Russian encyclopedic dictionary. encyclopedias

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© A.V. Smirnov 2001

X UKM(“judgment”) – along with the concepts of “action” ( Phil) and “intention” ( niyya), one of the main categories Muslim ethics. Like the concepts of "action" and "intention", X UKM is not a specifically ethical category. On the contrary, this concept is used extremely widely in Arab-Muslim science: in philology, jurisprudence, logic, and other theoretical and philosophical disciplines. In Islamic law, the word " X UKM” stands for any specific legal rule, established in relation to a thing or action (shares of inheritance, correctness of contracts, etc.), as well as the qualification of an act in accordance with the system of “five categories” (al-ahkam al-hamsa). In philosophy, the term X UKM” denotes the conclusion (“judgment”) of the syllogism, and also, in the broader sense, the qualification of a thing, established on the basis of one or another of its properties. For example, the term can be used when discussing exactly how a person's action is evaluated: as a product of his free choice or the result of divine intervention; both solutions are indicated as X UKM(assessment, qualification) of an act. As for the ethical theory, we can say that with the so-called. content, it represents the making of certain judgments about the semantic complexes "intention - deed" (see. fi‘ l, Niya). Judgment in ethics is a certain qualification, which is given to an act on the basis of its correlation with intention.

The system of judgments, which operates ethical theory, is closely related to that used in fiqh (jurisprudence), and can be considered as its modification. At the same time, the essential difference between the system of ethical judgments and religious-legal ones is the absence of an area of ​​indifferent (mubax) actions: ethical judgment is distinguished by its totality, and ethical motivation covers a much larger sphere of human behavior than religious-legal motivation.

Fiqh operates with a five-term system of judgments (ahkam). Actions are divided into: a) mandatory ( INA jib), b) recommended (mandub), c) indifferent, d) not recommended (makrux), e) impermissible (xaram). This classification correlates, on the one hand, with the command (’amr) and the prohibition (nahy), and on the other hand, with the question of the afterlife reward (jaza’), whether it is a reward (savab) or punishment(‘ikab). Command and prohibition express the will of the Legislator, i.e. God himself; in other cases, the legends about the words and deeds of Muhammad (hadith) serve as a source for determining orders and prohibitions. The combination of these two sides - prescription / prohibition and retribution - determines the judgment that is correlated with this or that act. Mandatory are actions that are prescribed by the Legislator and the implementation of which is rewarded, and non-performance is punished. Actions are impermissible, to-rye are prohibited by the Legislator, non-commitment of which is rewarded, and commission is punished. The prescribed actions are recommended, non-fulfillment of which is not punished, but the commission of which is rewarded. Non-recommended are those whose commission is not punished, but refraining from which is rewarded.

This complex system of qualifications arose historically, in the course of the analysis of the fundamental religious and legal texts - the Koran and the Sunnah. The introduction of categories of recommended and non-recommended actions was largely consistent with the need to interpret the non-categorical prohibitions and recommendations contained in these texts. At the same time, the system of five categories, as it exists in fiqh, indicates that Islamic culture did not feel the need to form such a system for classifying actions, which would be built on a strict dichotomization of the concepts of good and evil. In the form in which it really existed in Islamic culture, religious and legal thought (fiqh) seems to merge in a single system of categories what in European culture was historically divided between two essentially various areas law and religious morality. Sphere rights built there on the idea of ​​the need for celebration justice, ultimately ascending to the idea good, and presupposes an unconditional division of what is appropriate and what is inconsistent with the idea of ​​justice. In principle, law presupposes that what is inconsistent with the idea of ​​justice is subject to punishment or, in any case, restriction. The sphere of religious (Christian) morality sets a different system of semantic coordinates, offering the idea of good as a maximum guideline, any approach to Krom is commendable, although non-approach may not be religiously condemned, and giving rise to a whole system of institutions, ideas and practices focused on stimulating the achievement of such a maximum: for a believer, the moral ideal of a saint, passion-bearer, martyr (and in an infinite perspective - Christ himself) sets the criterion for ethical evaluation, according to which an act that is not good does not necessarily turn out to be evil and subject to punishment.

Externally, the system of four stimulating-prohibiting categories used by fiqh looks as if it unites what in European culture is divided between two spheres. But it is impossible not to notice that such a representation turns out to be purely external. The system of law and religious morality can hardly be combined without abandoning the fundamental categories for both. But the point is precisely that for Muslim religious and legal thought, the highest regulatory idea is not the concept of good or goodness (as it can be seen in European culture), but the degree of prescription or prohibition of this or that act. Although outwardly the system of categories used by the religious and legal thought of Islam resembles certain legal and religious and ethical institutions of European culture, in essence there is a serious discrepancy between them.

As for indifferent acts, they include such, the commission or non-commission of which does not violate the will of the Legislator. This is precisely the area that does not fall into the field of view of religious and legal thought and is not subject to direct religious and legal regulation.

However, such actions may be subject to moral evaluation. The system of ethical categories is simpler than that used in fiqh. Ethical reasoning operates, as a rule, in two categories: an act can be assessed as “good” ( X asanas) or "bad" (To abAnd X). These assessments are based on the idea of ​​meritorious or blameworthy actions. In this case, as a rule, we have in mind a correlative, and not absolute, interpretation of the concepts “good” and “bad”; The Mu'tazilites tried, however, without much success, to offer an absolute interpretation of them (cf. KalA m). What an act is related to, in order to be judged as “good” or “evil”, is either a command and a prohibition as such, or the system of five categories used in fiqh. Since the assessment of “good-bad” is binary, and the five-fold system of categories is fundamentally non-dichotomous, the definition of an act as good or bad through correlation with the five judgments of fiqh is almost always paradoxical. If we consider good everything that “in which there is no flaw”, then unrecommended actions should also be classified as good, since they do not contain a flaw, since their commission does not entail punishment. If everything that does not bring reward or benefit is considered bad, then all indifferent actions should be declared bad. The sheer absurdity of such results forced us to look for other ways to define the concepts of “good-bad”. The search also went in the direction of a correlative definition. It was proposed to consider such actions as good, the commission of which is preferable ( avlA) than non-doing, and bad ones, non-doing to-rykh is preferable to committing; however, this classification was supplemented by a third element, obligatory actions, in order to preserve the imperativeness of a number of prescriptions that cannot be understood correlatively. This classification turns out to be, as it were, an extension of the concepts “recommended–not recommended” to all actions, except for obligatory ones, and the fate of categorical prohibitions that are complementary to categorical imperatives remains unclear.

Literature:

At-TahA navAnd . Kashshaf istilaxat al-funun. T.1-2, Istanbul, W.N.Lees; Press, 1984

Ibn aT - T ayyib. al-Mu‘tamad fi ’usul al-fiqkh. T. 2. Damascus: 1965

(RES) occupies a special place among the encyclopedias presented at the Rubricon. He not only continues the tradition of encyclopedic dictionaries published by the Big Russian Encyclopedia publishing house over the past twenty years. RES involuntarily falls into a niche intended for a multi-volume universal encyclopedia on a national scale. This role continues to be played to this day by the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (BSE), which so far remains the most complete and reliable source of information in various fields. modern knowledge. However, many events and changes that have taken place over a quarter of a century, separating us from the publication of the last volume of the TSB, urgently require their reflection at the encyclopedic level. It is this task that the RES is called upon to solve today, albeit in a much more “compressed” style, but this is how a dictionary should be.

RES and TSB included in single system search and navigation of the Rubricon, together form a unique information complex that has no analogues in Runet. The total number of articles is more than 165 thousand, about 70 thousand of them are included in the RES. Mutually complementing each other, RES and TSB turn into an extraordinary effective tool obtaining information, which users can very quickly be able to verify.

If we touch on how the Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary was created, then it should be noted that the authors and editors sought to update and expand the information contained in the previous dictionaries and encyclopedias. Using the constantly replenished information arrays of the publishing house, as well as materials published in recent years by the publishing house of thematic encyclopedias, dictionaries and reference books, they included hundreds of new articles and references in the RES. Many materials of the dictionary cover the problems of history and the current state of mankind. Considerable attention is paid to questions of literature, art, religion, law, philosophy, sociology, economics, and ethnology. The dictionary contains information on physical and socio-economic geography, technology, mathematics, physics, chemistry, geology, biology, medicine, sports, etc. Particular attention in the materials of the dictionary is paid to new scientific disciplines that have developed in the last decades of the 20th century. There are significant arrays of articles on ecology and environmental protection.

The biographical block of the dictionary includes articles about state, political and public figures of all countries of the world, about religious figures, military leaders, scientists and cultural figures who left a noticeable mark on the history of civilization.

The creators of the dictionary sought to fully illuminate the problems of Russia's past and present, to reflect its place and role in the changing world. The reader will find in it articles about all subjects Russian Federation and cities, about natural and cultural-historical objects, historical events, about people whose activities are connected with the history of our country.

The dictionary includes several thousand illustrations. They represent the landscapes of Russia, monuments of national culture, the peoples inhabiting our country. A separate notebook of illustrations is occupied by portraits of historical figures of Russia.

Organic integral part The dictionary is a set of applications, including tables of physical quantities, measures and weights, monetary units, economic and statistical materials, chronological tables on Russian and world history.

Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary: In 2 books. / Chap. Ed.: A. M. Prokhorov M.: Great Russian Encyclopedia, 2001, Book. 1: A-N., Book. 2: N-I. 2015 p.: ill.

Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary / M.: Great Russian Encyclopedia, 2001

The Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary (RES) occupies a special place among the encyclopedias presented at the Rubricon. He not only continues the tradition of encyclopedic dictionaries published by the Big Russian Encyclopedia publishing house over the past twenty years. RES involuntarily falls into a niche intended for a multi-volume universal encyclopedia on a national scale. This role continues to be played to this day by the Big soviet encyclopedia» (TSB), which so far remains the most complete and reliable source of information on various areas of modern knowledge. However, many events and changes that have taken place over a quarter of a century, separating us from the publication of the last volume of the TSB, urgently require their reflection at the encyclopedic level. It is this task that the RES is called upon to solve today, albeit in a much more “compressed” style, but this is how a dictionary should be.
RES and TSB, included in the unified search and navigation system of the Rubricon, together form a unique information complex that has no analogues in Runet. The total number of articles is more than 165 thousand, about 70 thousand of them are included in the RES. Mutually complementing each other, RES and TSB turn into an unusually effective tool for obtaining information, which users can very quickly be able to verify.
If we touch on how the Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary was created, then it should be noted that the authors and editors sought to update and expand the information contained in the previous dictionaries and encyclopedias. Using the constantly replenished information arrays of the publishing house, as well as materials published in recent years by the publishing house of thematic encyclopedias, dictionaries and reference books, they included hundreds of new articles and references in the RES. Many materials of the dictionary cover the problems of history and the current state of mankind. Considerable attention is paid to questions of literature, art, religion, law, philosophy, sociology, economics, and ethnology. The dictionary contains information on physical and socio-economic geography, technology, mathematics, physics, chemistry, geology, biology, medicine, sports, etc. Particular attention in the materials of the dictionary is paid to new scientific disciplines that have developed in the last decades of the 20th century. There are significant arrays of articles on ecology and environmental protection.
The biographical block of the dictionary includes articles about state, political and public figures of all countries of the world, about religious figures, military leaders, scientists and cultural figures who left a noticeable mark on the history of civilization.
The creators of the dictionary sought to fully illuminate the problems of Russia's past and present, to reflect its place and role in the changing world. The reader will find in it articles about all the subjects of the Russian Federation and cities, about natural and cultural-historical objects, historical events, about people whose activities are connected with the history of our country.
The dictionary includes several thousand illustrations. They represent the landscapes of Russia, monuments of national culture, the peoples inhabiting our country. A separate notebook of illustrations is occupied by portraits of historical figures of Russia.
An integral part of the dictionary is a set of applications, including tables of physical quantities, measures and weights, monetary units, economic and statistical materials, chronological tables on Russian and world history.

Ethics. Encyclopedic Dictionary / Ed. R. Apresyan, A. Huseynov. - M., 2001

« Good in teaching gr. Tolstoy and F. Nietsche (Philosophy and preaching)”- the work of Lev Shestov, which determined the existential nature of his philosophical and religious-moral quests and prepared the “revision” of the ethical tradition, which reached its climax in the “paradoxical ethics” of N.A. Berdyaev (see “On the Appointment of Man”). According to S.N. Bulgakov, Shestov’s mental attitudes, already formed in his early works, “represent a series of attempts to express in a new way one main theme - the apotheosis of philosophical “groundlessness”, which means nothing more than the philosophy of faith.” Criticism of ethical reason, undertaken by Shestov, is the experience of substantiating morality on the basis of "philosophical groundlessness", or the philosophy of faith.

It can be considered very significant that V.S. Soloviev, having become acquainted with the manuscript of Shestov’s book, advised the author not to rush to publish his work, realizing the seriousness of the ethical counter-argument expressed in it. Nevertheless, it was with the assistance of Solovyov that Shestov's book was published in 1900. The specific response of LN Tolstoy to the work written about him is unknown, especially in the context of comparing his "sermon" with the "philosophy" of F. Nietzsche. Judging by Tolstoy's diary entries and the memoirs of his secretary (VF Bulgakov), Tolstoy did not read this book (although the book itself is kept in the Yasnaya Polyana library). However, it is known that after a personal conversation with Shestov, Tolstoy spoke of him as "a writer and not a philosopher at all" (Diaries, March 2, 1910). This assessment can be considered a kind of Tolstoy's response to Shestov's book, who was just trying to prove that Tolstoy was a philosopher in his literary works. (“War and Peace” is a truly philosophical work, and Tolstoy is a philosopher in the best and noblest sense of the word, for he depicts life from all its most enigmatic and mysterious sides.) Tolstoy’s own philosophy, trying, according to Shestov, to believe the harmony of life with the “algebra of goodness”, reveals the one-dimensionality and impotence of preaching.

This is how Shestov approaches one of the main themes of his philosophizing: the theme of "replacing" life with good, ontology with ethics. First of all, he tries to reveal the true motives for posing the very problem of the “meaning of the good”, “justifying the good”, “serving the good”. Tolstoy's experience of evolution from the philosophy of life to the preaching of goodness means the transformation of a philosophical problem into a "personal question", "the placement of goodness on the Procrustean bed of one's own life." However, the main reason for the “substitution” lies elsewhere: in the subjective fear and impotence of the human mind before the mystery of life, before the law of necessity. What the mind considers itself subject to, it calls "good"; all the elements of life that are not subject to reason are rejected by him as "evil". This is how the phenomenon of "ethical rationalization of being" arises. According to Shestov, "the ethical was born along with reason"; the concepts of "reason" and "ethics" are synonymous. It is not surprising that for Shestov all philosophers are in fact ethical; Tolstoy is only an extreme and obvious case. The only exceptions are Plotinus, Nietzsche, F.M. Dostoevsky, S. Kierkegaard and E. Husserl.

Shestov emphasizes that the very phenomenon of “ethical rationalization”, which entails the substitution of life for good, is possible only in the conditions of the loss of genuine self-evident faith, when good becomes the subject of faith, when God is understood as good, and good as God. It is in this ethization of religious consciousness that Shestov sees the essential similarity between the positions of Tolstoy and Nietzsche. Tolstoy's saying "God is good" and Nietzsche's words "God is dead" are, according to Shestov, "unambiguous expressions". However, Nietzsche did not stop at Tolstoy's goodness. Shestov defines his turn from goodness to life, from ethics to ontology as "the revolt of conscience against goodness." Conscience, as the inner voice of life and the threshold of faith, returns to a person a holistic perception of life, expressed by Nietzsche in amor fati (love of rock). This allowed Nietzsche to recognize that "evil is as necessary as good, that both are necessary condition human existence and development, and that the sun rises equally on the good and on the evil." Nevertheless, Nietzsche, according to Shestov, did not hold on to this stage. From the preaching of goodness through the philosophy of life, he moves not to the philosophy of faith, but to a new preaching of the morality of the "superman". The path of faith turned out to be closed to him, and Nietzsche again fell into the "temptation" of ethical rationalism. Shestov's book ends with the programmatic words: “We must look for that which is higher than compassion, higher than goodness. We must seek God." Shestov does not renounce ethics at all, but sets himself the task of justifying ethics within the framework of the philosophy of faith, creating ethics that would be based not on the freedom of choice between good and evil, but on “freedom to good”, which determines the final triumph and victory of good over life. Shestov's "ethics of faith" is called upon by an incomprehensible divine participation to abolish the "former evil" ("the suffering of Job", "the death of Socrates", "the betrayal of Judas", etc.), turning it in a super-rational, absurd way into "good that was not yet." In this sense, Shestov's ethics can be definitively defined as "justification only by faith of the not yet former good."

Lit.: Berdyaev N.A. The tree of life and the tree of knowledge // Way. 1929. No. 18; Bulgakov S.N. Op. in 2t. M.: Nauka, 1993. Vol. 1; Baranova-Shestova N.L. Life of Lev Shestov. According to correspondence and memoirs of contemporaries. T. I—P. Paris: YMCA-Press, 1983; Shestov L. Good in the teachings of gr. Tolstoy and F. Nietzsche (Philosophy and Preaching) // Vopr. philosophy 1990. No. 7; Fondane B. Rencontres avec Leon Chestov / Paris: Plasma, 1982.

V.N. Nazarov

Immoralism (< лат. in - не-, moralis - моральный, нравственный) — философская позиция, претендующая на выход за сковывающие рамки существующих моральных понятий и ценностей. И. не следует отождествлять с аморализмом — житейской позицией, намеренно отвергающей моральные нормы, а также с нигилизмом, ограничивающимся только отрицанием общепринятых моральных норм и ценностей. Впервые термин «И.» был употреблен для обозначения тех учений, к-рые не рассматривают моральной стороны явлений, т.е. моральный индифферентизм (В.Круг). Однако в широкий философский обиход данное понятие ввел Ф.Ницше, давший ему более глубокое толкование. В произведении «По ту сторону добра и зла» он желает встать на «внеморальную» т.з., с к-рой критикует современную культуру и философию, основанные на христианской морали. Но критический пафос Ницше направлен не на мораль саму по себе, а на общепринятые нормы поведения. Он при этом допускает, что «возможны другие..., высшие морали», имеющие абсолютное значение, ради к-рых стоит производить «переоценку ценностей». Ницше рассматривает традиционные нравственные идеалы (добро, сострадание, любовь, смирение) с т.з. «природы», «жизненного инстинкта», «воли к власти» и утверждает, что первые не способствуют укреплению жизненной силы индивида, а напротив — делают его слабым безликим «стадным животным». Напротив, эгоизм, гордость, презрение к мещанству и посредственности, ярко выраженная индивидуальность способствуют развитию сильной личности, за к-рыми Ницше усматривает будущее человеческого рода. Анализируя взгляды Ницше, О.Шпенглер дает наиболее точную формулировку И. как нового рода морали «с притязанием на преимущество по сравнению со всеми прочими». Ницшеанская мораль стремится стать по ту сторону самих понятий добра и зла. Однако по своей сути И. близок к релятивизму (см. Абсолютизм и релятивизм), утверждая, что каждый вправе иметь свою систему оценок и по ее критериям судить устоявшиеся моральные требования.

Despite the fact that Nietzsche began to actively use the term "I." for the first time, the tradition of I., expressed in the desire to free himself from the fetters of the usual moral foundations for the sake of higher freedom, has always existed in the history of philosophy. In Buddhism, there is an idea of ​​a sage-bhikkhu, who, having gained knowledge and attained enlightenment, finds himself on the other side of the vain world, incl. "Stands above good and evil." Antiquity put the following of virtue at the forefront of moral life, to which nature itself leads (stoicism). But Christianity pointed to the difference between virtue (law) and the inner state of man (grace), thus opening up a different moral world. Al. Paul says, "The power of sin is the law." For salvation, it is not enough just to follow the letter of the law of Moses, the main thing is to gain faith, love God and accept the image of Christ as the highest moral ideal. If the ancient sage subordinated his will to the world mind (Logos), then the Christian ascetic brings his own will in line with Divine Providence, which is incomprehensible. Later, in the tradition of apophatic theology (Dionysius the Areopagite, Gregory Palamas), it is argued that neither our usual ideas of good and evil, nor any other philosophical definitions can be attributed to God, because he is higher than them.

New time makes its own reassessment of values. Changes are taking place not in the virtues and commandments themselves, which remain formally Christian, but in their motivation, which goes back to antiquity, but with a much greater reliance on the human mind. The Renaissance era revived the ancient interest in nature, but the New Age is losing the holistic view of the Greeks on the world as an organic unity of truth, goodness and beauty. Enlightenment one-sidedly considers nature as a mechanism indifferent to good and evil. Hence the "man-machine" (J.O. Lametrie) does not need any morality. The philosophy of romanticism interpreted nature only as an aesthetic phenomenon, devoid of a moral dimension; the purpose of man is to develop all its hidden powers, to reach its creative power. For I. Goethe and the romantics, the highest virtue is genius. In the panlogism of G. W. F. Hegel, the World Spirit on the way to the realization of the idea of ​​freedom reconciles all contradictions; the opposition of good and evil is ultimately imaginary, for the Spirit will adapt even the most terrible manifestations of evil for its own purposes.

The philosophy of life put forward the very concept of "life" as a kind of simple, indecomposable foundation of a human being. Life is neither good nor evil, it does not depend on anything, but it affects everything. S. Kierkegaard saw its highest realization in the religious stage of the development of human existence. But in order to climb it, one must abandon secular moral institutions. Nietzsche most consistently adhered to the principle of I., as well as his forerunner, M. Stirner, who directly stated that good and evil "do not make sense to me", and proposed to introduce a different scale of values ​​- "mine - not mine."

In the 20th century only fascism claimed to be free from any moral constraint, which was the result of an extremely superficial reading of Nietzsche. Existentialism, ch.o. A. Camus and J.P. Sartre point to the absolute freedom of a person (freedom of choice), with the help of which he creates his own moral world, not paying attention to any social regulations, thereby choosing absolute responsibility for his actions . The features of I. are inherent in the modern philosophy of postmodernism. They appeared as a reaction to the ideology of liberalism, which asserts that morality should be reduced to perfect social institutions and law. M. Foucault calls such morality “a way of subjugating oneself” and thinks a lot (like J. Deleuze, J Derrida, etc.) on how a person can escape from the yoke of power and fashion.

Lit .: Nietzsche F. Will to power. Moscow: Zhanna, 1994; Fullier A. Nietzsche and immoralism. St. Petersburg: Public benefit, 1905; Spengler O. Decline of Europe. Essays on the morphology of world history. M.: Thought, 1993. S. 524-566; Stirner M. The only one and his property. Kharkov: Osnova, 1994.

A.A. Skvortsov

« To the genealogy of morality"("Zur Genealogie der Moral", 1887) - a work by F. Nietzsche, conceived as an appendix to the work "Beyond Good and Evil" (1886). The first Russian edition in trans. VA.Weinstock - "The Genealogy of Morals: Pamphlet" (1908). The purpose of the work is the criticism of moral values. To achieve this goal, Nietzsche uses the genealogical method, which consists in revealing the meaning of values ​​through the explication of the historical origins and primary forms of the phenomenon in question, the causes of deformation or the concealment of its original meaning. "To g.m." consists of three sections - "considerations". Section I raises the question of the basis of judgments of value. Nietzsche comes to the conclusion that the differences in the understanding of good and evil are primarily related to the difference between two types of morality - the morality of "masters", "aristocrats" and the morality of "slaves". These are two radically different value systems, each of which has its own socio-psychological foundations, its own mechanism of formation and functioning. The morality of the "masters" ("primary morality") is primordial, "natural" and grows out of the "triumphant self-affirmation" of man as an unbridled force of nature. The morality of the “slaves” is secondary, it is “not an action, but a reaction”, this is the answer of the weak, the weak, “the repressed hatred, the revenge of the powerless”, the expression of ressentiment - vengeful malice. Nietzsche is credited with discovering the phenomenon of ressentiment. He considers the will to power among the losers, the humiliated, the weak, as the deepest foundation of ressentiment, ressentiment is a transformed form of this will. Necessary prerequisite ressentiment is a negative emotional background: hostility, anger, revenge, envy, jealousy. Ressentiment is an evaluative look, turned not to oneself, but outside, it is “no” to everything else, alien, successful, really high, healthy, powerful, becoming a creative force. Using the etymology of moral terms, Nietzsche proves that the concept of good in aristocratic morality goes back to the concept of "noble", "noble" (how noble and noble perceived themselves and their deeds as "good"), and the concept of bad - to the low, plebeian in the class sense . Nietzsche connects the emergence of morality of the second type with the "revolt of the slaves in morality" and the "revaluation of values" they produced. Own impotence was reinterpreted as “kindness”, cowardly meanness as “humility”, submission to those who are hated as “obedience”, inability to stand up for oneself as unwillingness to take revenge or forgiveness, etc. Ever since the morality of the common man, inherited by Christianity, won out, the frail, "incurably mediocre" man imagined himself to be the goal and meaning of history. Centuries of Christian culture have given rise to a new breed of people with a slavish type of consciousness, submissive to fate, hypocritical, incapable of social initiative. The morality of masters is fundamentally different from the morality of slaves: the former are the creators of genuine values, the latter are opportunists who pervert these values, asserting themselves through the denial of everything healthy and active. Therefore, Nietzsche clarifies, the "good" noble is by no means identical to the "good" plebeian. Romanticizing heroic, chivalrous-aristocratic morality and defending the individual's right to independence and individuality, Nietzsche rejects the obligatory principles and rules raised above man, paralyzing the creative activity of the noble.

In section II "To g.m." we are talking on the role of evil in the history of morality. Nietzsche shows that the fundamental concepts of moral consciousness - "responsibility", "conscience", "duty", "justice", "guilt", "good" and "evil" - are the products of a historically long process of humanizing a person. According to J. Habermas, Nietzsche demonstrated the bankruptcy of the “philosophy of subjectivity”, attempts to find the foundations of moral duty in the psycho-biological structures of the subject. Suffering fulfill different function in the socialization of a person: they can be a tool for the formation of a responsible, independent, even generous person, and they can also be a tool for suppressing independence and cultivating servility. The more a person became humanized, the more subtle and spiritualized the tools of socialization became: education through art, tragedy is, according to Nietzsche, essentially the same method of influencing a person by causing him pain. The suffering sanctioned by Christianity is another matter. Christian morality, calling for compassion for all insignificance and impotence only because they are weak, thereby legitimizes and sanctifies physical squalor, slavish psychology and incapacity in a person.

In section III, Nietzsche analyzes the functions of the Christian moral ideal and puts forward arguments against faith in God and science, since both are equally rooted in the soil of the unfree spirit, the unfounded absoluteness of truth. Nietzsche puts forward the ideal of a free person who spontaneously manifests his essence and is not programmed for any goal external to him. For such a person, the ascetic ideal is just a condition creative activity rather than a goal in itself. The Christian ascetic ideal is a manifestation of ressentiment and the will to power, which one would like to dominate not over anything in life, but over life itself: by giving meaning to suffering, the ascetic ideal supports degenerating life. Christian ideology as a whole is based on moralizing and manipulating consciousness. Rejecting Christian morality, Nietzsche puts forward the ideal of the superman as a guideline and prefers a new, future morality. Creativity that was before hallmark God is now embodied in human activity. Assessing the place of Nietzsche in Western philosophy in European Nihilism, M. Heidegger credits him with turning to value thinking; Thanks to Nietzsche, the problematic of values ​​becomes decisive in philosophy. According to many (K. Jaspers, P. Ricoeur, R. Rorty, J. Deleuze, G. G. Gadamer), Nietzsche, along with S. Kierkegaard, K. Marx and Z. Freud, determined the face of modern philosophy. Nietzsche's genealogical method, with its focus on depersonalized objectivism and the exposure of discourse, was adopted by M. Foucault, who for a certain time even identified his "archaeological" method with it. Nietzsche's ideas, set forth in K.M., were developed in the philosophy of life, psychoanalysis, phenomenology, existentialism, and other areas of philosophy.

See Resentment, "Resentment in the Structure of Morals."

Lit.: Nietzsche F. Zur Genealogie der Moral. Leipzig: Hrsg. von C. G. Naumann, 1887; Nietzsche F. To the genealogy of morality (Translated by K.A. Svasyan) // Nietzsche F. Works. in 2 vols. T. 2. M.: Thought, 1990; Huseynov AL. Philosophy as Ethics (An Experience of Nietzsche's Interpretation) // F. Nietzsche and Philosophy in Russia. St. Petersburg: Russian Christian Humanitarian Institute, 1999; Deleuze J. Nietzsche. St. Petersburg: AKHYUMA, 1997; Kuzmina T.A. Is it possible to "overcome a person"? // Kuzmina T.A. The problem of the subject in modern bourgeois philosophy. Moscow: Nauka, 1979; Motroshilova I.V. "Beyond Good and Evil" as a "philosophical drama" // F. Nietzsche and philosophy in Russia. St. Petersburg: Russian Christian Humanitarian Institute, 1999; Rorty R. Randomness, irony and solidarity. M .: Russian Phenomenological Society, 1996; Svasyan K. A. Friedrich Nietzsche: a martyr of knowledge // Nietzsche F. Works in 2 vols. Vol. 1. M.: Thought, 1990; Trubetskoy E./!. Philosophy of Nietzsche (critical essay) // Friedrich Nietzsche and Russian Religious Philosophy: Translations, Studies, Essays of Philosophers of the “Silver Age”: In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Minsk, M.: Alcyone, Pristsels, 1996, Heidegger M. “Nietzsche’s words “God is dead” // Voprosy filos ., 1990. No. 7; Jaspers K. Nietzsche and Christianity. M.: Medium, 1994; Deleuie G. Nietzsche et la philosophic. Paris: Presses univ. de Franse, 1962; Fink E. Nietzsches Philosophic. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960 Kaufmann W.A. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1950.

T.N. Porokhovskaya

Nihilism (< лат. nihil — ничто) — в широком смысле — отрицание всего культурного наследия прошлого, а также принятых в обществе норм, идеалов, традиций, ценностей. Как философская позиция Н. имеет много разновидностей и оттенков, но их общая черта — преобладание критического деструктивного пафоса над положительным идейным содержанием. Наиболее точную формулировку Н. дает Ф.Ницше: «Высшие ценности теряют свою ценность». В истории философии впервые этот термин применяет Августин, называя нигилистом неверующего человека, т.е. обращенного душой не к Божеству, а к окружающему миру, к-рый без Бога есть ничто. Понимание Н. как неверия закрепилось не только в богословии, но и в светской мысли. В таком значении этот термин употребляли С.Кьеркегор, И.А.Ильин и др.

It is possible to single out the main types of N. 1) Metaphysical N., which consists in the denial of reality outside world, its ontological basis. It was characteristic of Buddhism, which considers the world to be illusory (“Maya”), for Heraclitus and the Sophists, who pointed to the constant variability of reality. In modern times, the features of metaphysical N. are clearly expressed in the voluntarism of romanticism, in A. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, N. Hartmann, who considered the irrational will to be the basis of everything that exists. 2) Gnoseological N. as a synonym for skepticism and agnosticism. For the first time in this sense, the term appears in F. G. Jacobi in 1799. Criticizing the philosophy of I. Kant, he noticed that the knowledge of only the phenomena of consciousness, and not the real world, is the knowledge of nothing, i.e. N. In the philosophy of positivism, as well as in J. Dewey and B. Russell, N. is called the denial of the reliability of logical relations and scientific knowledge. 3) Social N., which is an expanded understanding of anarchism - the denial of not only state institutes, but also any form of social organization (communities, churches, etc.). Especially clearly social N. can be traced in the philosophy of Nietzsche and M. Stirner. 4) Ethical N., denying established moral norms and values. The moment of N., as a criticism of previous and modern teachings about morality, is contained in any moral philosophy. For example, Aristotle criticizes the intellectualism of Socrates, Kant criticizes the ethics of inclinations. Radical N. should be distinguished as a denial of the norms and ideals themselves from moderate N. - an attempt to deprive the value of its sacred divine sanction and re-justify it either as a derivative of the laws of nature, or as an establishment of the human mind. This process Nietzsche calls "depreciation", and M. Weber - rationalization.

In its pure form, radical N. as a perfect amoralism did not exist in ethics, otherwise it would not be worth talking about ethics in general. Some of its features are found in the early Christian apologists (Tertullian, Tatian, Athenagoras), who sharply criticized antiquity for its pride, in the works of vulgar materialists, who mocked any spiritual impulses of man, in Marxism, Nietzsche, as well as in modern atheistic teachings, hostile or ironically related to Christian morality. But this kind of N. can be called immoralism: the negation existing form morality and generally accepted moral values ​​for the sake of asserting others - higher ones. On the contrary, moderate N. meets very often. Moreover, Nietzsche, who gave the most accurate analysis of this phenomenon, argued that the entire history of thought is N.: the depreciation of some values ​​and the positing of others, doomed to fall in advance. So, although there is an organic connection between antiquity and the Middle Ages, the main ancient virtues (wisdom, courage, moderation, justice) are replaced by others - faith, hope, love. It cannot be said that the Renaissance completely rejected the Christian worldview, but the revival of antiquity leads to a reassessment of values. From now on, it is not God that stands in the center of attention of artists, poets and philosophers, but man in the Universe; Christian asceticism is gradually replaced by hopes for earthly happiness. New time developed the Greek. rationality to the limit: there are no more inaccessible depths for the mind; man no longer wants to rely on God's will, he wants to settle down at his own discretion. Christian humility is rejected, self-confidence is extolled, faith is changing: now they believe not in a suffering God, but in a God-scientist who created the world and no longer interferes in history. The moral ideal also gradually changes: from the ancient sage to the Christian saint, then to the Renaissance scholar-encyclopedist and, finally, to the citizen of the New Age. The ideal becomes worldly, becomes publicly available; its nihilistic component, expressed in the denial of previous values, surpasses the positive content. However, the cult of reason, which finds its culmination in the panlogism of G.W.F. Pessimism becomes the ground for N.: since life is meaningless, then one should not look for ideals in it, since the world is changing, then there is nothing unshakable in it. Nietzsche, who wrote an essay on European N., understands it as "the belief in the absolute inconsistency of the world in relation to the highest of the recognized values." Moreover, N. became possible only thanks to the dominance of Christian values. The too high moral ideal of Christianity, which has developed a sense of truthfulness in people, is unattainable. There is disappointment and understanding that life is richer than traditional values. All higher ideals are depreciated, and the fall in morality is of decisive importance. Nietzsche distinguishes between active N. - "violence aimed at destruction" and passive - doubt, disbelief, fatigue. However, having abandoned God, a person does not abandon the Christian view of the world and continues to seek in it the highest good, truth, justice, substantiating them with the dictates of conscience, reason, social contract, etc. But these values ​​are also nihilistic: they affirm what is not really there, for the world is not an ordered whole, but a constantly changing stream, a collection of actors eternally fighting among themselves, fighting with each other wills to power. Nietzsche believes that N. is a "pathological, intermediate state." He will be defeated when the realization comes that the world is not being, but pure becoming. Then the Christian worldview will be replaced by another - vital, creative, the features of which in the works of Nietzsche are not entirely clear.

Nietzsche's analysis of N. caused different assessments of this phenomenon among his commentators. For O. Spengler, H. Ortega y Gasset, M. Heidegger, N. is a destructive process that rejects sacred things and leads humanity to a weakening of the spirit, to thoughtlessness, to the degeneration of culture. On the contrary, for existentialists (A. Camus, J.P. Sartre) N. is a positive phenomenon, because, crushing all "metaphysical assumptions", he gives a person true freedom. Nihilistic motives are strong in the modern philosophy of postmodernism (J. Derrida, J. Bataille, J. Deleuze and others), calling for a “deconstruction” of basic metaphysical concepts in order to free the mind from their dictate and move on to a free interpretation of phenomena.

In Russia, the term "N." was used to characterize the various directions of the revolutionary-democratic movement of the second. floor. 19th century, who denied the fundamental foundations of Russian. life and professed atheism and materialism. The following motto was attributed to them: "Do not take anything seriously, but only swear." This word became widespread after the publication in 1862 by I.S. Turgenev of the novel “Fathers and Sons”, where a collective image of the nihilist Bazarov is given. But for the first time this term was introduced into literary use by the critic N.I. Nadezhdin. In the article “Crowd of Nihilists” (j. “Teleskop”, 1835) he called so ... A.S. Pushkin for romantic motives in “Poltava” and “Count Nulin”.

The main spokesmen for the views of the revolutionary youth were N.G. Chernyshevsky, N.A. Dobrolyubov, D.I. Pisarev, M.A. Antonovich and others. metaphysical forces, professing mechanism. They explained the origin of moral virtues by the "natural needs" of man, given by nature, they saw the essence of moral ideals in people's dreams of a just society. Nihilists rejected the free will of man, considering his actions to be determined in two ways: both by nature and by the social environment. By correcting human and social vices, they considered changing the conditions of life through a revolution - a violent change in the existing system. Their ideal was the building of a socialist society, but its features are indicated by them too vaguely: they criticized all existing socialist teachings. The nihilists considered the purpose of man to be selfless service to his neighbors, to free them from "mental servility." In the field of moral reflections, they adhered to one of the types of utilitarianism - the theory of rational egoism, according to which the private interest of the individual must be subordinated to the interests of society, and the happiness of one is possible subject to the achievement of universal happiness. Their hero is a “new man” (“bright person”), having specific knowledge of the natural sciences, helps people, does not shy away from the hardest work. At the same time, its main goal is to conduct educational work, destroy established dogmas, and bring about a revolution.

The views of Chernyshevsky, Pisarev, and other revolutionary democrats were much deeper than the worldly N. of radical youth. No wonder Antonovich considered Turgenev's image of Bazarov offensive to the democratic movement. Representatives of the Russian Religious philosophy criticized nihilists for atheism and the denial of popular shrines, for simplifying the individual and revolutionary maximalism. N.N. Strakhov and F.M. Dostoevsky pointed to their separation from their native soil, to the infection of their minds with second-rate philosophical ideas of the West and argued that, rejecting their culture, they are doomed to misunderstanding. At the same time, as the authors of "Milestones" noted, the worldview of nihilists is based on a pure religious desire for the highest good and justice.

Nihilistic features are found in the work of Russian. religious philosophers - K.N. Leontiev (in criticism of modern liberal trends and forms of secular culture), N.A. Berdyaev (in his sharp remarks about “official Orthodoxy”), L. Shestov (in rejection of rationalist philosophy).

Lit .: Davydov Yu.N. Aesthetics of nihilism. M.: Art, 1975; Nietzsche F. Will to power. Moscow: Zhanna, 1994; Heidegger M. European nihilism//Heidegger M. Time and Being. M.: Respublika, 1993.

A.A. Skvortsov

In the conservative journalism of Russia since the 60s. 19th century the content of the concept of N. is reduced to a radical denial of cultural values. The whole system of public and state life, religious beliefs and church hierarchy, moral values ​​of the "old world" and its family traditions and customs, science of the old model - all these in-you were rejected as soulless authorities that impede the "free development of the individual." At the basis of the nihilists' pseudo-worldview lies the belief in the only reality of the animal in man, a kind of physiological materialism; every man, as a natural organism, satisfies his needs more or less completely; and only depending on this can he be "kind" and "honest", while he cannot be so at all, contrary to his own interests and needs. Therefore, the dispute about the good or evil nature of man beyond these limits of physiological mechanics does not make sense; a person is neither good nor evil, he is selfish; duty, regardless of inclination, is therefore an idealistic fiction for the nihilist. It is opposed by the morality of pragmatism and utilitarianism in the social, hedonism - in a personal sense: "good is a pleasant feeling", good is "benefit, evil is a loss" (Pisarev); fulfilling the requirements of duty “in vain dishonors his existence” (Dobrolyubov). Within the framework of this hedonism, only a technical or physiological meaning is recognized for the improvement of beings.

The morality of respect was perceived as a bourgeois prejudice, and, in particular, respect for someone else's property and life could now be based only on the calculation of a self-preserving egoist, on fear of state sanctions; but from here there was one step to the actual denial of the crime: “Nothing but personal taste prevents smart people from killing and robbing” (Pisarev); if a person's actions are determined by the necessary pressure of the social environment or his own organism, then guilt, responsibility, criminality of will are just as exactly subject to "honest" denial. The absence of morally understood guilt makes the trial of the criminal absurd. Criminal punishment could now be understood solely as the instinctive self-defense of the state machine from persons disadvantageous to it. By denying the spiritual freedom of the individual, the very existence of civic obligations. The ideal of the nihilist himself is the self-development of humanity without limits, the self-determination of the individual, the autonomy of the citizen, not suppressed by serving the "ideal", "ideology"; a community of egoists and, accordingly, the state as a rational egoist, self-organization of the public from below (therefore, cultural N. naturally turns out to be an ally, above all, of social anarchism). Radical cultural N. is also radical social and political democracy; it opposes any authoritative authority; traditional state it seems to him that “reasonable progress” is restraining already by the mere fact that it is traditional. Therefore, democracy became permanently revolutionary; breaking and revolution were presented as a way of existence of a society that constantly resisted its formation into a state. Any new order self-organization can be revised, and for this alone must be revised by deed; such is the consistent conviction of N., who does not recognize the objective value of any form of public in-comrade. With a less consistent version of N., from the injustice of in-that private property, a conclusion was made about the fairness of common ownership, and therefore all public structures were charged with the task of taking care of organizing joint ownership and educating the solidarity of citizens; or a reasonable egoist was recognized as the ideal of man, and therefore the task of the public was to take care of such an egoist and educate his replacement. This "nihilism of one reservation" naturally denied in itself the nihilistic cultural leaven, preferring to be called something else.

The institute of the family was rejected as a "dark kingdom" that oppresses and disfigures women with its laws, so that they no longer dare to be selfish hedonists, and "except for marital happiness, they do not produce anything" (Pisarev). It was also natural: consistent hedonism is incompatible with the recognition of any kind of stable moral unions; the introduction of reservations into the doctrine led to the approval of the “new” family as a purely legal institution of private ownership and inheritance (in the liberal version) or as a moral union free from legal norms in the sense of “new morality” (in the communitarian version), and in any case - to the decomposition of the "old" family morality. Religiosity, previously parodied in a language accessible to the pragmatist, was ridiculed and rejected: “do not expect from above either a reward for good or a punishment for evil.” N.'s paradox consisted in the fact that the comprehensive denial of social in-ts and values ​​of the "old" model, the entire social system as "abnormal", moral culture and duties as an ascetic self-deprecation of the individual was directed by a semi-conscious affirmation of a normal, "new", free person, and with him - the new public. The "new" person, according to N.'s logic, a destroyer and a rebel, became a preacher of the public "truth" (which the swarm should not have known according to the initial setting), a healer and corrector of the public from the "ulcers" of the "old world". The denial of the "old" science (mainly the humanitarian idealism of this science) was driven by the affirmation of the "new", predominantly natural-technical science. N., initially incapable of having any positive doctrine of value, developed its own hierarchy of moral and cultural values, modest in appearance, but convincing in its social consequences. The nihilist became a moralist.

Lit .: De-Poulet M.F. Nihilism as a pathological phenomenon of Russian life // Rossiyskiy Vestnik. 1881. No. 11; Sokolov N.M. Dogmas of Russian nihilism // Ibid. 1905. No. 1; Zion M.F. Nihilists and Nihilism // Ibid. 1886. No. 6; Shchebalsky P.K. Nihilism in history // Ibid. 1869. No. 4; Shcherban N. Political depravity. "Narodnaya Volya" and "People's Volunteers" (Analysis Experience) // Ibid. 1887. No. 8.

A. K. Sudakov

« On the other side of good and evil” (“Jenseits von Gut und Bose”) is a work by F. Nietzsche, completed and published in 1886. It is written in the classic Nietzsche style of aphorism, i.e. it is divided into short fragments, complete in meaning, interconnected by a common theme and only one author can understand the logic. There are 296 such aphorisms in the book, plus the preface and closing song; they are distributed in nine sections, the most important of which for ethics are the fifth (“On the natural history of morals”), the seventh (“Our virtues”) and the ninth (“What is aristocratic?”). For the first time in Russian lang. The book appeared in 1905 in trans. N. Polilova and then repeatedly reprinted.

After the first, romantic, period of creativity (1867-1876), the moral problem in Nietzsche's philosophy becomes the main one. Although in “According to i.e. ...” there are reflections on a variety of philosophical topics, the main problem of the book is the question of the origin of modern European morality. It contains all the key concepts and the almost complete moral philosophy of the author.

The predominant motif of the work is Nietzsche's anxiety for "the degeneration and reduction of man to a perfect herd animal", into which the contemporary European has become. The blame for this lies with the prevailing morality, which has Christian roots. The author wants to “for the first time” consider morality not as something wholly positive, but to subject it to critical examination from a different, non-moral perspective, thereby finding himself “beyond” good and evil. The author himself calls this position “immoralism”. Nietzsche understands morality as "a system of values ​​rooted in the living conditions of a being." He rebels against the dominance of Christian norms, noting that “the requirement of one morality for all is harmful precisely higher people". Meanwhile, Christian morality, despite the assertion of its apologists, is not the only one. Nietzsche identifies two moralities: masters and slaves. They are inherent in any culture and era, and even coexist in the soul of a particular person, where "creature and creator are united." Both moralities originated in primitive communities. The Lord's became an expression of will strong people command and create values; its main features are a bright individuality, selfishness, courage, pride. Slave - a manifestation of the instinct of submission of the passive majority to the power of tyrants; its characteristics: impotent envy of the masters, the desire to equalize all members of the team, the desire for a quiet life. An increase in the number of slaves leads to an increase in their power and a "revolt in morality." Wishing to "revenge" the masters, they condemned aristocratic morality and glorified the following virtues: "public spirit, benevolence, reverence, diligence, moderation, modesty, compassion." The first "revolt of the slaves in morality" historically corresponds to the assertion of Christianity, the last - Fr. revolution. From now on, according to Nietzsche, all individualistic character traits are cursed, the “herd instinct” is glorified. This led to the gradual withering away of aristocratic virtues, the humiliation of a person, his imprisonment in the “herd”. Nietzsche rejects the basic Christian virtues, considering them "tyranny in relation to nature", the main driving force of which is the will to power: the desire of any natural figure to assert himself and expand his sphere of influence. Compassion is harmful because it wants to destroy suffering, while overcoming suffering hardens the will of the individual. Love for one's neighbor makes a person be distracted by other people, while selfishness - "a property of a noble soul" - contributes to the concentration of internal forces. Rejecting Christian morality, Nietzsche argues that "other ... higher moralities" are possible, going back to the ancient mastery, characteristic of Homeric Greece. To do this, it is necessary to make a “revaluation of values”, to which only “people of fate” dare, one of whom was Napoleon. However, Nietzsche indicates the features of "higher morality" in a very vague way; "the best we have remains unknown." In its most complete form, Nietzsche's philosophy of morality is set forth in the work "On the Genealogy of Morals".

Lit .: Nietzsche F. Beyond Good and Evil. Op. in 2 vols. T. 2. M.: Thought, 1990; Deleuze, Nietzsche. St. Petersburg: AKHYUMA, 1997; Fullier A. Nietzsche and immoralism. St. Petersburg: Public benefit, 1905; Shestov L. Good in the teachings of gr. Tolstoy and F. Nitshe // Shestov L. Izbr. op. Moscow: Pravda, 1993; Jaspers K. Nietzsche and Christianity. M.: Medium, 1994.

A.A. Skvortsov

Resentment(French ressentiment - rancor, malice) - the concept of the philosophy of F. Nietzsche, denoting the psychological basis, deeply hidden (including from the moralizing individual himself) the motive of morality. Nietzsche saw in morality the spiritual degeneration of European man, his illness, and considered R. as the cause, a kind of virus of this illness. R. is a phenomenon first discovered by Nietzsche, to designate to-rogo he, not finding a suitable lexical unit in it. lang., used fr. in a word, giving it a strict terminological meaning.

R. occupies a central place in Nietzsche's genealogy of morality. The latter acts as a socio- and psychoanalysis of morality. The socioanalysis of morality resulted primarily in the categories of "morality of slaves" and "morality of masters", and the psychoanalysis of morality - in the category of "R.". R.'s structure is made up of the actual history of self-poisoning of the soul, which resulted in moral Tartuffeism, morality as Tartuffeism. Nietzsche reconstructs this process, distinguishing the following four stages in it: a) the initial emotions are anger, shame, caused by the humiliation of a person’s dignity, moreover, not by accidental or erroneous humiliation, but by regular ones, arising from his real, constantly reproducing disposition in relation to the offender; we are talking about the humiliation of the dignity of someone who is actually humiliated, and therefore it looks in relation to him more like a factual statement than an undeserved assessment; b) recollection and re-experiencing of these emotions, their transformation into a desire for revenge, malicious hatred, intensified by jealousy for the offender, envy of his strength; c) a feeling of despair associated with the realization that revenge cannot be carried out, hatred cannot find an adequate outlet and hit the offender - after all, the insult inflicted by the latter is not his whim, evil will, it is a simple reflex, only reinforced; a person begins to vaguely understand that he is doomed to be offended, “worthy” of humiliation; d) anger, envy, despair, revenge, not being able to be realized in actions, get an ideal embodiment, everything turns upside down, and impotence becomes strength, defeat becomes victory, “ressentiment itself becomes creative and generates values” (To the genealogy of morality, 1.10 ). Unable to establish itself in life, in deeds, the offended soul rewards itself with imaginary revenge; it reverses the real scale of values ​​and declares the strong morally weak, who will certainly wait for his punishment, if not in this, then in the next world, and the weak - strong, the bearer of good, which will be rewarded. This is how the opposition of good and evil is constructed, which makes it possible to give a false outlet to a vengeful feeling, to turn anger inward, to give the appearance of effectiveness to impotent malice. Thus, R. is revenge without revenge, displaced by hatred, turned into envy, psychological self-poisoning. This is human humiliation, weakness, which pretends to be dignity and strength.

R. exists in two main historical forms: herd morality and the ascetic ideal. The herd morality is extraverted, it brings guilt outward, the ascetic ideal is introverted, it transfers guilt inward. The herd morality is a slavish morality, a kind of self-intoxication with one's own weakness; the ascetic ideal contains a semblance of power, for it is better to “want nothing than not want anything” (On the Genealogy of Morals, 111.28), but nevertheless it is a degenerate form of activity, it is a kind of path, which a person reversed, the desire to look "too good" for this world.

The most fertile ground for R. Nietzsche considered the democratic order of universal competition and equality. R. grows out of the dissonance between the internal claims of the individual and his real position in society, from the discrepancy between high self-esteem and inevitably low assessment from others. With the transition from the status regulation of the Middle Ages to the universal equality of the New Age, which, of course, could not cancel the real difference in abilities, as well as in the social status of individuals, this asymmetry between internal and external that feeds R. increases many times over. R. in these conditions becomes universal and more militant, turns into a triumph of mediocrity.

See Genealogies of Morals, Beyond Good and Evil, Resentment in the Structure of Morals.

Lit .: Nietzsche F. To the genealogy of morality // Nietzsche F. Works. in 2 vols. T. 2. M.: Thought, 1990; He is. Esce Homo (“why am I so wise”) // Ibid; Sheler M. Resentment in the structure of morals: St. Petersburg: Nauka; University Book, 1999; Scheler M. Vom Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen. Abhandlungen and Aufsatze. bd. 1. Leipzig, 1915.

A.A. Huseynov

« Resentment in the structure of morality"("Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen") - a work of the phenomenological period of M. Scheler's work, published in 1912 and standing on a par with the works "Shame and Shame", "Ordo Amoris" ("The Order of Love"), "Idols Self-Knowledge”, “Bourgeois”, etc., adjoining in terms of problems to his fundamental works - “Formalism in Ethics and the Material Ethics of Values” and “The Essence and Forms of Sympathy”. "R. in cm" consists of a Preliminary Remark and five chapters: I. On the Phenomenology and Sociology of Resentment; P. "Resentment and the moral judgment of value"; III. "Christian Morality and Resentment"; IV. "Resentment and modern philanthropy"; V. "Resentment and Other Value Shifts."

"R. in cm" is interdisciplinary; the study is carried out at the intersection of ethics, metaphysics, psychology, political economy, history, politics using the conceptual tools of phenomenology, psychoanalysis by Z. Freud, analytical-understanding and descriptive psychopathology of K. Jaspers, adapted and 1a W. Sombart of criticism of political economy of K. Marx, Christian ( Catholic) theology. The main stimulus for writing this work was Scheler's desire to illuminate in his own way the origins and mechanisms of the formation of bourgeois morality or bourgeois morality (Bourgeois), while starting from the brilliant philosophical, historical and sociocultural research of M. Weber, W. Dilthey, Sombart, E. Trölch . The ethical energy of the treatise, its unadvertised providentiality were determined by Scheler's determination to protect Christian, in particular Catholic, morality from the merciless denunciations and destructive criticism of F. Nietzsche, who gave the word "Ressentiment" a categorical status and conceptually unfolded it into the doctrine of " great importance" of the process of ressentiment for the "revaluation of values" that took place in modern times. exemplary descriptions and insightful analysis of ressentiment and ressentimental psychology Scheler found in Rus. literature, such writers as N.V. Gogol, F.M. Dostoevsky, L.N. Tolstoy and even P.A. Kropotkin.

The concept of "ressentiment" has been formed in the European artistic and philosophical tradition for a relatively long time, at least since M. Montaigne (Experiments, II, XXVII). But it was only thanks to Nietzsche that this concept received its modern sound, and the theme and problem of ressentiment moved forward into a number of cornerstone subjects of ethics and moral philosophy. According to Scheler, Nietzsche's discovery of ressentiment is the most profound of the new European discoveries regarding the origin of moral judgments. Sections 8, 10 and 14 of the first review are devoted to a systematic description of the phenomenon of ressentiment in Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals, where the main ideological motifs are introduced in symphonic consonance, which are thoroughly analyzed by Scheler. Scheler was not going to give a formally logically flawless definition of the term, he offers a concise essential characterization of the phenomenon. Resentment, according to Scheler, is mental self-poisoning, which has quite definite causes and consequences; it is a stable mental attitude resulting from a systematic delay in the discharge of certain mental movements and affects, which are in themselves normal and integral to human nature. It results in a stable attitude towards certain types of value manipulation (Werttäuschungen) and corresponding value judgments. These primarily include such spiritual movements and affects as the thirst for revenge, hatred, malice, envy, hostility based on envy and deceit.

According to Scheler, the most important starting point in the genesis of ressentiment is revenge, the motive and impulse of revenge as a kind of response to someone's (actually or imaginary) aggressive or offensive actions. Revenge, however, involves procrastination with a direct response to aggression or insult, postponing the reaction to a more "convenient" time and guessing a more "suitable" situation. The immediate reaction to aggression is also delayed by the fact that the one from whom the reaction is expected is aware that, having reacted immediately, he may lose to the offender; this is the reason for the feelings of "inability", "powerlessness": revenge is cherished by impotence, it is the lot and business of the "weak". If revenge (envy, malice) realizes itself, then it does not turn into ressentiment; on the contrary, as soon as such a realization does not occur, then directed revenge turns into scattered vindictiveness, which predisposes to ressentiment. When revenge turned into revenge, the latter is looking for any reasons for its manifestation. However, she is restrained by fear and the awareness of the avenger's own "weakness": vengefulness cools down, i.e. is forced out of consciousness, then the illusory satisfaction of the feeling of revenge in fantasies is forced out, then the very emotional excitement caused by the thirst for revenge. This creates adequate conditions for the formation of ressentiment. This is facilitated by the tendency towards ever greater cooling and displacement of the initial impulse of revenge, the establishment of a certain paradoxical parity, equality between the offender and the offended (namely, the progressive political and social differentiation society informs him of the most powerful charge of ressentiment), the perception by the offended of his insult as "the finger of fate." The more “fateful” the oppressed social oppression seems, the less forces are unleashed that can practically change this state: total criticism of everything that exists without any positive goals rules the show. Any real improvement in the situation in society only interferes with resentment criticism: its motto is "the worse, the better" or "a plague on both your houses."

Another starting point in the formation of ressentiment is the affective triad: envy, jealousy, obsession with rivalry. Envy stems from the feeling of impotence of the individual, which paralyzes his desire to get the thing he desires, due to the fact that another possesses it. The contradiction between this impotence and the desire to get a thing is discharged in acts of hatred or in a position of hatred in relation to the owner of the desired thing, which turns into the reason that the individual does not have this thing. Moreover, in the experience of hatred, the fact of possession of a thing by another looks like a “withdrawal” of this thing from a lustful and envious individual. Envy becomes full envy and the foot of ressentiment when the desired thing is absolutely unattainable. Envy, leading to the formation of the strongest ressentiment, is directed at the individual essence and being of another person, this is “existential envy”. Paths to ressentiment are also laid by the individual's comparison of his own value with the value of another: the active type of such a comparer is a careerist, a knight of competition. A passive, ressentimentary person gets rid of the feeling of his own inferiority, discharges internal tension by belittling the one with whom he compares himself, illusoryly devalues ​​his valuable qualities or shows a specific "blindness" to them.

The most important, successful move of a ressentimentary person is that he gets rid of an inferiority complex by juggling the values ​​themselves, in the presence and significance of which the objects of comparison can generally have a valuable character. Scheler leads a sharp debate with concepts (including those of B. Spinoza), which derive values ​​and anti-values ​​from “desire”, “lust”, and vice versa. These are ressentimental concepts. At the same time, Scheler emphasizes that the scale of genuine values ​​does not completely disappear from the consciousness of a person of ressentiment: they seem to be “overlapped” by ressentimental values, “shine through” through them. Further, the author considers people and situations, under which favorable conditions for the formation of ressentiment: this is a woman who is completely dependent on a man, incl. a prostitute; they are mutually dependent "fathers" and "children"; they are members of symbiotic families; these are idolizing the Middle Ages in reproach to the modernity of romance; these are disgraced politicians and retired officials. Unlike them, the criminal, as a rule, is not a person of ressentiment. But a renegade, a renegade, on the contrary, as a rule, is such.

Turning to the problem of the relationship between ressentiment and moral judgments of value, Scheler defends as a lemma the thesis that “in the world there is not one morality, but different moralities”; this thesis includes the proposition that the rules for preferring some values ​​to others are different. As a theorem, Scheler states the following: morality is a system of rules for the preference of values, which needs to be “discovered” behind the specific assessments of the era and the people as its “moral constitution”, undergoing a certain evolution. Morals are related to eternally significant ethics in the same way that cosmological systems, for example, Ptolemaic and Copernican, are related to the ideal system that astronomy seeks to recreate. The most important function of ressentiment is that it determines all morality, that the rules of preference underlying it are perverted, that what used to be "bad" seems "good". Although Scheler shared Nietzsche's belief that ressentiment had an amazing effect on the morality of the peoples of Europe, Christian ethics, he believed, did not fundamentally grow out of ressentiment. Another thing is bourgeois morality, which undoubtedly has its roots in ressentiment.

In accordance with these goals, Scheler analyzes the relationship between Christian morality and ressentiment. He, in essence, demarcates with the position of Nietzsche, who declared the idea of ​​Christian love to be the primrose of ressentiment. Among the ancients, the Greeks and Romans, love was understood as the desire of the “lower” for the “higher”, the “imperfect” for the “perfect”, etc. All love relationships between people fell apart into “loving” and “beloved”, and the beloved was always more noble and perfect, was a model for the being, will and activity of the lover. The Christian concept of love is directly opposite to the ancient one: in it, the noble rushes to the ignoble, the rich to the poor, the good to the bad, and moves without the ancient fear of losing, losing himself, his nobility. Changing the idea of ​​God and his fundamental relations with the world and man was the result of a change in the vector of love: the place of the eternal “prime mover” of the world was taken by the “creator”, who created it, the world, “out of love”. But ressentiment was not the driving force behind the change in the vector of love; secular altruism is a form of hatred rooted in ressentiment, envy of wealth, strength, vitality, happiness, the fullness of existence. From a similar position, Scheler criticizes modern philanthropy, philanthropy, and the ethics of the so-called. compassion.

In conclusion, Scheler consistently examines the ressentimental falsification of values ​​in other areas of bourgeois morality. In particular, he points out that individualistic-egoistic regulators of labor and private property undermine the Christian idea of ​​moral solidarity. It is replaced by the idea of ​​equality, in which Scheler sees one of the effects of ressentiment. One of the manifestations of ressentiment is the elevation of utility over the value of life.

The book has been reprinted several times. language separately and as part of Scheler's Collected Works, was translated into other European languages.

Lit .: Scheler M. Resentment in the structure of morals. St. Petersburg: Nauka; University Book, 1999; Frings M.S. Person and Dasein. Haag: Nijhoff, 1969; Jaspers K. Nietzsche. Berlin; Leipzig: de Gruyter, 1936; Klages L. Die psychologischen Errungenschaften Nietzsches. Bonn: Bouvier, 1958; Levy H.M. Scheler, seine Lehre vom Ressentiment // Der Morgen. 1929. No. 4; Montcheuil Y. de. Le "ressentiment" dans la vie morale et religeuse, d "apres Max Scheler// Montcheuil Y. De. Melange theologique. Paris: Aubier, 1951; Scheler M. Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1978; Scheler M. Ethik // Jahrbucher der Philosophie 1914. Jg II; Scheler M. Schriften aus dem Nachlass Bd. 1. Zur Ethik und Erkenntnistlehre Bern: Franke, 1957; Sombart W. Der Burgeois Zur Geistesgeschichte des modernen Wirtschaftsmenschen. Munchen; Leipzig: Dunker, 1923.