by 6-8 times compared to open areas. In the forest, the levels of radiation, and consequently, the doses of exposure to personnel are 20-40 percent less than in uninhabited areas. The best protective properties against nuclear weapons are medium-aged dense forest, as well as tall deciduous shrubs. In a young forest and shrubs, the defeat of troops by falling trees is excluded. Terrain with deep hollows, ravines, gullies with steep slopes and hilly terrain has good protective properties. In the mountains, the effect of the shock wave can be strengthened or weakened depending on the position of the epicenter of a nuclear explosion in relation to the direction of the ridges and valleys. At the same time, its damaging effect can be significantly intensively flying fragments of rocks, as well as landslides, rockfalls and snow avalanches. The desert steppe terrain has the weakest protective properties, the open and flat nature of which contributes to the unimpeded propagation of the shock wave, penetrating radiation and radioactive contamination of the air and terrain.

Camouflage properties of the terrain and conditions of observation - this is a property of the terrain that contributes to the actions of troops hidden from the enemy and obtaining the necessary information about him by observation. They are determined by the degree of visibility of the surrounding area, the viewing range and depend on the nature of the relief, vegetation, settlements and other objects that obstruct the view of the area.

When evaluating the conditions of camouflage and observation of any terrain, first of all, it is determined to what extent the terrain and local objects favor or restrict visibility. Based on this, the region is subdivided into open, semi-closed and closed.

open area devoid of natural masks formed by landforms and local objects, or they occupy no more than 10 percent of its area. Such terrain allows you to view its entire area from commanding heights, which creates good conditions to monitor the battlefield, however, it makes it difficult to camouflage and hide from observation and shelling. Therefore, it is advantageous to have an open area in front of the front line of defense, since this will provide good observation of the enemy’s actions and will make it possible to better hit him with fire from all types of weapons.

Terrain with hilly or flat relief (rarely mountainous), in which natural masks occupy about 20 percent of the area, belongs to half closed. The presence of natural masks provides good camouflage of units when deployed in place. However, about 50 percent of the area of ​​such terrain is visible from command heights.

closed area allows you to view less than 25 percent of its area. This creates good conditions for camouflage and shelter from enemy fire, but makes it difficult to control the unit in battle, navigate the field of action and interact.

Orientation condition - these are terrain properties that help determine your location and the desired direction of movement relative to the sides of the horizon, surrounding terrain objects, as well as relative to the location of your troops and enemy troops. They are determined by the presence on the terrain of characteristic relief elements and local objects that clearly stand out among other objects in their own way. appearance or position and convenient to use as reference points.

Evaluation of orientation conditions is of particular importance in the operations of subunits in the mountains, desert, steppe, wooded and swampy areas, where there are few landmarks. In such cases, additional measures are planned for orienting subunits on the ground, using navigational equipment, and setting up light landmarks.

Orientation on the ground

Orientation techniques

To navigate the terrain means to find directions to the cardinal points (north, south, east and west) and determine your location. To find the direction along the cardinal points, the north-south direction is first determined; after which, facing north, the determiner will have to the right - east, to the left - west. The cardinal points are usually found by a compass, and in the absence of it, by the Sun, the Moon, the stars, and by some signs of local objects.

Knowledge of topographic orientation is essential, especially when passing through unfamiliar terrain and when visibility is poor. Topographic orientation should be understood as orientation on the ground, i.e., determining its location relative to the sides of the horizon, surrounding local objects and terrain.

By compass.

Of the numerous compass systems in tourist practice, the Sport-3 liquid compass has found the widest application. When using any compass, it should be remembered that in a freely suspended state, the magnetic needle will point north and south with its ends. But it's close. The arrow is located not in the direction of the true (geographic) meridian, but in the direction of the magnetic meridian. The angle between the true meridian and the magnetic one is called the declination of the magnetic needle (magnetic declination). It is different for each locality and can be eastern (with a + sign) or western (with a - sign). Magnetic declination can be determined locally from sunrise and sunset or from a map.

With the help of a compass, you can most conveniently and quickly determine the north, east, south, west. To do this, you need to give the compass a horizontal position, release the arrow from the clamp, let it calm down. Then the dark end of it will be directed to the north. To determine the accuracy of the deviation of the direction of movement from the direction to the north or to determine the positions of points of the terrain in relation to the direction to the north and their reference, divisions are applied on the compass, of which the lower divisions are indicated in degree measures (the smallest division is 3 °), and the upper divisions of the protractor in tens of thousands. Degrees are counted clockwise from 0 to 360°, and divisions of the goniometer are counted counterclockwise from 0 to 600°. Zero division is located at the letter "C" (north), there is also a triangle glowing in the dark, replacing the letter "C" in some compasses. Under the letters "B" (east), "S" (south), "3" (west) there are luminous dots.

On the movable cover of the compass there is a sighting device (sight and front sight), against which luminous pointers are mounted, which serve to indicate the direction of movement at night. In the army, the Andrianov system compass and the artillery compass are the most common. Compass Andrianov allows reading in degrees and in thousandths. The inscriptions on a fixed scale of degree divisions (division price 3 °) are given clockwise through 15 °, and thousandths - in reverse direction through 500 thousandths (5-00). The sighting device is movable. The artillery compass is graduated only in thousandths with a division value of 100 thousandths (1-00) clockwise. The sighting device is stationary, and the scale (limb) rotates, which allows, without changing the position of the compass, to quickly combine the zero division of the limb with the northern end of the magnetic needle. The mirror on the hinged cover allows you to control the orientation of the compass and make a reading on the dial when sighting an object. A sports compass is very convenient for use by scouts, the arrow of which is placed in a special liquid, so it quickly calms down and almost does not fluctuate when moving.

Map orientation.

To do this, a large-scale map is oriented along the lines of the terrain (along straight sections of roads, canals, clearings, etc.), a compass with a zero diameter is applied to the line of the true meridian, and the magnitude and direction of the magnetic declination are judged by the deviation of the magnetic needle. It must be remembered that in this case it is impossible to use power lines, railway lines, communication lines, etc. to orient maps, since metal and electric currents will affect the readings of the magnetic needle. Magnetic declination is not a constant value. It is a manifestation of the magnetic properties of the Earth. On the territory of Russia, it varies within a fairly wide range. Moreover, the magnetic declination, even for the same point, can be different, changing from year to year. When moving a group in azimuth, it is necessary to carefully maintain the direction and check the compass more often. For a more accurate approach to the landmark, one should not assign very large distances between the turning points. In the case of avoiding obstacles on the opposite side of the obstacle, you should notice some landmark and, having bypassed the obstacle, continue moving in azimuth from this landmark.

By the sun.

The places of sunrise and sunset are different for the seasons: in winter, the Sun rises in the southeast, and sets in the southwest; in summer the sun rises in the northeast and sets in the northwest; in spring and autumn the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. At noon, the Sun is always in the south direction. The shortest shadow from local objects occurs at 13 o'clock, and the direction of the shadow from vertically located local objects at this time will point to the north.

Sun and clock.

Gotta send hour hand on the Sun, and the angle formed between the direction of the hour hand and the number 1 (13 hours) of the dial, divided by an imaginary line in half. The line dividing this corner will indicate the direction: in front - south, behind - north. At the same time, it must be remembered that until 13 o'clock you need to divide the left corner, and in the afternoon - the right corner.

By the North Star.

Topic #1

Fundamentals of command and control

Lesson #1

Key points

By organization of management

Question #1

Introduction to the discipline under study,

Setting goals. Organization of communication

and combat use of nodes and communication lines (OSiBP)\

The organization of communications is a set of measures aimed at preparing the communications system (SS) to ensure command and control of troops (HC) and the combat use of communications troops.

Combat use of signal troops - their purposeful use for the deployment of a communications system (SS) in order to ensure effective, continuous and operational (ENO) command and control (UV)

Question #2

Essence, content

And the requirements

to command and control

Troop control (HC) is a purposeful activity of commanders (chiefs) (KiN), officials (DL) of headquarters, services and other military command and control bodies (OVU) to maintain constant combat readiness (B / C) of troops, prepare their forces and means for fulfillment of tasks for their intended purpose and management of them during hostilities (n/a)

Troop Command Goals:

in peacetime - ensuring constant combat readiness (B/D) of subordinate troops, their comprehensive preparation for combat operations (b/d);

in wartime - provision effective use combat capabilities of the troops and their successful completion of tasks on time in any situation

Command and control tasks:

1. Organization and implementation of measures to increase (maintain) combat readiness and ensure the combat capability of troops.

2. Continuous acquisition, collection, processing, generalization, analysis and evaluation of situational data.

3. Making a decision.

4. Setting tasks for subordinate troops.

5. Planning of military operations.

6. Organization and maintenance of interaction.

7.Organization and implementation of measures for comprehensive support.

8. Organization of management.

9. Leadership in the preparation of forces and means of subordinate troops.

10. Organization of control and assistance to subordinates.

11. Direct control of the actions of troops in the performance of combat missions.

12. Other tasks.

Basic principles of command and control:

1. Unity of command.

2. Personal responsibility of commanders (chiefs) for the decisions made, the use of subordinate troops, and the results of the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to them.

3. Firmness and perseverance in the implementation of the decisions and plans made.

4. Prompt and flexible response to changing conditions.

5. Centralization of management with the provision of initiative to subordinates in determining ways to perform tasks

Troop Command Requirements:

Efficiency

Continuity

Efficiency

Management efficiency -

the degree of use of the potentials or capabilities of subordinate troops for the successful and timely fulfillment of the tasks assigned to them

Continuity of control -

the ability of officials of command and control bodies at any time to provide the necessary targeted control effect on subordinate troops during the preparation and conduct of hostilities

Efficiency of management -

constant knowledge of the situation by officials and a quick response to all its changes, timely influence on the course of hostilities to achieve the intended goals

TO basic principles of command and control, applied taking into account the specific situation in modern combined arms combat, include: unity of command; personal responsibility of commanders (chiefs) for the decisions made and the results of the fulfillment of the assigned tasks; centralization of management combined with the initiative of subordinates; constant knowledge and deep analysis of the situation, foreseeing the course of events; firmness and perseverance in carrying out the decisions and plans made; high level of organization and creativity in the work of governing bodies; knowledge of personnel, reliance on subordinate commanders.

unity of command - the most important principle of command and control, which means that the commander is endowed with full administrative power in relation to his subordinates. Although headquarters, chiefs of military branches, special troops and services take an active part in command and control, nevertheless, the principle of unity of command must always be observed at all levels, because its absence "leads inevitably to catastrophe, chaos, panic, multi-power, defeat" . Only with unity of command is the unconditional and strictest unity of will achieved by subordinating the will of many people to the will of one - the leader, ensuring "the best use of human abilities ...".

Unity of command is expressed in the fact that the commander personally decides to fight, gives the necessary orders and instructions to his subordinates, and organizes their implementation.

Inextricably linked with unity of command is the principle personal responsibility of commanders (chiefs) for the decisions made and the results of the fulfillment of assigned tasks.

One-man commanders of all levels carry full responsibility for all aspects of life and activities of troops subordinate to them. And although each commander, in solving problems of command and control, relies on the team, uses the help of other officials of the command and control bodies to the necessary extent, none other than he bears personal responsibility for the expediency of the decision to fight, the correctness and validity of the decisions made during the battle, the most effective use of the available forces and means in combat and the final results of the accomplishment by the troops of the assigned combat missions.

The need to comply with the principle centralization of management due to the fact that modern combined-arms combat is still conducted in accordance with the plan of the senior commander, and in order to achieve a common goal, coordinated efforts of all the forces and means participating in the battle are required.

The centralization of command and control of troops is manifested in the unification by the senior commander of all the actions of subordinate and attached subunits and units in a single plan, in directing their efforts towards the fastest achievement of the common goal of the battle. It is especially important in resolving issues related to the use of nuclear weapons, with the use of the results achieved by the troops, the need to destroy, first of all, nuclear and chemical weapons, enemy high-precision weapons systems, with the actions of troops in zones of contamination, in areas of destruction, fires and flooding. . How more power and long-range have the available means of struggle, the greater the degree of centralization of their management in a higher instance is necessary.

Centralization does not exclude, but presupposes a broad subordinate initiative. Bold and intelligent daring, striving to find best ways performance of the task, the ability to demonstrate independence in a difficult environment has always played a big role.

Efficiency and flexibility in responding to changing conditions are classified among the basic principles due to the fact that without this management is simply unthinkable. They make it possible to single out the main, most significant in the current situation, to identify the moments that make it difficult to complete the assigned task on time, and in a timely manner to outline measures to eliminate their negative impact on the actions of subordinate troops, to make the best decision for battle. Constant knowledge and in-depth analysis of the situation in which the combat activities of the troops take place enable the commander, headquarters and other command and control agencies to correctly direct the efforts of subordinates to overcome the difficulties encountered in the course of the battle, and to respond in a timely manner to changes in the situation.

But if in modern combined-arms combat we confine ourselves to reacting to those events that have already taken place, then with rapid and abrupt changes in the situation as a result of nuclear, chemical strikes by the enemy or the massive use of high-precision weapons, it is difficult to count on the successful completion of the assigned tasks. Now more than ever, the role foreseeing the course of events on the battlefield.

Foreseeing the prospects for the development of events makes it possible to successfully overcome such difficulties of modern combat as the incompleteness of situation data and lack of time, and to reasonably outline in advance ways and means to achieve the set goal. Today, the commander must foresee possible changes in the situation to a much greater depth and with greater lead in time than was required during the years of the last war. And this depends mainly on the degree of preparedness of the commander and other officials involved in command and control, on their knowledge of enemy tactics, on taking into account the factors influencing the development of events, conducting active and purposeful reconnaissance, the availability of reliable communications, the timeliness of reports from subordinates and constant information from higher authorities and neighbors.

Past experience shows that firmness and perseverance in the implementation of the decisions made in life have always contributed to the achievement of success in battle. The importance of this principle is especially growing in the conduct of combat under the conditions of the use by the enemy of nuclear, chemical, high-precision conventional weapons, which often gives rise to many unforeseen difficulties, violates pre-planned action plans for troops, is capable of causing heavy losses in subunits and units, severe contamination of the area, extensive destruction, floods, fires. Some of the personnel may become confused, panicky, and the commander organizing the battle may have uncertainty, doubts about the correctness of his actions, and sometimes faith in victory has been lost. All this will put the troops in a difficult position.

Firmness and perseverance in putting the decisions and plans made into practice is not a desire contrary to common sense or the need to adhere to decisions and plans that no longer correspond to the actual combat situation. Firmness and perseverance in carrying out the decisions and plans made should be manifested only as long as this ensures the defeat of the enemy with as few forces as possible, otherwise this will cause unjustified losses in forces, means and time, reduce the combat capability of the troops, undermine confidence in the ability of commanders to lead troops to victory. This can be avoided by timely clarification or change of decisions and plans that no longer correspond to the situation, and, if necessary, by abandoning them, by adopting and implementing new decisions and plans.

Historical experience shows that successful leadership of troops could only be achieved if high organization and creativity in the work of management bodies .

Commanders, staffs, heads of military branches, special troops and services must act as a single cohesive team. Each of them is obliged to know well and skillfully fulfill his functional duties, and the actions of the entire administrative body as a whole must be distinguished by a clear distribution of tasks and functions between the performers and consistency in their work, discipline, strict order, ensuring accurate and timely implementation of measures for command and control of troops in difficult conditions of modern combined arms combat.

The professional skills of officers of the administrative apparatus and the technical means of control must be used to the maximum to develop original techniques and methods of action that are unexpected for the enemy. The rejection of the template, the constant search for ever new ways of solving problems that arise in the process of leading troops, to a large extent contribute to the success of command and control of subunits and units during preparation and during the battle.

Without knowledge of the personnel and reliance on subordinate commanders one cannot count on successful command and control of troops in modern combat. The personnel of subunits and units is the direct creator of tactical art. It is the human factor, high awareness, combat and moral, psychological qualities of personnel that largely determine the methods and methods of action in combat, the development of tactics.

In order to comprehensively take into account the skills and abilities of each soldier, sergeant, officer and make the best use of them in solving problems that arise in the specific conditions of a combat situation, one must know his subordinates well, especially the commanders of subunits and units, because without skillful reliance on subordinate commanders, skillful use strengths In a real situation, it is impossible for any commander to achieve the strictest unity of actions of all forces and means involved in the battle, the exact fulfillment of the senior commander's plan, the timely and complete implementation of the decisions made, and the defeat of the enemy at the cost of minimal losses.

Rice. 8. Essence and content of command and control

TROOP MANAGEMENT is a purposeful activity of commanders, headquarters, chiefs of military branches and services to maintain the combat readiness of units (subdivisions), prepare them for battle and guide them in the performance of the assigned task.

Tactics - the art of command and control

The core of tactics as a theory and practice of warfare is the art of command and control (Fig. 8). Without control, there is no fight. If the knowledge, skills and abilities of each serviceman actuate individual types of weapons, military equipment as part of the primary military units (squad, crew, crew), then the command and control system realizes the potential capabilities of all military formations in their totality and in accordance with their purpose and potential capabilities. . It is only through command and control that it is possible to put into practice the plan of battle—to achieve high combat readiness of subunits, skillful concentration of troop efforts and continuity of their interaction, to carry out flexible maneuver and all-round support.

At all times, management was considered by generals, military theorists as a complex multifaceted art.

TROOP MANAGEMENT INCLUDES:

1. Continuous acquisition, collection, analysis, generalization and evaluation of situational data

2. Decision making

3. Bringing tasks to subordinates

4. Fight planning

5. Organization of maintaining interaction

6. Organization and implementation of measures to increase (maintain) the combat readiness of units, ensure their security, combat, technical, logistic support

7. Organization of the management system, incl. communication systems

8. Direct management of the preparation of units for the performance of tasks

9. Organization and implementation of control and assistance by units and other activities


Here is what A.M. wrote, for example. Vasilevsky: “Troop command and control is an art, and the art is complex, multifaceted, intellectual and psychological. I think that every military leader, be it a commander of a unit or a division, an army or front commander, should be moderately prudent and cautious. He has such a job that he is responsible for the lives of thousands and tens of thousands of soldiers, and his duty is to weigh, think through, and look for the most optimal ways to accomplish a combat mission” 35 . The English military theorist Liddell Garth highly appreciated the role of command and control. He noted: "Although the battle is a physical act, it is controlled by the human mind" 36 . V. Cheremisov wrote that “the commander is required not to blindly follow orders, but to take reasonable initiative, artistic creativity» 37 .


Marshal Soviet Union THEIR. Bagramyan in his book “Sons of the Great People”, characterizing the military activity of G.K. Zhukova, A.M. Vasilevsky, K.K. Rokossovsky, B.M. Shaposhnikova, S.K. Timoshenko, I.S. Konev, noted that each of them had his own character, creative style, but they all had one thing in common - the high art of command and control, "irrepressible energy, the ability to boldly take responsibility, quickly navigate in the most difficult situation" 38 .

IN modern conditions the control factor is legitimately equated in its importance in achieving success in battle with the material factor (the number and quality of troops and weapons), and the command and control levels of the opposing sides are an important indicator of their combat capabilities and are considered as the ratio of combat assets.

The modern art of command and control has absorbed the centuries-old experience of wars, the need to study which is due primarily to the fact that without knowledge of the past, penetration into the future is impossible. The historical approach to management issues is designed to equip officer cadres with methodological guidelines, the ability to identify fundamental trends in the development of the management process. The lessons of the past help to avoid the mistakes made by previous generations.

35 Vasilevsky A,M. The work of a lifetime. M.: Politizdat, 1973. S. 437.

36 L i dde l Hart B.H. Strategy of indirect action, S. 488.

37 Cheremisov V. Fundamentals of modern military art. Kyiv. 1910. S. 2.

38 Bagramyan I.Kh. Sons of a great people. M .: Military Publishing House, 1984. S. 7.

The command and control service was born and developed quite extensively long before the advent of regular armies. Even in the period of the slave-owning society, the military leader, organizing a campaign, had to determine its goal and ways to achieve it, conduct reconnaissance, choose a battle site, guard, supply troops, coordinate the actions of cohorts, legions, detachments, squads, etc.

Scientific Foundations theories and practices of command and control in the most complete form are laid in the XVIII-XIX centuries in the works of A.V. Suvorov "The Science of Victory" (1795-1796), Heinrich Lloyd "The Spirit of the Newest Military System" (1799), K. Clausewitz "On War", A. Jomini "Essays on Military Art" and other works. Based on the generalization of the experience of wars, they formulated the concept of “command (leadership) of troops”, showed the complexity of this process, set out the requirements for the commander, who, according to Clausewitz, must, firstly, have “a mind capable of seeing the flickering of his inner light thickened twilight and grope for the truth; secondly, the courage to follow that faint glimpse of guidance” 39 .

A lot of valuable in the art of command and control is contained in the writings of Napoleon and the experience of his military activities, although one cannot agree with all the provisions expressed by him. First of all, this refers to the ambiguous assessment by the great French commander of the human factor in the war. He wrote that “in a war, people (soldiers) are nothing, the commander is everything ... Not the Roman army conquered Gaul,” Napoleon argued, “but Caesar; it was not the Carthaginian army that made the republic tremble at the gates of Rome, but Hannibal; not the Macedonian army reached the banks of the Indus, but Alexander ... not the Prussian army defended Prussia for seven years, but Frederick the Great.

The role of man in the war was understood differently by the Russian commanders A.V. Suvorov, P.A. Rumyantsev, P.I. Bagration, G.A. Potemkin, M.I. Kutuzov, M.B. Barclay de Tolly and others. In their activities, they relied on the initiative and resourcefulness of the Russian soldier, his patriotic qualities,

39 Klausevnts K. About the war. T I. M .: Military Publishing House, 1941. S. 66.

40 Cit. Quoted from: Soviet military encyclopedia. T. 5. M.. 1978. S. 506.


It was necessary that each of them understand his maneuver in battle. All charters of the Russian army, starting with the charter "Teaching and cunning of the military structure of infantry people" (1647), were permeated with the idea of ​​developing independent actions of commanders, encouraging resourcefulness, cunning, and ingenuity of soldiers in battle.

As the army grew, the requirements for command and control increased more and more. By the beginning of the 19th century in Russia, the organizational structure of the troops received a significant improvement, infantry and cavalry divisions and permanent corps were created, and in 1812 V the operation of the regulation on command and control of troops "Institution for the management of a large active army." In formations (divisions and corps) were established state governing bodies- headquarters, also introduced the position of chief of staff. At the same time, it became more and more obvious that the existing communication system (mail and mobile communications) was not capable of fully ensuring the required speed of transmission of orders and combat documents. Russian scientists and inventors, seeking to resolve this problem achieve some success. So, in 1795 I.P. Kuli-bin designed a semaphore (optical) telegraph. Soon, fleet officer A.M. Butakov invented the telegraph, which consisted of a flag, a pennant and a ball. This communication system V In 1810, Admiral D.N. Sinyavin during the war between Russia and Turkey 41 .

In the years Patriotic War of 1812-1814 the connection of Kutuzov's headquarters with Moscow and St. Petersburg was provided by courier and mail. Army commanders communicated with corps commanders with the help of mounted adjutants and orderlies. Management in the division-battalion link was organized through foot orderlies, horse messengers and signals (pipes, drums). With skillful leadership, such a control system made it possible to collect situational data in a timely manner, make decisions based on them, and communicate orders to the troops. Here is one such example. During the Battle of Borodino, the French, having captured the village of Semenovskoye, pulled up a 35,000-strong army and about 300 guns to a profitable area for them, they were preparing for a decisive attack on the Raevsky battery, but Kutuzov forestalled the events. Having received information about the actions of the French, he, through the orderlies, gave the order to the atamans Platov and Uvarov to hit the cavalry.

Military Bulletin. 1989. No. 2. S. 77.

Tsei on the left flank of the enemy. With an unexpected attack, the Cossacks confused all the plans of the enemy, inflicted significant damage on him, and then retreated in an organized manner, maintaining contact with the command and neighbors 42 .

Thanks to a well-functioning postal service and mobile means, Kutuzov managed to ensure the replenishment of the army with reserves (infantry - from Arzamas, cavalry - from Murom, Cossack regiments - from the Don). It is characteristic that Kutuzov introduced written reports as the main reporting document on hostilities. They were delivered by the headquarters of the armies and corps twice a day with the obligatory indication of the place, date and hour of dispatch. From the main field headquarters to the troops, partisan detachments, equestrian orderlies sent orders through adjutants on further actions, maintaining interaction, communications, reports on the movement of the enemy, as well as personal instructions from the commander-in-chief 4 -.

Fundamental changes in the command and control system of troops occurred with the emergence of mass armies equipped with more advanced types of weapons and military equipment. In the second half of the 19th century, rifled artillery and small arms appeared, which began to develop rapidly, especially after the invention of smokeless powder. The range, accuracy and effectiveness of fire have increased dramatically. The development of railway transport and the appearance of automobiles ensured a wide maneuver of troops. Under the influence of this, armed struggle became much more complicated, the role of fire increased, the survivability of armies increased, it became possible to prepare reserves, transfer them to the front, and maneuver forces and means. The invention of the telegraph and telephone made it possible to control troops from a distance.

Under such conditions general battle as a form of military action began to lose its priority. The scope of hostilities increased sharply. So, if the largest battles in the Franco-Prussian war at Gravelotte and Sedan (1870), with the participation of a total of half a million troops on both sides, were deployed on a front 12-15 km and 3-5 km in depth, then in Russo-Japanese War active hostilities covered a space of hundreds of kilometers. The scope of operations in the first world war, where the entire territory of the theaters of military operations has already become the scene of fierce battles. This complicated the process of planning operations, affected

42 Military Gazette. 1989. No. 2. S. 77-78. 43 Ibid. S. 79.


on the nature of command and control. The structure of management bodies has become multi-stage. If in XVIII century, divisions and corps were the highest operational units, then in the first quarter of the 20th century, these were armies, fronts (army groups).

The enormous scope of the armed struggle required a change in the methods of strategic and operational control. It became impossible to manage multimillion-strong armies according to the old "commander-in-chief - army" scheme. Has developed new structure supreme governing bodies: headquarters - front (army group) - army. The use of technical means of communication (telephone, telegraph, radio, airplanes and cars) ensured a high degree of centralization of control. During the years of the First World War, the army command and control unit lost its former independence and began to act according to the directives of the main and front command.

The main trend in the development of the content of command and control at the tactical level during the First World War was a significant increase in the volume of tasks performed by division and regimental commanders and their headquarters in preparation for and during combat operations. This was due to the fact that the battle took general character. The problem of organizing and maintaining the interaction of various branches of the armed forces, the comprehensive support of hostilities, arose acutely. In the course of the war, the role of headquarters as command and control bodies, especially operational departments, increased, their functions expanded, the rights of the chief of staff in command and control of troops increased significantly, further development received a communication system, improved combat documentation. IN interwar period In the Red Army, an intensive search was carried out for new structures and methods of command and control, which was reflected in the field manuals. So, in the Provisional Field Regulations of the Red Army of 1925, questions of command, command and control techniques, maintaining the combat readiness of troops, and the communications service And 262 paragraphs are devoted to intelligence. A certain continuity in this regard was also preserved in subsequent drafts of the field regulations of the Red Army (1929. 1936, 1939, 1940, 1941).

A major role in the development of the command and control system in the Red Army in the pre-war period was played by the Staff Field Service Manual, which was republished in 1926, 1933 and 1936. Thus, in the Manual of 1926, for the first time in the history of military art, the theory and practice of the work of staffs to ensure command and control of troops was quite fully described. It contained functional responsibilities officials

headquarters for the preparation and conduct of combat, the procedure for its planning, support, coordination of combat efforts of troops, bringing the commander's decision to subordinates, organizing reconnaissance and other types of support.

In the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s, works on the theory of command and control by M.V. Frunze, M.N. Tukhachevsky, B.M. Shaposhnikova, N.E. Varfolomeeva, V.K. Trian-dafillova, S.N. Krasilnikova, M.R. Galaktionov, A.P. Lapchinsky and others. Of particular note is the fundamental military-theoretical work of B.M. Shaposhnikov "The Brain of the Army". It has largely retained its value to this day.

The development of the theory of deep combat had a significant impact on the revision of established views on issues of command and control. Its main provisions required a different way to organize hostilities. This was especially true of the interaction of military branches in the course of simultaneous fire impact on the entire depth of the enemy’s combat formation. With the goal is to achieve a quick breach of the defense, followed by the introduction of mobile troops into the breakthrough and the landing of airborne assault forces to develop success. All this led to an increase in the role of communications, especially radio communications.

In the course of the military reform of 1924-1925, significant changes took place in the structure of command and control bodies in divisions and regiments. Their construction was based on the principles of stability, efficiency and continuity of management. However, not all of these requirements have been implemented in practice.

The Great Patriotic War subjected to a cruel test the system of command and control that had developed in the pre-war period, and made many adjustments to it. The first days of the fighting showed that not all commanders and staffs were prepared to control units and subunits in the event of a sudden attack by the enemy. In many rifle divisions of the first echelon, contact was lost with subordinate units and with senior commanders. Particularly significant shortcomings were observed during the withdrawal of troops and the exit from the encirclement. For example, formations of the 5th and 21st armies of the Southwestern Front in September 1941, having lost control, mixed up during the retreat and made their way from the encirclement by separate detachments and groups numbering from several tens to several thousand people 44 .

44 History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 - 1945. T. 2. M.. 1963. S. 34-37.


The main reason for ineffective command and control was that in pre-war times, commanders and staffs learned to command troops primarily on the offensive, in a favorable situation, with superiority over the enemy in forces and means, and retaining the initiative of action.

The restructuring in the methods of work of the control bodies for the organization and conduct of combat was carried out "on the go" and was very painful. The extremely unfavorable conditions that prevailed in the very first hours of the war (constant interruptions in communications, poor intelligence, lack of information not only about the enemy, but also about neighbors, and often about their own units), led to confusion and confusion. Many commanders made decisions only on the map, without conducting reconnaissance. The interaction was organized in general terms, due attention was not paid to the organization of combat support, camouflage, and engineering support.

During the war, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took decisive measures to improve the command and control system of troops at all levels. This is evidenced, in particular, by the fact that before 1944, 30 charters and manuals were issued, including the Combat Charter of the Infantry of 1942, the Field Charter of 1943 (draft), the Manual on the field service of the headquarters of 1942, the Manual on military intelligence 45 Orders and directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, information collections, bulletins and instructions of the General Staff, which reflected the accumulated combat experience and changes in the means and methods of armed struggle.

Improving the structure of governing bodies was not without mistakes. Among them should be attributed the liquidation of the corps administrations with the outbreak of war. As a result, by the end of 1941, out of 62 corps directorates, only six remained, and the number of directorates of combined arms armies increased from 27 to 58*. In the absence of corps directorates, army commanders were forced to create temporary operational groups to lead the troops operating in separate directions. Combat practice required the revival of the corps command link. During 1942-1943, the number of corps increased to 61. The improvement of the command and control system was significantly facilitated by the creation during

45 Popel N.N., Savelyev V.P., Shemansky P.V. Troop control in the goals of the Great Patriotic War. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1974. P. 17. 46 50 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR. M.: Military Publishing House, 1968. S. 269.

warriors of powerful mechanized, tank, artillery and anti-aircraft artillery formations. In general, to develop an optimal structure of command and control bodies V the war took more than two years. It took shape mainly by the end of 1943.

The experience of the war has shown that the most important role in ensuring command and control of troops is played by combined arms headquarters. IN Headquarters field service manual 1942, it was stated that “the headquarters is the body of the commander for command and control. He organizes and ensures the continuous command and control of the troops and bears full responsibility for this ... The chief of staff is the main organizer for the implementation of the will of the command and control of the troops. According to field charter In 1943, the chief of staff became the first deputy commander, the chief of logistics and the chiefs of services were obliged to constantly keep him informed of the measures they were taking and the orders given to ensure the decision of the commander.

Efficiency and continuity of command and control of troops during the war largely depended on the creation of a rational system of command posts. At the beginning of the war, control in the division and regiment was carried out from one point. When it failed, this often led to a loss of control. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to create several control points in each command instance (starting with the regiment). They were organized by separation(division) of regular forces and means of the control apparatus. The main control point was the command post. All work on planning and organizing combat operations, as well as on leading units (subunits) during the battle, was concentrated on it. The command post included an observation post, which was organized during the battle to monitor the actions of the troops. In addition, to manage the rear, a rear group (second echelon) of management was created, which was headed by the head of the rear.

In tank and mechanized formations acted mobile command post. It was divided into three components: a control group, a communication center and a service group. In the course of hostilities, operational groups were allocated from the command post, if necessary.

Analyzing the command and control system that developed in the initial period of the war, it should be noted that it often suffered from excessive centralization. senior bosses


unnecessarily interfered in the functions of subordinate commanders, and this often deprived the latter of initiative and independence. Given this circumstance, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in 1943 issued a directive according to which senior commanders did not have the right to interfere in the work of subordinates unnecessarily, to control the troops "over their heads."

Another shortcoming in the activities of the governing bodies was sample in planning combat operations, which made it easier for the enemy to reveal the nature of the actions of our troops. Especially often, a formulaic approach was observed in conducting reconnaissance in force on the eve of an offensive. Here is what German General K. Tippelskirch wrote about this: “Reconnaissance in force was a sure sign that the expected enemy offensive would follow the next day. At the same time, this served as a signal for our artillery and heavy infantry weapons crews to take up prepared positions, for infantry to leave the first trench and retreat to the second, in order to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy’s artillery preparation” 47 .

In general, during the war, a lot of positive experience was accumulated in management activities generals and officers. Many battles testify to their creative, innovative approach to solving combat missions, the ability to achieve surprise attacks on the enemy, the use of military cunning, the ability to achieve success with little bloodshed due to military skill. The war tempered the will of young talented commanders and commanders, accustomed them to independence. As General of the Army I.M. Tretyak, who at the age of 20 was already in command of a regiment, “during the war there were no“ commander’s nannies ”. Each officer, without allowance for youth and inexperience, was entrusted with the solution of combat missions and was strictly asked of each.

Unfortunately, in the domestic literature, the military experience of the managerial activities of outstanding generals, commanders and commanders is poorly generalized, which contains a lot of instructive information for modern officers. It is characteristic that G.K. Zhukov, K.K. Rokossovsky, I.Kh. Bagramyan, A.M. Vasilevsky, I.S. Konev, R.Ya. Malinovsky, F.I. Tolbukhin always sought to create an environment in subordinate headquarters conducive to the manifestation creative active-

47 Tippelskirch K. History of the Second World War. M.: Izd-vo inostr. lit., 957. S. 317-318.

48 Tretiak I.M. Brave hearts of fellow soldiers. M.: Military publishing house. 1977.S. 18.

sti subordinates. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to the experience of organizational activity in a combat situation by K.K. Rokossovsky, his relationship with subordinates, officers of the front headquarters. “We tried,” he noted, “to create a favorable working atmosphere that excludes relationships built according to the “as you command” rule, excluding the feeling of constraint when people are afraid to express a judgment that differs from the judgment of the elder” 49 .

Army General I.D. was a model of organization, creative aspiration for subordinates. Chernyakhovsky. The soldiers and officers of the 3rd Belorussian Front spoke of him as follows: “We saw in him a decisive and fair commander, commanding and attentive, adamant in the implementation of his will. A man of great personal culture, he knew how to say a warm, encouraging word to each of his subordinates in time. His very exactingness to us - always and in everything - was the result of a deep knowledge of the situation and business, knowledge of life. He was able to achieve not only the fulfillment of his orders and instructions, but also that they be carried out creatively” 50 .

During the war years, General of the Army N.F. Vatutin. In conversations with staff officers, Nikolai Fyodorovich always emphasized that when assessing the situation, it is necessary to think through the solution not only from one's own positions, but also from the positions of the enemy. At the same time, he cited as an example a good chess player who, mentally losing a game, confronts himself. Vatutin believed that only in this way could one trace unexpected turns and identify moments of a possible aggravation of the situation.

Combat practice has shown that the flexibility and efficiency of the control system have a decisive influence on the nature of the battle, its course and outcome, predetermine the effectiveness of the use of weapons and military equipment, make it possible to achieve success in a shorter time, with fewer losses, contribute to achieving surprise in striking, seizing the initiative and its retention, maintaining a constant superiority over the enemy in a decisive direction, allow him to dictate his will.

Here it is appropriate to turn to such a philosophical category as ratio of objective and subjective in the process of fighting, to try to understand how folding-

49 Cit. Quoted from: Kardashov V. Rokossovsky. M.: Young Guard, 1980. S. 247. 50 Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Army General Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky. M.: Military Publishing House, 1953. S. 19.


All circumstances in combat affect the practical actions of commanders and staffs in a specific situation, their ability to bend the course of combat events to their will and find ways out of difficult situations. The conclusion can be drawn as follows: the objective factor (conditions of the situation) is inherent in the position of the determining cause of the emergence of opportunities for victory or defeat of troops, and the subjective factor (the wisdom of the commander's decision) is characterized by a decisive role in turning these objective possibilities into reality.

In the almost six decades that have passed since the end of World War II, fundamental changes have taken place in the material basis of the troops, their technical equipment, organizational structure, in views on the methods of warfare. All this could not but affect the command and control system of troops. In the course of local wars, as well as military exercises, some theoretical provisions in this area were refined, which was the impetus for improving the technical base of command and control and searching for new methods of organizing and conducting combat operations.